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This study concerns the nature and role of analyticity in the work of Immanuel Kant and 
Edmund Husserl. Its initial goal is that of clarifying the place of analytic judgment in 
Kant's critical project. Against the widely held assumption that analytic judgment has no 
role to play in the critical project, I show that analytic judgment has a precise and 
genuinely important role to play in the context of Kant's metaphysics. Analytic judgment 
has the role of clarifying our a priori conceptual repertoire and thus of making possible 
the synthetic a priori judgments that are properly constitutive of metaphysics. The next 
goal of the study is that of unifying and defending Kant's various characterizations of 
analytic judgment. Whereas a number of commentators have suggested that Kant is 
vague or ambivalent as regards the properties of analytic judgment, I show that we can 
extract a clear, consistent picture of analytic judgment from his work. The key to seeing 
this, I argue, is becoming clear on Kant's basic assumptions concerning concepts, logic, 
and propositional form. Subsequently, I turn to Husserl. Picking up on the fact that for 
Husserl, too, analyticity has metaphysical, or ontological significance, I spell out his 
conception of analyticity in detail. I show that analyticity for Husserl embraces two 
essentially symmetrical domains of law: the a priori laws of objective givenness and the a 
priori laws of propositional form. I then bring Husserl and Kant together. After showing 
that Husserl fails to capture the essence of Kant's theory of analytic judgment, and so 
fails to see exactly where he stands relative to Kant, I argue that what ultimately 
distinguishes Husserl from Kant is the claim that analytic truth is properly articulated in a 
purely formal context. I show that this departure from Kant has extremely significant 
consequences. For example, it enables Husserl to describe whole systems of judgment, 
such as mathematics or logic, as analytic; and it enables Husserl to defend the possibility 
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 1 
Introduction 
In the Introduction to the first edition of Critique of Pure Reason, Kant proposes an 
apparently exhaustive distinction between two different kinds of subject-predicate 
judgment. "In all judgments in which the relation of a subject to the predicate is thought", 
he explains, "this relation is possible in two ways". Either the predicate concept already 
belongs to the subject concept, "as something that is (covertly) contained in this concept", 
or the predicate concept "lies entirely outside" the subject concept. In the first case, we 
have what Kant calls an 'analytic' judgment; in the second case, we have a 'synthetic' 
judgment " (A7/B10).1 
 Why does Kant introduce this distinction? Is it merely a formal distinction for the 
sake of a formal distinction? On the contrary, the context in which Kant introduces this 
distinction makes it clear that he has something rather more ambitious in mind. What 
Kant wants to do, it seems, is to illuminate the nature of scientific inquiry. By developing 
a language in which to characterize the kinds of judgments that this or that science 
generates, Kant hopes to shed light on the sciences themselves.  
 Mathematics offers a good example of what Kant has in mind here. Just a few 
lines after he first introduces the analytic-synthetic distinction, Kant takes up the 
judgment 7 + 5 = 12. He notes that while this judgment might look initially like an 
                                                
1 References to the Critique of Pure Reason will be given, as above, as parenthetical 
citations specifying the edition(s) of the first Critique to which I am referring and the 
page number on which the passage in question appears. The page numbers are taken from 
the Academy edition of Kant's works. (The A-edition of the Critique of Pure Reason is 
the third volume in the Academy edition; the B-edition of the Critique of Pure Reason is 
the fourth volume). References to other works by Kant will be given as parenthetical 
citations listing the volume and page number from the Academy edition. All quotations 
of Kant in English are taken from the Cambridge Edition of the Works of Immanuel Kant 
(Cambridge University Press).  
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analytic judgment, because it might look as if the concept of the number 12 is contained 
in the concept of the sum of 7 and 5, this appearance is deceptive. In reality, Kant 
suggests, the judgment is synthetic in nature: when we reflect on the concept of 7 + 5, we 
find that the concept 12 is actually not contained in the former after all. This makes 
possible an important conclusion about mathematics in general: although the judgments 
of mathematics are manifestly a priori, in the sense that they hold with absolute necessity 
and can be known without recourse to experience, they do not owe their apriority to their 
formal, propositional structure. This in turn makes possible an important task for the 
philosopher of mathematics—that of unearthing the extra-conceptual principle on which 
the apriority of mathematical judgments actually rests. Given that 7 + 5 = 12 is not 
simply a statement of identity, how can we explain the fact that this judgment admits of 
no counter-example and can be grasped independently of experience? 
 The case of natural science is similar. Although we might think that judgments 
like "matter persists" are analytic, because we might think that what distinguishes matter 
as such is the fact that it survives the deformation and reformation to which it is subject, 
reflection on what we actually think in the concept matter suggests that this is not the 
case. According to Kant, what we actually think in the concept matter is "only its 
presence in space through the filling of space" (B18). The understanding that matter 
endures across changes in its sensible properties reflects a logically subsequent judgment, 
a judgment that is synthetic in the sense that it draws together essentially distinct 
concepts. How, therefore, are we to explain the apparent necessity of this judgment? 
Again, since we cannot appeal to propositional form or to conceptual content, we are 
obliged to seek out a "completely different principle". Supposing that we can identity 
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such a principle, according to Kant, then it will be possible to give a meaningful account 
of natural scientific judgments like "matter persists". 
 The case of metaphysics is slightly different. As Kant explains in the Preface to 
the second edition of the first Critique, he is less concerned to understand how 
metaphysics actually works than to reform it. Since metaphysics has hitherto been "a 
mere groping, and what is the worst, a groping amount mere concepts", it is necessary to 
set metaphysics on a more fruitful, progressive path. Having just learned something about 
successful sciences such as mathematics and natural science, it is possible to see what 
this will entail. Rather than remaining at the level of conceptual analysis, metaphysics 
should pursue conceptual synthesis. Like mathematics and natural science, metaphysics 
should seek out the principle that will enable it to grasp the a priori relations between 
essentially distinct concepts.  
 What, therefore, can we conclude regarding scientific inquiry? On the one hand, it 
looks as though the sciences that Kant is concerned with are strongly oriented toward the 
production of synthetic judgments. Conversely, it looks as if analytic judgment plays no 
real role in scientific inquiry. In each case, the idea of analytic judgment seems to be 
introduced in a purely negative sense—as way of clarifying what successful sciences are 
not, or should not, be engaged in.  
 This, perhaps, is one way of understanding a widespread tendency, that of 
illustrating Kant's theory of analytic judgment by means of the judgment "all bachelors 
are unmarried men". Perhaps since Kant does not give analytic judgment anything to do, 
epistemologically speaking, it is appropriate to exemplify analytic judgment by means of 
a judgment that does very little.  
 4 
 In some ways, the point of departure for the first part of this study is simply the 
following question: to what extent does this universally adopted example capture what 
Kant has in mind when he talks about analytic judgment? What I hope to show, 
ultimately, is that this example is deeply misleading as a way of representing Kant's 
theory of analytic judgment. Whereas this example suggests that analytic judgment is a 
matter of making explicit the significations that attach to everyday terms, what I will 
show is that analytic judgment, for Kant, is a way of making explicit the content of our a 
priori conceptual repertoire. Rather than a formula for the production of verbal truisms, 
analytic judgment represents the initial stage of metaphysical inquiry.  
 This calls for some explanation. Above, I indicated that Kant wants to turn 
metaphysics away from conceptual analysis; just a moment ago, however, I suggested 
that Kant sees a role for conceptual analysis in metaphysics after all. The key to resolving 
this apparent contradiction is to see that Kant is not recommending the analysis of just 
any arbitrarily summoned concept: he is recommending the analysis of those concepts 
that are involved in the cognition of appearances. The problem with metaphysics hitherto, 
Kant thinks, is that it has been oblivious to this restriction, and so has sought to generate 
truths on the basis of concepts having no role in the cognition of appearances, concepts 
like God, or world. What metaphysics should do, he thinks, is to interrogate those a priori 
concepts that are implicated in our sensible experience—first by analyzing those 
concepts, and then by explaining how those concepts come to be augmented synthetically 
in the context of experience.   
 Of course, this does not yet tell us that analytic judgment is oriented exclusively 
toward metaphysics. On the contrary, we have several good reasons for thinking that this 
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is not the case. First, nothing in the definition of analytic judgment that I cited above 
suggests such a restriction; second, several of Kant's own examples of analytic judgment, 
like 'gold is yellow metal', are clearly not metaphysical judgments.  
 Both points are well taken: although Kant does nothing to encourage the view that 
analytic judgment is a matter of unpacking mundane verbal meanings, he also does very 
little to suggest that analytic judgment is a matter of unpacking a priori metaphysical 
concepts. There are, however, two reasons for thinking that analytic judgment is oriented 
principally towards its employment in the context of metaphysics. First, as Kant himself 
more or less says, analytic judgment is only epistemically valuable in the context of 
metaphysics. To the extent that analytic judgment is possible in the context of 
mathematics or natural science, it is epistemically redundant: it amounts to the mere 
recapitulation of antecedently adopted definitions. Second, and most importantly, analytic 
judgment can only be successfully defended in the context of metaphysics. Given Kant's 
view that an analytic judgment is an absolutely a priori truth, meaning a judgment that 
holds necessarily and universally of some particular class of objects or events, what we 
will find is that an analytic judgment can only be a judgment having a metaphysical 
concept like substance or cause in its subject position.  
  Establishing this result will occupy our attention for the first four chapters of this 
study. In Chapter Five, we will turn to one of Kant's most important successors, Edmund 
Husserl, and explore the notion of analyticity that he develops in works spanning the first 
three decades of the twentieth century. Why Husserl? Why not one of the many other 
philosophers who take up the idea of analytic judgment in Kant's wake? The answer is 
that Husserl is unique in recognizing the genuinely metaphysical import of analytic 
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judgment. Husserl follows Bolzano and Frege in emphasizing, against Kant, that 
analyticity is function of logical or propositional form; but Husserl distinguishes himself 
from these thinkers in maintaining that analyticity also has a genuinely metaphysical, or 
ontological dimension. What Husserl calls an analytic law is a law that holds 
unconditionally and universally of all objects whatsoever.  
  What does Husserl contribute to the development of the Kantian idea of 
analyticity? On the one hand, he contributes a clearer and more explicit picture of 
analyticity than Kant himself does: as I have already suggested, Kant is vague as regards 
the overall methodological significance of analytic judgment. On the other hand, and 
much more significantly, Husserl succeeds in broadening the scope of the analytic, and to 
do so without departing from the spirit of Kant's doctrine. This second point requires 
some explanation.   
 For Kant, an analytic judgment captures the strictly logical element in our a priori 
cognition of objects. Whereas a synthetic a priori judgment like 'all events have causes' 
tells us something about the material reality of objects, an analytic judgment like 'a cause 
is something that allows an inference to something else' tells us just what is logically 
implicit in the experience of causation, namely, a necessary relation between two things. 
Husserl, for his part, agrees with this basic representation of analyticity: he thinks that 
analytic laws capture the logical, or 'categorial', formation to which objects are subject. 
What Husserl contributes is a more far-reaching understanding of categorial formation. 
For Husserl, categorial formation does not extend just to objects of experience; it extends 
as far as the 'manifolds' that are the objective correlates of deductive theories. Thus, it 
extends as far as the objective correlate to Euclidean geometry, and the objective 
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correlate of Newtonian physics. This in turn means that analytic law extends further than 
the laws that govern the objects of experience; it encompasses the laws that govern highly 
complex, relationally ordered manifolds. From Husserl's perspective, there is no 
qualitative difference between these laws and the strictly formal laws that we bring to 
bear directly on experience. Both sets of laws bear on objects independently of their 
material specificity; hence, both sets of laws are analytic.  
 The plan going forward is as follows. I begin, in Chapter One, by considering 
three of Kant's important predecessors, Locke, Leibniz, and Hume. I note that while all 
three come to something like the analytic-synthetic distinction, none of them give 
analytic judgment any real work to do relative to synthetic judgment. In other words, 
none of them think that identical, or tautological judgments have any role to play in the 
progression of knowledge. This, I suggest, stands in contrast to Kant. I suggest that 
despite initial appearances to the contrary, analytic judgment for Kant is not simply a foil 
for the idea of synthetic a priori judgment. Rather, analytic judgment performs an 
important methodological role relative to synthetic a priori judgment. It allows us to 
justify the syntheticity of synthetic a priori judgments; and more importantly, it puts us in 
a position to formulate synthetic a priori judgments. Once we have clarified the content 
of this or that a priori concept analytically, Kant explains, it becomes possible to explain 
how the concept in question is realized in the context of spatio-temporal experience.  
 In Chapter Two, I try to develop a picture of what an analytic judgment actually 
looks like. This means working through Kant's notoriously varied definitions of analytic 
judgment, including the 'containment' definition cited above; and it means working 
through the various formal, modal, epistemic, and semantic properties that Kant attributes 
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to analytic judgment. In the second half of the chapter, I catalogue the many possible 
objections that arise from this picture of analytic judgment, for instance, the charge the 
idea of 'containment' lacks any clear, non-metaphorical meaning.  
 In Chapter Three, I temporarily set aside these concerns in order to demonstrate 
several crucially important facts about Kant concepts. I show that concepts, for Kant, are 
not simply arbitrarily constructed bundles of meaning, but representations that bear a 
precisely specifiable relation to a corresponding object. Most importantly, I show that in 
the case of the pure concepts of the understanding, this relation is secured a priori.  
 Chapter Four takes up the narrower problems canvassed in Chapter Two, namely, 
the problems that bear on Kant's specific formulation of analytic judgment. What I try to 
show is that these problems can largely be resolved, and that the key to resolving them 
lies in the understanding of concepts developed in Chapter Three. For example, by 
emphasizing that a concept embodies all and only the essential features of the 
corresponding object, it becomes possible to explain why explicitly identical judgments 
like 'gold is gold' do not count as analytic from a Kantian standpoint, namely, because 
objects are not features of themselves: gold is distinguished by its yellowness; it is not 
distinguishes by its goldness. Likewise, by emphasizing that the conceptual constituents 
of analytic judgments are related a priori to objects, it becomes possible to understand 
how an analytic judgment can simultaneously be purely conceptual and necessarily true. 
Because the relation to objects is, as it were, built in to the concepts, it is possible it is 
possible to generate objective truths while remaining strictly at the level of conceptual 
analysis.    
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 In Chapter Five, I turn to Husserl. I begin by outlining Husserl's particular 
formulation of the analytic-synthetic distinction. I explain that for Husserl, a synthetic a 
priori law is a law that holds by virtue of the "specific nature" of some particular kind of 
object or phenomenon, and that an analytic law, conversely, is a law that holds of objects 
just insofar as they are objects. I then spell out the different strata on which analytic law 
can be articulated. Proceeding from the simplest unit of categorial formation, the object, I 
continue upward in complexity to the whole, the aggregate, and ultimately the manifold. 
In the second part of the chapter, I shift focus to the domain of propositions. I show that 
for Husserl, analytic law extends not just over the object as such, but over the proposition 
as such, and indeed, that these two areas of analytic law are effectively symmetrical. In 
the last section, I ask whether Husserl has some way of explaining the possibility of 
materially substantial analytic judgments like 'bachelors are unmarried men'. I show that 
whereas Husserl thinks that such propositions can be explained on the basis of linguistic 
meaning, any such explanation runs into insuperable difficulties. I conclude by noting 
that whereas Kant's notion of analyticity bears a perfectly straightforward relationship to 
the idea of conceptual analysis, this no longer seems to be the case with Husserl. I 
suggest that what is needed in order to resolve this apparent tension is just to adopt a 
broader, non-decompositional understanding of conceptual analysis.  
 In Chapter Six, I take up the relationship between Kant and Husserl on analyticity 
more directly. I begin by taking up the disparate, and generally quite negative remarks on 
Kant's notion of analyticity that turn up in Husserl's published and unpublished writings. I 
suggest that Husserl's critique of Kant comes down, effectively, to the charge that Kant 
fails to grasp the ontological significance of analytic judgment. In light of the results of 
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the first four chapters, I suggest that Husserl is incorrect on this score. Indeed, I suggest 
that Kant is actually much closer to Husserl on the subject of analyticity than the latter 
suspects: both think that an analytic judgment is a judgment that articulates our a priori 
knowledge of objects. The real difference between them, I suggest, concerns the kinds of 
judgments that succeed in articulating our a priori knowledge of objects, thus the kinds of 
judgments that rise to the level of analyticity: whereas Kant denies that purely formal 
logical judgments are properly speaking analytic, because he thinks that such judgments 
could turn out to be false for some objects, Husserl insists that formal logic is indeed 
analytic. From Husserl's perspective, there is no scenario in which a valid formal-logical 
law could turn out to be false. In what remains of Chapter Six, I explore some of the 
ramifications of Husserl's departure from Kant on this score. Most importantly, I show 
that this allows Husserl to move past the comparatively restrictive Kantian picture of 
analyticity, according to which analyticity is a property of a particular subject-predicate 
judgments exclusively, and to reconceive analyticity as a relation—a relation that can 
obtain between the terms in a proposition, between the propositions in argument, or 
between the propositions that jointly constitute a deductive science. Having shown that 
formal logic is analytic in a primary sense, Husserl can argue that a system of judgments 




Analytic Judgment and the Critical Project 
The main objective of this chapter is to clarify the relationship between analytic judgment 
and synthetic judgment, and in so doing, to clarify the position of analytic judgment in 
the first Critique as a whole. Against the tendency to see analytic judgment as a kind of 
trivial counterpart to synthetic judgment, I want to show that analytic judgment is a 
condition of possibility for the latter, and hence, that a coherent account of analytic 
judgment is crucial to the theoretical integrity of the first Critique.  
 I begin the present chapter by considering a trio of pre-Kantian philosophers: 
Locke, Leibniz, and Hume. This survey has two basic objectives. First, seizing on the fact 
that all three philosophers articulate something like the analytic-synthetic distinction—in 
the sense that all three philosophers distinguish between judgments that are true 
independently of contingent matters of fact and judgments that are true by virtue of 
contingent matters of fact—I explore the way in which the 'analytic' half of their 
respective distinctions functions within a broader horizon of philosophical, and more 
precisely, epistemological, concerns. What I find is that with partial exception of Locke, 
none of Kant's predecessors assign to (what I will simply call) necessary judgments a 
central epistemological role. In many cases, necessary judgments are brought to forward 
for contrastive purposes, to highlight the properties of genuinely informative judgments; 
elsewhere they are cast as a kind of archetype, or model for the latter. Only in Kant, 
however, do necessary judgments become explicitly preconditional for synthetic 
judgments. I argue that this fact relates ultimately to Kant's introduction of a second form 
of necessary judgment, namely, synthetic a priori judgment.  
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1. Pre-Kantian Anticipations  
Early in the first Critique, Kant makes a strong claim regarding the originality of the 
distinction that he draws in that work between analytic and synthetic judgment. While 
confident that no previous thinker has yet formulated the problem of synthetic a priori 
judgment, he adds that this may also apply to the analytic-synthetic distinction (B19). 
Writing a few years later, Kant moderates this claim slightly and notes that a "hint" of the 
analytic-synthetic distinction can be found in Locke's Essays Concerning Human 
Understanding, namely, in Locke's discussion of the various ways in which ideas can be 
related to one another (4:270). Still later, Kant will quietly acknowledge other hints, from 
other sources; and commentators on Kant will produce passages from other writers which 
seem to anticipate Kant's distinction, and of which Kant was likely aware. For the 
moment, let's look at the passage from Locke to which Kant directs our attention.  
 
Locke  
According to Locke, our ideas can be related in four distinct ways, resulting in four 
distinct types of judgment. The first, most basic form of relation is self-relation. Locke 
thinks that this relation is guaranteed for any idea whatsoever: "there can be no idea in 
the mind which [the mind] does not...perceive to be what it is". Concomitant on this 
awareness of self-identity is an awareness of difference. We are immediately aware that a 
given idea is different from all other ideas.2 The next, still very basic form of relation is 
that of co-existence. Given a set of simple ideas inhering together in a complex idea, we 
can ask what other simple idea might 'co-exist' alongside the first group. Thus, given the 
simple ideas of heat, luminosity, and upward movement, which together form the 
                                                
2 Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, p. 544.  
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complex idea of fire, we can ask whether an additional simple idea, such as redness, 
might not co-exist with our initial set of ideas. 
 For Kant, these first two forms of judgment point the way toward the analytic-
synthetic distinction. Perception of identity and difference (or "identity and 
contradiction", in Kant's paraphrase)3 captures the basic essence of analytic judgment; 
and perception of the co-existence of simple ideas (or the "existence of representations in 
a subject") captures the essence of synthetic judgment. Where Locke's account comes up 
short (beyond its "obscurity", and "indefinite" character) is just in its low estimation of 
our epistemic access to facts about co-existence. According to Kant, Locke fails to 
acknowledge that the co-existence of certain distinct ideas can be grasped with necessity. 
In Kant's lexicon, this means that Locke has failed to acknowledge the possibility of 
synthetic a priori judgment. 
 It is possible, of course, that Kant was aware of a seemingly much stronger 
precedent for analytic judgment from Locke's Essay. Just following the passages cited by 
Kant, Locke gives over a whole chapter to a consideration of 'trifling propositions', a 
category that seems to capture many of the properties of analytic judgment. For Locke, a 
proposition is 'trifling' if it spells out what is implied by its constituent ideas. Thus, the 
proposition 'all gold is fusible' is trifling, because it spells out what is "comprehended" in 
the idea of gold; it does not add anything to the understanding that we must have in order 
to understand the word 'gold' in the first place.4 Still less informative are identical 
propositions, the conditions of possibility for which we have just seen, and which include 
                                                
3 Lewis White Beck calls this re-wording a "significant slip" on Kant's part ("Analytic 
and Synthetic Judgments Before Kant", p. 82).  
4 Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, p. 612. 
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propositions like 'lead is lead'. Finally, Locke calls 'trifling' any proposition that is drawn 
from a freely stipulated definition. Such propositions will of course be true, provided that 
they do nothing but articulate a given definition; but they will not be instructive, since the 
definition will have arisen just from "men's fancies".5 
 It is easy to see why the second and third of these propositional types qualify as 
'trifling'. Even on the most generous interpretation of 'lead is lead', which would see in 
this proposition a claim concerning the property of self-identity exhibited by the real 
substance lead, the proposition nevertheless fails to predicate anything distinctive of lead. 
As far we know, everything has the property of self-identity. Propositions from stipulated 
definitions are even more transparently trivial. They are true only to the extent that they 
have forfeited empirical significance. The third propositional type, exemplified by 'gold 
is fusible', might give us pause however. After all, this proposition does seem to predicate 
something distinctive of gold. In order to see why 'gold is fusible' is nonetheless trifling, 
according to Locke, it is necessary to look briefly at the difference between nominal and 
real essence.  
 Knowledge of general substances begins, according to Locke, from the observed 
conjunction of certain sets of properties. Having experienced various objects that exhibit 
the properties of fusibility, yellowness, and malleability, we construct a complex idea in 
which the simple ideas of those properties are combined and which we associate with the 
word 'gold'. Our decision, in this case, may be very well motivated: it may be that many 
objects consistently exhibited the cluster of properties in question. For Locke, however, it 
is invariably quite shallow, ontologically speaking. We cannot say that the complex idea 
                                                
5 Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, pp. 615-6. 
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gold corresponds to a substance that is individuated independently of our taxonomical 
decisions.6 Nor, importantly, can we perceive a "necessary connexion" between the ideas 
that have gone into the complex idea of gold. We can say only that they are frequently 
conjoined in experience.7 
 In Locke's terms, this means that the proposition 'gold is fusible' targets the 
nominal essence rather than the real essence of gold. It does not draw out an essential 
feature of some robustly mind-independent substance; it recapitulates the collective 
decision to associate a particular set of properties with a particular substance. No doubt 
this decision resulted from a significant discovery of sorts: the discovery that fusibility, 
yellowness, and malleability are routinely to be found conjoined together. Given that the 
discovery has been made, however, and firmly encoded in our linguistic practices, it 
cannot be harvested as a source of renewed insight. According to Locke, real 
"improvement of knowledge" occurs when we hold our established idea up to the light of 
experience and record the agreement or disagreement between our complex idea and 
some additional predicate not already "contained" in that idea.8 
                                                
6 In at least one passage, Locke expresses doubt that nature is divided into discrete 
species in the first place (p. 418). Elsewhere, he speculates that species are arrayed on a 
kind of continuum, in which case the distinction between species would be vague (pp. 
446-7). 
7 An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, p. 644. Drawing from a draft of Locke's 
Essay, Joelle Proust remarks that the predicates within a complex idea are conjoined by 
means of the "simple coordinative "and" [rather than] the derivative "therefore"". To 
transgress this logical boundary, Proust explains, would be to pass "from the contingent 
enumeration of properties to the necessary knowledge of the properties of the substance" 
in question, and thus to lay claim to a kind of insight that according to Locke is simply 
unavailable—a knowledge of real rather than nominal essence (Questions of Form, p. 8). 
8 Supposing that this agreement is sufficiently well attested, it is plausible that the new 
predicate may be incorporated into the complex idea itself, in which case the proposition 
gold is x may come to seem trifling. Though Locke does not say so explicitly, the border 
between the trifling and the non-trifling appears to be fluid. 
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 Before moving on, it is important to note an exception to Locke's strictures 
against necessary predication. Whereas our ideas of substance can be conjoined with a 
merely inductive certainly, Locke notes that distinct ideas can be conjoined with 
necessity in geometry and in mathematics more generally. The idea of a triangle does not 
"contain" the many precise theorems that can be brought forward concerning triangles, 
but these theorems nevertheless enjoy a necessary connection with the idea.9 Locke 
attributes the possibility of necessary predication in such cases to the origin of the ideas 
involved. Whereas our ideas of substance are derived from contingent sensible 
experience, mathematical ideas are products of the mind. This means when I correctly 
predicate some property of a mathematical idea, the resulting proposition is invulnerable 
to empirical falsification. The predicate cannot cease to agree with the subject.10  
 
Leibniz 
The next important hint of the analytic-synthetic distinction emerges with Locke's 
contemporary Leibniz. Writing in his New Essays on Human Understanding, a book-
length critique of Locke's similarly titled work, Leibniz argues that Locke fails to 
distinguish adequately between "truths of reason" and "truths of fact".11 In particular, 
Locke fails to acknowledge their distinct origins: he maintains that all ideas can be traced 
ultimately to experience, and that the difference between a necessary and a factual 
proposition relates merely to the way in which our empirically acquired ideas are 
                                                
9 Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, p. 614. 
10 According to Louis White Beck, Locke's threefold distinction between propositions 
that are trifling, propositions that are informative but contingent, and propositions that are 
informative and necessary, suggests that he has all but formulated Kant's own threefold 
distinction between analytic, synthetic a posteriori, and synthetic a priori judgments. 
("Analytic and Synthetic Judgments Before Kant", p. 82). 
11 Leibniz, New Essays on Human Understanding, p. 77. 
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arranged within a given proposition. For Leibniz, on the other hand, matters are reversed: 
the way in which the concepts in any true proposition are combined is ultimately the 
same; what distinguishes a necessary proposition from a contingent, factual proposition is 
the origin of their constituent ideas.  
 Leibniz's first category, truths of reason, includes mathematical, geometrical, and 
logical truths, as well as what we might call 'substitution instances' of these truths.12 
Thus, the logical proposition 'A is A' is a truth of reason; and its substitution instance, 'an 
equilateral triangle is an equilateral triangle', is also a truth of reason.13 The hallmark of 
these propositions, for Leibniz, is their absolute necessity. Such propositions cannot fail 
to be true; their negations are formally contradictory.14 In the case of the propositions 
cited above, this is easy to see: 'A is not A' can immediately be recognized as 
contradictory. Its subject and predicate are explicitly non-identical.  In the case of other 
truths of reason, this may be less easy to see. Take, for example, the proposition 'man is a 
rational animal'. According to Leibniz, this is a truth of reason. However, when we 
consider its negation, 'man is not a rational animal', we are not immediately conscious of 
                                                
12 Leibniz, Theodicy, p. 74. 
13 Leibniz, New Essays on Human Understanding, pp. 361-2. 
14 Leibniz, Discourse on Metaphysics p. 13 (§13). Leibniz also says that the contrary of 
truths of reason are 'impossible' (e.g. Monadology. p. 236 (§33)). Impossibility, I want to 
suggest, is extensionally, if not intensionally equivalent with contradiction. In the first 
place, Leibniz actually uses these notions synonymously (e.g. Theodicy, pp. 235, 267 
(§173, §224)). Second, their extensional equivalence is compatible with Leibniz's central 
theological convictions. Briefly, possibility for Leibniz means possibility relative to God. 
Something is possible if it is within God's power to bring it about. If God were capable of 
bringing about contradictions (say, if he could create a world in which 2 + 2 = 4 and 2 + 2 
≠ 4) then contradiction and impossibility would not coincide. But Leibniz does not grant 
God the prerogative to bring about contradictory states of affairs, or to institute 
contradictory laws. This would be incompatible with God's perfection, in the sense that 
God will have instituted a less than fully harmonious set of laws. What is impossible for 
God, therefore, is just what is contradictory. 
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contradiction. Indeed, we might even think that the negation is true. Illumination in such 
a situation comes from analysis. When the subject concept man is subjected to analysis, 
we recognize that it "contains" the predicate concepts—and indeed, contains those 
concepts as a matter of necessity. This means that the proposition itself is a substitution 
instance of the logical law 'A(BC) is BC'.15  
 Since precisely this issue will come to be quite important when we turn to Kant, it 
is worth pausing to note that the illumination the Leibniz describes here, wherein I 
become aware that my concept man contains predicates of which I was not immediately 
aware, is effectively impossible on Locke's conception of things. For Locke, we could not 
reflect meaningfully on the idea of man if we did not already know that it was equivalent 
rational animal. A person inclined to doubt the proposition 'man is a rational animal' 
would simply not count as possessing the idea man. For Leibniz, on the other hand, it is 
possible to possess an idea without being conscious of everything that is entailed by that 
idea. Indeed, since Leibniz maintains that all of our ideas are innate, he is obliged to 
allow for the opacity of some ideas, at risk of committing himself to the counter-intuitive 
claim that everyone knows everything at all times. Leibniz reconciles the doctrine of 
innatism with the obviously imperfect reality of human knowledge by arguing, in 
Platonic spirit, that our understanding is in many cases simply potential.16 While I 
implicitly know that man is rational because I fully possess the concept man, this 
knowledge is not necessarily actualized. When I come to formulate the proposition 'man 
is rational', I can thus truly be said to have learned something. Relative to my particular 
                                                
15 Leibniz, Monadology, pp. 236-7 (§33-34); "On Universal Synthesis and Analysis, or 
the Art of Discovery and Judgment", pp. 230-231; see also: Beck, "Analytic and 
Synthetic Judgments before Kant", pp. 85-86.  
16 Leibniz, New Essays On Human Understanding, pp. 85, 86-7. 
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epistemic situation, 'man is rational' counts as genuinely informative. To now retake the 
thread of our discussion, and see why 'man is a rational animal' should count as 
absolutely necessary, we should look to the theological underpinnings of Leibniz's 
theory.  
 As we have just seen, it is possible to justify the truth of a given proposition with 
reference solely to its constituent concepts and the relations between them. According to 
Leibniz, however, the "ultimate foundation" of all truths is God.17 True propositions are 
reflections of God's creative potency. What is crucial is just that not all true propositions 
are related to God in exactly the same way. Truths of reason, Leibniz informs us, belong 
to God's understanding. They represent a kind of emanation of the divine intellect. This 
means that they are maximally perfect expressions of God's essence. But it also means, 
paradoxically, that God has no choice as regards their form or their institution. God could 
not have made the world such that A is not A. Nor, indeed, could God make a different 
world such that A is not A. Along with the principles of geometry and metaphysics, the 
logical principle of self-identity belongs to the architecture of every possible world. It is 
in this sense that such truths are absolutely necessary. 
 Leibniz's second category of truths partially reverses the determinations of the 
first category. In the first place, truths of fact are contingent. The negation of a truth of 
fact does not imply a contradiction.18 Our mode of access to such truths is likewise 
distinct. They do not become accessible by means of analysis. Rather they become 
                                                
17 Leibniz, New Essays On Human Understanding, p. 447. 
18 Leibniz, Discourse on Metaphysics, p. 13 (§13), Monadology, p. 236 (§33). 
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accessible through external perception and through public testimony.19 In order to know 
whether the proposition 'the cat is on the mat' is true, I check to see whether the 
phenomena before me confirm this proposition; and in order to know whether the 
proposition 'Caesar conquered Rome' is true, I consult the relevant historical literature. 
What is significant for us is Leibniz's account of what actually makes such propositions 
true. For Leibniz, truths of fact are true in the same way as truths of reason: the subject 
concept in such a proposition "contains" the predicate concept. The concept of my cat 
contains the idea of being on the mat at this particular time, and the concept of Caesar 
contains the idea of conquering Rome.20 These truths, moreover, can ultimately be 
credited to God. God's creation of the world, Leibniz explains, involved the creation of 
"complete concepts" of my cat, of Caesar, and of everything else—concepts containing 
every true proposition that can be advanced concerning those individuals.  
 But if the concept of Caesar actually contains the idea of conquering Rome, why 
can't we access this fact through analysis? The answer, very simply, is that the analysis 
required would be infinite: while we can derive the predicate rational from man in a 
finite number of steps, it would be necessary to run through a virtually unending series of 
predicates in order to derive the idea of conquering Rome from the concepts of Caesar—
predicates representing the infinite set of facts and events that were instrumental in 
bringing about this result. A second, more important question concerns Leibniz's 
identification of truths of fact as contingent. Given that the concept Caesar always 
already contains the idea of conquering Rome, it would seem that the proposition 'Caesar 
                                                
19 Leibniz, New Essays On Human Understanding, p. 75; "On Universal Synthesis and 
Analysis, or the Art of Discovery and Judgment", p. 232. 
20 Leibniz, Discourse on Metaphysics, p. 13 (§13). 
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is the conqueror of Rome' is at all times necessary, even prior to the event itself.21 To this 
concern, Leibniz responds with an additional theological nuance. In short, God did not 
have to create, or actualize any given individual concept. The actualization of individual 
concepts is an expression of the God's free will rather than God's understanding.22 
Whereas God could not have chosen to create a world in which A is not A, God could 
have chosen to create a world in which the concept Caesar is not actualized.23 
 
Hume 
A final precedent for Kant's analytic-synthetic distinction comes by way of Hume, and 
the distinction that Hume draws between propositions based on the relations of ideas and 
propositions based on matters of fact. Like Leibniz, Hume draws this distinction along 
                                                
21 According to Benson Mates, the notion that the predicates like conqueror of Rome 
apply to individual concepts in a temporally unspecified fashion is consistent with 
Leibniz's own usage.  Mates notes that Leibniz "says several times that King—not King 
between 336 and 323 BC—is included in the complete individual concept of Alexander". 
This has the effect of preserving the generality of the predicates belonging to individual 
concepts. Instead of conqueror of Rome in 49 BC, we have simply conqueror of Rome. 
As Mates notes, however, this also suggests a different model of containment than the 
one that applies to truths of reason. While the predicate rational is contained in the idea 
man at all times, the predicate conqueror of Rome arguably does not belong to Caesar in 
50BC. The solution, Mates suggests, is to think of a complete individual concept as a 
"temporally ordered series of states". Then it is indeed the case that conqueror of Rome 
belongs to the complete individual concept of Caesar, because it belongs to at least one of 
the 't-states' that comprise this concept. (The Philosophy of Leibniz: Metaphysics and 
Language, pp. 88-89; cf. A.W. Collins "The Unity of Leibniz's Thought on Contingency, 
Possibility, and Freedom", p. 148). 
22 Leibniz, Discourse on Metaphysics, p. 13 (§13), Monadology pp. 242-3 (§46). 
23 According to Jack Davidson, however, it is not meaningful to imagine a world in 
which the concept Caesar is actualized, but in which Caesar does not conquer Rome. 
God's creative volition is not exercised at the level of the particular actions of particular 
individuals; it is exercised at the level of entire worlds. What God decides is not whether 
Caesar will conquer Rome, but whether the concept Caesar, which includes the idea of 
conquering Rome, will be actualized—and if so, which concepts, from the set of concepts 
compossible with Caesar, will be actualized alongside it ("Untying the Knot: Leibniz on 
God's Knowledge of Future Contingents", p. 103). 
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what we can call regional boundaries, explaining that the propositions of a geometry, 
algebra, and arithmetic can be understood as expressing relations of ideas, while the 
propositions of natural science, and many of the propositions of everyday life, can be 
understood as expressing matters of fact.24 But Hume, again in concert with his Prussian 
predecessor, maintains that this regional distinction can be expressed in formal terms. For 
Leibniz, this formal distinction relates to the length of the analytic process necessary to 
derive the predicate idea from the subject. For Hume, on the other hand, the distinction 
between relations of ideas and matters of fact concerns the way in which propositions are 
justified. In the case of the first category, relations of ideas, Hume thinks that it is 
possible to construct an unbroken argumentative sequence leading from the subject idea 
to the predicate idea. Thus, given the proposition 'the square of the hypotenuse is equal to 
the squares of the two sides', I can supply the intermediary ideas that will lead, by a series 
of clearly grasped argumentative steps, from the subject idea to the predicate idea. In 
matter of fact propositions, on the other hand, there is a gap in my reasoning. In trying to 
demonstrate that 'sunlight causes warming', I am forced to appeal to an idea which I 
cannot justify—the idea that the relationship between sunlight and warming which I have 
witnessed up until now will persist into the future. Even if I tried to remedy this problem 
by reformulating my statement in terms of the past only (sunlight caused warming), I 
                                                
24 An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, p. 18. I will for the most part restrict 
my survey of Hume to the Enquiry, on the grounds that it was from the Enquiry that 
Kant's understanding of Hume was drawn. This will not have major interpretive 
consequences, given the generally high level of agreement between the Treatise and the 
Enquiry. One minor consequence is reflected above, in the inclusion of geometry in the 
list of sciences based on the relations of ideas. In the Treatise, Hume is not convinced 
that geometry belongs on this list, owing to its dependence on imprecise, external 
perception as a source of its central ideas: "As the ultimate standard of these things is 
derived from nothing but the senses and imagination, 'tis absurd to talk of any perfection 
beyond what these faculties can judge of" (Treatise of Human Nature, p. 51). 
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would run up against another argumentative gap in the idea of causation. According to 
Hume, causation fails to meet the basic criterion of validity for ideas: we cannot point to 
an impression from which the idea of causation is plausibly derived; we simply do not 
perceive any "power or necessary connection" that conjoins together events; we witness 
only the events themselves.25  
 If we are nevertheless invested in the truth of propositions like 'sunlight causes 
warming', it is not therefore because we can avail ourselves of some consistent, stepwise 
argument from subject to predicate. Rather, Hume explains that our investment in such 
propositions is a function of custom. We have experienced sunlight and warmth as 
conjoined in the past, and have therefore formed a custom, or habit, of associating one 
with the other. We can always conceive of a situation in which sunlight is unaccompanied 
by warmth. Since the idea of sunlight and the idea of warmth arise from different sets of 
impressions, they are essentially distinct, and can be dissociated from one another 
without contradiction. Hume's point is that we are nevertheless compelled to conjoin 
together ideas whose objects are frequently encountered together in experience. If we do 
not actually know that they will always be conjoined, we are persuaded by the course of 
events to believe that this will be the case.   
 Relations of ideas, meanwhile, cannot be denied without contradiction. The 
contrary of a mathematical or geometrical truth is not merely false, but contradictory. In 
the Prolegomena, Kant seizes on one part of this claim, arguing that by making 
mathematical propositions cognizable through the principle of contradiction, Hume is 
effectively claiming analytic status for mathematics and thus missing its real synthetic a 
                                                
25 Hume, An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, p. 46. 
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priori character (4:272). According to several commentators, however, this is to mistake 
the meaning the Hume attaches to the idea of contradiction. In particular, it is to project 
onto the Enquiry a formal notion of contradiction that is foreign to Hume.26 We will have 
occasion in the next chapter to assess the implication here concerning Kant, namely, that 
Kant understands contradiction in formal terms and counts a proposition as analytic when 
its contrary is formally contradictory. For the time being, it is easy to find support for the 
view that Hume's understanding of contradiction is essentially non-formal—indeed, that 
it is a matter of the psychological incompatibility of ideas, rather than the non-identity of 
concepts.27 Thus, because we cannot "distinctly conceive" the equality of 3√64 and 10/2, 
Hume claims that the proposition expressing this equality is contradictory.28 Conversely, 
the proposition 'the sun will not rise tomorrow' qualifies as non-contradictory for Hume, 
because the idea of the sun can be coherently thought together with the idea of its not 
rising tomorrow: "if something is intelligible and can be distinctly conceived", Hume 
explains, "it implies no contradiction".29 Both propositions, 3√64 = 10/2 and 'the sun will 
not rise tomorrow', are false.30 But only the first resonates for us as contradictory, and 
does so because of the nature of the ideas that it contains, and the way in which we are 
constrained to understand those ideas. 
                                                
26 R.F. Atkinson, "Hume on Mathematics", pp. 128-129; Donald Gotterbarn, "Kant, 
Hume, and Analyticity", pp. 277-278. 
27 As Louis White Beck puts it, by contradiction Hume does not have in mind "an 
assertion like “A is not A.” He means also “A is not B” where an A that is not a B is 
“inconceivable” or “unimaginable" ("Analytic and Synthetic Judgments Before Kant", p. 
83). 
28 An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, p. 119. 
29 An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, p. 18. 
30 As Hume remarks in the Treatise, "truth or falsehood consists in an agreement or 
disagreement either to the real relations of ideas, or to real existence and matters of fact" 
(p. 458). 
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 Undoubtedly, still more ancestors of Kant's analytic-synthetic distinction could be 
turned up in the pre-Kantian literature. As early as 1793, Kant's correspondent J.B. Beck 
pointed out to Kant that his distinction was foreshadowed in the work of Christian August 
Crusius.31 And Kant himself acknowledged both Crusius and the logician Johann Peter 
Reusch in a polemical work from the same period (8:245-6). More recently, Lewis White 
Beck has pointed to intimations of the analytic-synthetic distinction in Kant's near-
contemporary Wolff.32 For our purposes, what is important is less an exhaustive 
catalogue of the philosophers that influenced Kant, than a survey of the different ways in 
which necessary judgment was conceived prior to Kant—both as regards the place of 
such judgments within a broader, epistemological context, and the internal issues that 
impinge on the idea of necessary judgment.   
 
Necessary Judgment in Epistemological Context 
Having outlined the various theories of necessary judgment to be found in Kant's 
predecessors, we are in a position to look more closely at the question of how those 
theories stand within a broader epistemological context. To begin, I think that we can see 
the ideas of necessary judgment that originate with Locke and Hume as arising from a 
certain kind of tension: the tension between the narrow, empiricist premises that both 
thinkers take as a point of departure, and the breadth of the epistemological 
accomplishment for which both thinkers hope to account.  
                                                
31 "zu meinen Verwundern habe ich...die Unterscheidung der analytischen und 
synthetischen Urteilen weit deutlicher darin gefunden als in der von Ihnen zitierten Stelle 
des Locke" (11:444-45) 
32 Lewis White Beck, "Analytic and Synthetic Judgments Before Kant", pp. 90-91. 
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 Locke, for his part, maintains that we have direct access just to simple properties 
such as color. This, in turn, creates a challenge when it comes to explaining our manifest 
ability to talk about and reflect upon general substances in the world. Locke, as we saw, 
meets this challenge by appealing to social convention. When I think about, or discuss 
gold, according to Locke, what I invoke is not a particular instance of a gold, but a 
complex idea, formed collectively and inductively on the basis of similarities encountered 
in nature. This distinctively Lockean solution supplies the basic conditions for a certain 
kind of necessary truth. Because complex ideas are, precisely, complex, it becomes 
possible to form true propositions just on the basis of those ideas: we need only predicate 
a part of the complex idea to the whole idea.33 And because complex ideas are not 
anchored to any particular empirical objects, or set of objects, they are—at least as far as 
their inaugural properties are concerned—invulnerable to refinement in the light of 
experience. Propositions that we form concerning those ideas can therefore be grasped 
with necessity. 
  For Hume, there exists a similar gap between the representational content to 
which we have genuine access and the representational content that is reflected in our 
standard ways of thinking and talking about the world. While we take ourselves to have 
insight into the relations between different kinds of objects, we have genuine perceptual 
access just to different kinds of objects. This creates counter-intuitive consequences in 
the realm of causality: for example, we cannot know that submersion in water causes 
                                                
33 This possibility does not exist for Hume, given his understanding of how reference to 
general substances works. The proposition gold is fusible, on the Humean picture, does 
not predicate part of a complex idea of the whole idea; rather, it predicates one aspect of a 
certain, imagistically conceived particular of the whole particular. Thus, the judgment is 
not true in a purely formal sense, by virtue of containment relation between subject and 
predicate, but by virtue of the manifest properties of the particular to which 'gold' refers. 
 27 
drowning. This might be an epistemic limitation that we could live with. We could be 
content to simply wager on the reliability of the above-cited rule, and others like it. But 
are less likely to rest content with this limitation in the realm of mathematics and 
geometry. We do not think that 2 + 2 = 4 is just a well-attested rule of thumb; we think 
that this relation is necessary and eternal. It behooves Hume, therefore, to try to find 
some way of reconciling his basic premises with our modal intuitions.  
 Significantly, Hume does not adopt a Lockean solution to this problem: he does 
not argue that our mathematical ideas originate with the mind, and are therefore immune 
to empirical disqualification. On the contrary, he is committed to the view that 
mathematical ideas, like all ideas, represent 'images' of externally encountered objects.34 
Given that the required distinction cannot be drawn at the level of origin, therefore, Hume 
attempts a different gambit. He argues that our empirically derived ideas can be related in 
two fundamentally different ways: externally and internally. Thus, the ideas water and 
drowning are externally related; for all I can tell, there is nothing internal to these ideas 
that would explain their apparent causal conjunction. On the other hand, the ideas of 2 + 
2 and 4 are related internally. I simply do not grasp the idea of 2 + 2 if I do not grasp its 
equality with 4.35 It is these internal relations that form the basis of the propositions that 
Hume groups under the heading of 'relations of ideas'. Because it bears just on the 
                                                
34 Henry Allison argues that Hume's commitment to this principle is not sustainable; and 
that it breaks down specifically around large numbers, of which we do not plausibly have 
an adequate, imagistic conception. The challenge of accounting for large numbers, 
according to Allison, obliges Hume to adopt an essentially Kantian account of number. 
Instead of seeing the ideas of large numbers as copies of externally encountered objects, 
the Hume of the Treatise effectively understands large number ideas as "rules" for 
generating the number in question (Custom and Reason in Hume, pp. 34-35).  
35 Daniel Gotterbarn, "Kant, Hume, and Analyticity", p. 275. 
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essential properties of its constituent ideas, the proposition 2 + 2 = 4 can be denied only 
on pain of incoherence. 
 Differences notwithstanding, then, there is a sense in which Locke's trifling 
propositions and Hume's relations of ideas reflect compensatory mechanisms. Since 
basic, empiricist premises do not account of our understanding of general substances or 
mathematical relations, it is necessary to invoke a kind a second-order principle that does 
explain the possibility of such understanding. In Locke's case, this second-order principle 
is the complex idea; in Hume's case, it is the internal relation between ideas. The 'trifling 
proposition' and the 'relation of ideas' then become possible as expressions of these 
compensatory mechanisms. A somewhat different perspective on both proposition-types 
emerges when we consider the rhetorical role played by each. In that light, it becomes 
possible to see both as motivating a crucial epistemological thesis.  
 Trifling propositions, for their part, emerge in the context of Locke's campaign 
against scholastic philosophy: specifically, the scholastic tendency to inflate the 
significance of self-evident propositions like 'gold is fusible' and 'lead is lead'. For Locke, 
our grasp of propositions like 'gold is fusible' does not reflect insight into the real 
essences; it reflects mere verbal consciousness, that is, an awareness of how particular 
words are understood. Likewise, our grasp of propositions like 'lead is lead' does not 
reflect an antecedent grasp of the general principle of identity; it expresses our grasp of 
the self-identity of a particular idea.36 This deflationary project corresponds, in turn, to a 
positive vision for epistemological progress. Rather than simply analyzing our 
                                                
36 See Margaret Wilson's informative essay "Locke and Leibniz on "First Truths"" for 
discussion of the polemical context surrounding Locke's discussion of trifling 
propositions. 
 29 
antecedently held ideas, Locke thinks, we should refer those ideas to experience, and 
assess their agreement and disagreement with other ideas. Locke's discussion of trifling 
propositions works to motivate this vision, precisely by indicating what a non-
informative proposition looks like.  
 Writing a half-century later, Hume is concerned to underscore the limitations in 
the epistemological vision endorsed by Locke. What he wants to show is that in empirical 
matters, which occupy the lion's share of our attention, the agreement or disagreement 
between ideas can be grasped with only inductive certainty. Relations of ideas then 
become a way of underscoring this fixed limit to possible insight. As Norman Kemp 
Smith remarks, relations of ideas offer a "standard in light of which we are able to detect 
[the] complete absence [of rational necessity] in all other fields".37 
 In the case of our third pre-Kantian figure, Leibniz, something very similar 
obtains. A certain kind of non-empirical, necessary truth becomes a lens through which to 
view empirical truth. Where Leibniz goes beyond Hume is in seeing the former as a 
model for empirical truth, and not simply as a way of underscoring its inadequacy. Thus, 
even while acknowledging that our access to truths of fact comes via external perception, 
Leibniz insists on analyzing these propositions in terms of the containment model of 
truth—a model which sits comfortably in the context of mathematical, logical, and 
definitional truths, but which gives rise to difficult problems in the context of truths of 
fact. Leibniz's reasoning in this regard is essentially theological in nature. Concerned to 
preserve an understanding of God as perfectly omniscient, Leibniz supposes that God has 
available for inspection the complete concepts of every possible individual, concepts 
                                                
37 Norman Kemp Smith, The Philosophy of David Hume, p. 69. 
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containing all of the eventualities that will, over the course of time, befall those 
individuals. This gambit makes it difficult for Leibniz to account for individual free will 
(since every action that I will ever perform is already set out in my 'complete concept'), 
and seems to threaten the idea of God as omnibenevolent (since God will have actualised 
certain concepts in full knowledge of the evil acts that would ensue). But more 
importantly, this gambit allows Leibniz to claim that truths of fact are true in the same 
way as truths of reason: by virtue of an intra-propositional relation of conceptual 
containment. 
 So far, then, we have seen three ways in which the idea of necessary judgment 
circulates in the texts of Kant's predecessors. First, the idea of necessary judgment 
emerges in both the Essay and the Enquiry as a way of accounting for an epistemic 
accomplishment that cannot readily be explained from empiricist premises: our 
knowledge of general substances, for Locke, and our knowledge of mathematics for 
Hume. Second, necessary judgment plays a rhetorical role, either as a way of exposing 
the triviality of some rival epistemic endeavor, or as way of qualifying the epistemic 
value of empirical truths. Third, necessary judgment serves as a model for truth in 
general, as we have just seen in Leibniz. Before concluding, it is worth returning briefly 
to Locke, and considering a fourth and final role that the idea of necessary judgment 
plays in his theory of knowledge.  
 For Locke, as I have tried to show, there is a sense in which lexically necessary 
propositions like 'gold is fusible' are doubly trifling. In the first place, such propositions 
simply spell out what is contained in a given complex idea. Second, we have no reason to 
think that this complex idea mirrors the real essence of a real substance, meaning a 
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substance with a unique place in the real taxonomy of nature. For all we know, the idea 
of gold is a purely human innovation, an idea that the proposition 'gold is fusible' simply 
articulates. What I want to claim, however, is that this second degree of triviality 
corresponds to a deep significance. Precisely because the idea of gold is a contingent, 
historically specific, human construction, my grasp of the idea gold arguably presupposes 
a disposition to assent to the proposition 'gold is fusible'. I need not actually assent to this 
proposition, or even make it the object of conscious thematization. The point is simply 
that on the Lockean picture, reflection on gold would be empty, or solipsistic, if it were 
not mediated by the understanding that gold is fusible. Gold is not just something lying 
around in my environment of which I could form my own idiosyncratic conception. It is 
individuated by a socially constituted idea.38   
 Something similar applies, I think, in the case of mathematics. Indeed, Locke 
himself makes it clear that reference to mathematical objects proceeds entirely through 
mathematical ideas.39 We do not first observe triangular objects in experience and then 
form the general idea triangle; we form the idea in question, and then identify instances 
of that idea in experience. This being so, it is plausible to think that reference to, and 
reflection upon those objects presupposes a disposition to assent to certain idea-
constituting statements. We need not reflect on the Pythagorean theorem every time we 
wish to refer to triangles (as we have already seen, there is reason to think that for Locke, 
                                                
38 Locke gestures toward the point I have been making here in various places. He says 
that identical propositions show us "nothing but what we must certainly know before, 
whether such a proposition be either made by, or proposed to us" (p. 609). Lexical 
propositions, meanwhile, "teach nothing but what every one who is capable of discourse 
knows without being told"  
(p. 611); they "contain no more than one of the terms does, and which a man was 
supposed to know before" (p. 614). 
39 Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, p. 565. 
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such theorems are not actually contained in the idea triangle); but since the reference of 
the word 'triangle' is fixed by an idea, rather than some archetypal object, or set of 
objects, the possibility of mathematical discourse seems to presuppose that this idea has a 
fixed, minimal content, one that the participants in mathematical discourse are 
necessarily disposed to affirm.    
 Perhaps, then, we could distinguish a fourth role for the idea of necessary 
judgment alongside the three that we have already identified. In short, such judgments 
may be seen as expressing the basic conditions of possibility for meaningful thought and 
discourse concerning particular kinds of complex objects. On this view, if I did not grasp 
a given idea at the level of its individual constituents, I could not participate in discourse 
concerning its object. Nor, crucially, could I learn anything about that object, since 
learning would likewise presuppose a grasp of the idea through which reference to the 
object is established. 
 Having completed our necessarily hasty survey of Kant's most important 
predecessors, let's move on at this point to the Critique of Pure Reason. By getting a 
sense, first, of the basic theoretical architecture of this famous work, we can move on to 
consider the place and role of analytic judgment within it. What we will find is that 
analytic judgment assumes an epistemological importance for Kant that the roughly 
equivalent notions in Locke, Leibniz, and Hume do not have for those thinkers. This, in 
turn, will ultimately prove to be a function of Kant's introduction of a second form of 
necessary judgment—a kind of judgment that does not owe its necessity strictly to the 




2. The Critique of Pure Reason 
The introduction of this second, non-conceptual form of necessary judgment is not long 
in coming. Indeed, Kant's point of departure in the first Critique is precisely the manifest 
actuality of such judgment. He claims that our actual achievements in mathematics, 
natural science, and metaphysics bear witness to an ability to grasp necessary relations 
that are not purely conceptual (B20-21, B40). When I grasp that 7 + 5 = 12, according to 
Kant, I grasp a relation that is not inherent in the concepts 7 + 5 and 12, but which is 
nevertheless grasped with necessity. What is in question for Kant are the conditions of 
possibility for such judgment. He wants to understand how the mind must stand with 
respect to the world, and how the mind itself must be structured, such that these 
epistemological accomplishments are possible. 
 Kant's answer begins with the claim that the mind is structured in terms of two 
distinct faculties: sensibility and understanding (A15/B29, A50-1/B74-5). Sensibility, on 
the one hand, is a fundamentally receptive faculty. Through the deliverances of 
sensibility, which Kant calls intuitions, we acquire a relation to objects outside of 
ourselves (A19/B33). Understanding, on the other hand, is a spontaneous faculty, one that 
acts upon the sensibility. It represents our ability to invest intuitions with conceptual 
content. Thus, it is by virtue of the understanding that the manifold of intuition appears to 
us as populated with particular types of objects, having certain generic features. The 
activities of the understanding, according to Kant, take the form of judgment (A69/B64). 
In apprehending a dog, for example, I judge that a certain object falls under the empirical 
concept dog. The possibility of actually formulating this judgment in thought or in 
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language grows out of the more fundamental, judicative structure of perceptual 
experience.   
 Of course, this does not yet show how Kant's model of cognition justifies our 
insight into necessary relations and states of affairs. Plausibly, we have explained how 
judgments like 'the sky is overcast' are possible: some kind of intuitive content is given to 
sensibility; this intuitive content is brought under the subject-concept sky and the 
predicate-concept being-overcast.40 What we have not explained is how our judgments 
can be categorical. It appears we can confidently declare that x is y at this moment. But 
what enables us to declare that x is y tout court? In order to see how this next step 
becomes possible, it is necessary to say more about the structure of both sensibility and 
understanding.  
 Sensibility, I have just explained, is fundamentally receptive. It represents our 
capacity to receive intuitive content. But sensibility, according to Kant, also plays a 
structuring role. Without dictating the 'matter' of appearance, meaning the specific 
content that shows up in any given experience, sensibility prescribes the form of 
appearance, meaning the most basic spatio-temporal determinations of any appearance 
whatsoever (A20/B34, A22/B36). Objects, according to Kant, do not have spatial 
determinations intrinsically (A26/B42), nor are they intrinsically embedded in time 
(A36/B52). Their appearance as spatio-temporally determined reflects the way in which 
human beings, with our particularly constituted faculty of sensibility, are constrained to 
experience them. And this kind of structuration does not simply inform our experience of 
                                                
40 cf. (17:616-617 [R4636]). In terms of the analysis that Kant presents here, sky 
represents the "logical subject" of the judgment "the sky is overcast". The judgment 
expresses the fact that "something x, which I cognize under the predicates that together 
comprise the concept of [sky], I also think through the predicate of [being-overcast]". 
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external objects. According to Kant, all mental representations whatsoever "necessarily 
stand in relations of time" (A34/B51, cf. A22-23/B37). In reflecting on some idea, for 
example, my thoughts are necessarily given successively, or simultaneously. In no 
instance do my various mental representations fail to assume some kind of temporal 
order.  
 As for the understanding, it turns out that it too plays a kind of dual role. In the 
first place, the understanding is responsible for the production and application of 
empirical concepts, enabling us to experience particular objects in terms of generic types, 
and thus to formulate judgments such as this is a dog. But the understanding also supplies 
an even more basic precondition for such judgments. According to Kant, it is by virtue of 
the understanding that we experience the perceptual manifold in terms of discrete 
individuals in the first place. The understanding 'synthesizes' the perceptual manifold 
such that it shows up for us in terms of distinct objects, exhibiting distinct sets of 
predicates (B106, B203, A199/B244).41 Of course, since none of us have ever been 
confronted with an undifferentiated array of color and shape, which we then transformed 
into a manifold of discrete individuals, Kant cannot maintain that this process of 
subjective synthesis is in any way conscious, or deliberate. Indeed, his thesis is precisely 
that this synthesis goes on behind the scenes, effectively in advance of actual, conscious 
                                                
41 As Henry Allison notes, this point is less than completely perspicuous in the first 
Critique. A particular source of ambiguity is Kant's identification of intuitions as 
'singular', language which suggests that intuitions already represent individual objects, 
even prior to being brought under concepts ("The Originality of Kant's Distinction 
Between Analytic and Synthetic", pp. 20-21). Charles Parsons makes a similar point with 
regard to Kant's 'things in themselves'. Since individuation is a function of the 
understanding and pure sensibility, Parsons notes, it is not clear why we should imagine 
that the noumenal realm is populated by individual 'things' ("The Transcendental 
Aesthetic", in From Kant to Husserl, p. 40). 
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experience. If we can nevertheless become aware that such synthesis takes place, it is by 
virtue of the 'clue' provided by singular judgments, and the manifest possibility thereof.42 
Kant's claim is that we can work backward from this clue, and others like it, to the most 
elementary forms of subjective synthesis (A69/B94, A79/B104-5). Thus, the possibility 
of hypothetical judgments, having the form, if x, then y, points the way to another 
important synthetic function of the understanding. According to Kant, such judgments are 
possible only to the extent that the understanding represents the sensible manifold as 
causally ordered (4:300, B163). Likewise, the possibility of making judgments with 
necessity, of asserting that x is necessarily y, presupposes that certain relations within the 
sensible manifold are represented as necessary. Working backward from the various 
forms of judgment to their conditions of possibility, Kant secures a list of what he calls 
categories. Totaling twelve altogether, the categories, or the 'pure concepts of the 
understanding', encapsulate the essential modes of synthesis to which the understanding 
subjects the sensible manifold.43 
 For the moment, I cannot go into Kant's arguments for why these extremely basic 
forms of structuration should be understood as subjective in origin. What is important to 
emphasize is simply the kind of subjective structuration that Kant has in mind. Unlike 
Hume, Kant is not arguing that we are inclined, as a matter of custom, to understand 
sensible experience in certain ways. We do not represent the world in terms of distinct, 
causally related individuals simply because doing so makes reality more tractable. Kant's 
                                                
42 "The functions of the understanding can therefore all be found together if one can 
exhaustively exhibit the functions of unity in judgments" (A69/B94). 
43 While in a certain practical sense identical, there is nevertheless a conceptual 
difference between the categories and the pure concepts of the understanding. In short, 
the categories are the pure concepts of the understanding when considered in relation to 
intuition.   
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argument is that our experience actually presupposes certain modes of subjective 
synthesis. If we had not always already run the sensible manifold through the categories, 
as well as the pure forms of sensibility described in the previous paragraph, then we 
would not have the experience that we have. Another way to make the same point would 
be to say that the categories, along with the 'pure intuitions', space and time, are 
necessary conditions for human experience—and this, finally, provides an indication as 
to how we are able to produce knowledge that is both informative and necessary. Let's 
take these conjuncts in turn. 
 We generate knowledge, according to Kant, when we conjoin to an antecedently 
held concept some predicate not already contained in that concept (A7/B11). In most 
cases, this predicate is drawn from empirical intuition. Thus, when I declare that dogs are 
playful, I conjoin to my concept dog a predicate drawn from my experience of dogs. 
Because I have thereby enlarged my initial concept, Kant calls this kind of judgment 
'synthetic'. And because this enlargement is defeasible in the light of future experience (I 
may discover that dogs are not actually playful), Kant calls such judgments 'a posteriori'. 
In order now to generate synthetic a priori judgments, it is clear what is required. We 
need to enlarge an initial concept in such a way that the resulting judgment is not 
defeasible in the light of future experience.44 What we have just learned concerning 
sensibility and understanding indicates how this is possible. Instead of drawing our 
predicate from empirical intuition, which is to say, from the content that is given to 
sensibility, we can draw our predicate from the necessary structure of sensibility itself—
                                                
44 Kant makes it clear that apriority does not mean temporal priority vis-à-vis experience 
(B1). Instead, apriority for Kant means independence—as regards truth-value—from 
experience "and even of all impressions of the senses" (B2). 
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specifically, from the pure intuitions of space and time. What might this look like? What 
kind of 'content' can be ascribed to space and time, such that a predicate can be drawn 
from these pure intuitions? In short, space and time have content to the extent that they 
embody multiple invariant conditions for the possibility of experience. Thus, we can 
think of the judgment 'space has three dimensions' as synthetic a priori, in the sense that it 
articulates the most basic constraint on our experience of space (B41, 4:284). At a higher 
level of sophistication, Kant refers to Euclid's proof that the interior angles of a triangle 
are equal to the sum of two right angles. On his reading, this judgment does not say 
anything about the ideal essence of the triangle. Just by contemplating the idea of the 
triangle, we would never arrive at Euclid's insight (A716/B744). Like all true geometrical 
propositions, Kant thinks, this proposition gives precise mathematical expression to a 
necessary feature of our representation of space. It is somewhat less clear how the pure 
structure of temporal intuition can be captured by synthetic a priori judgment. Unlike 
space, time does not lend itself in any obvious way to formalization, at least not to any 
formalization that would rival geometry for complexity and instructiveness.45,46 Time 
does, however, enter into synthetic a priori judgment when combined with the pure 
concepts of the understanding.  
                                                
45 Kant notes that time can be represented, by "analogy", as a "line progressing to 
infinity" (A33/B50). He goes on to acknowledge that space is a richer source of synthetic 
a priori cognition than time (A46/B64). 
46 Kant's identification of mathematical knowledge as synthetic a priori has encouraged 
the view that mathematics articulates the structure of pure, temporal intuition. As Philip 
Kitcher argues, however, there is little evidence in Kant himself for such a 
straightforward identification (Philip Kitcher, "Kant and the Foundations of 
Mathematics", pp. 33-34; cf. Charles Parsons, From Kant to Husserl, p. 28). Michael 
Friedman points to an additional reason for skepticism on this score. He notes that while 
mathematics makes essential use of the unit, "there is no distinguished unit in time itself" 
(Kant and the Exact Sciences, p. 105). 
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 While somewhat resistant to quick summarization, this idea goes roughly as 
follows. The pure concepts of the understanding, as we just saw, represent conditions for 
the possibility of experience. They dictate the formal structure of empirical intuition. 
Because Kant's objective is to describe this formal structure, and the various relations in 
which it consists, we might expect that we could capture these relations in the form of 
judgments. These judgments would be synthetic, because they would describe the way in 
which the pure concepts of the understanding are augmented through intuitive realization; 
and they would be a priori, because they would articulate necessary conditions for the 
possibility of experience. According to Kant, however, the pure concepts of the 
understanding are not actually applied directly to the manifold of intuition in the course 
of real experience. Nor, he thinks, is such a direct application even possible, owing to the 
heterogeneity of the pure concepts and empirical intuition (A137/B176). While the 
former are abstract and ideal, empirical intuition is sensible. If the pure concepts are 
nevertheless brought to bear on empirical intuition, Kant maintains, it is through the 
mediation of what he calls the 'transcendental schemata'. The schemata are temporal 
"representations" of the pure concepts of the understanding. They enact the pure concepts 
at the level of real, temporal experience. Thus, for example, the pure concept substance is 
schematized as "the persistence of the real in time" (A144/B183). Amplified slightly, this 
means that we experience the concept substance as that which endures in outer 
experience, over and above any contingent empirical change. It is this experience that can 
be formulated as a judgment (A148/B188). Having brought the concept into contact with 
empirical intuition by means of the transcendental schematism, we are in a position to 
articulate the way in which the concept is intuitively augmented. Thus, it becomes 
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possible to assert that "in all change of appearances substance persists, and its quantum is 
neither increased nor diminished in nature" (B224). The bare concept substance does not 
contain the idea of persistence in time, or consistency as regards its quantum, and hence 
the judgment is synthetic. And the judgment is a priori, Kant thinks, because the relevant 
predicate has been drawn from pure, rather than empirical intuition, and thus expresses a 
feature of human experience that is not subject to change.   
 So far, then, it looks like there are two distinct routes to synthetic a priori 
judgment. As we have just seen, we accomplish such judgments when we articulate the 
necessary temporal conditions for the intuitive realization of the pure concepts of the 
understanding. And as we have also seen, these judgments arise when we articulate the 
necessary spatio-temporal conditions for the intuitive realization of an 'impure' concept—
such as the concept triangle or the empirical concept matter. According to Kant, the first 
route represents the ideal direction taken by metaphysics; the second route, meanwhile, 
describes the actual direction taken by mathematics and natural science.  
 Having thus accounted for the possibility of synthetic a priori judgment, we have 
reached what is at the same time the point of the departure and the theoretical summit of 
the first Critique. En route, we have outlined the complex theoretical edifice that Kant 
constructs as means of reaching this summit, involving, first and foremost, the distinction 
between sensibility and understanding, and the directly related distinction between 
intuition and concept.  
 Of course, this scheme would be of limited value if it only succeeded in capturing 
the mechanics of synthetic a priori judgment, and indeed, Kant is able to show that his 
model of cognition accounts for the possibility of other forms of judgment. The first, 
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most quotidian form of judgment is synthetic a posteriori judgment, which we have 
already encountered, and which encompasses the judgments that we routinely make 
concerning external objects and states of affairs. On Kant's analysis, a synthetic a 
posteriori judgment involves the understanding and the sensibility. Seizing upon an 
empirical concept, which Kant understands as a product of the understanding, I conjoin 
with that concept a predicate drawn from empirical intuition. What this leaves, finally, is 
analytic a priori judgment, or simply analytic judgment (since the idea of analytic a 
posteriori judgment is effectively incoherent on Kant's way of seeing things).47 Though 
we will of course have much to say about the nature of analytic judgments in what 
follows (particularly in the second chapter), we can understand them for the time being as 
judgments that engage the understanding alone. More precisely, they are judgments in 
which a predicate is drawn from the judgment's own subject concept, rather than from 
pure, or empirical intuition. Thus, for Kant, the judgment 'triangles are three-sided; is 
analytic, because the predicate three-sided is contained in the subject concept triangle. 
The judgment 'gold is a yellow metal', likewise, simply unpacks what is implicit in the 
concept gold. These judgments are a priori in precisely the sense already explained: they 
are indefeasible in the light of future experience. It is the grounds of their indefeasibility, 
                                                
47 An analytic a posteriori judgment would be a judgment based on concepts alone that 
was defeasible in the light of future experience. The idea of such judgment would be 
coherent, perhaps, if we could distinguish sharply between conceptual identity and 
conceptual content. This would enable us to say, for instance, that while 'cats are 
mammals' has the status of an analytic judgment at this time, it might come to have the 
status of an empirically false, non-analytic judgment, because some new and surprising 
discovery about cats might result in a renegotiation of the concept cat.  But for Kant, this 
cannot work. The reason is that for Kant, conceptual identity is a function of conceptual 
content: a concept associated with the word 'cat' that did not contain the concept mammal 
would not count as a revised version of the concept that was associated with the word 
'cat'; it would count as an entirely new concept.  
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however, which distinguish them from synthetic a priori judgments. Whereas the latter 
are empirically indefeasible in the sense that they articulate necessary conditions for the 
possibility of experience, analytic judgments are empirically indefeasible in the sense that 
they decline to make empirically substantial claims in the first place. Analytic judgments, 
according to Kant, bear simply on their component concepts; they do not bear on 
experience (A7/B11) or on any actually existing objects (A259). They represent a species 
of judicative necessity; but a formal, comparatively insubstantial brand of necessity.  
 
3. Analytic Judgment in Epistemological Context 
To be sure, there is nothing particularly controversial in the thought that Kant's objective 
in the first Critique is the justification of synthetic a priori knowledge. In the Introduction 
to the second edition, he says that the "real problem of pure reason is...contained in the 
question: how are synthetic judgments a priori possible?" (B19). Elsewhere, he remarks 
that the "only concern" of the Critique of Pure Reason is the illumination of the 
"principles of a priori synthesis in their entire scope" (A12/B25). Nevertheless, there is 
something slightly one-sided in the foregoing reconstruction of Kant's argument for 
synthetic a priori knowledge. I have supposed, in short, that Kant is concerned to supply 
the a priori part of synthetic a priori judgments—that he takes for granted our epistemic 
access to empirical states of affairs and simply wishes to know how empirically 
significant judgments can be made with necessity. In this respect, Kant's principal 
interlocutor is of course Hume. As we saw above, Hume allows that we have access to 
empirical content, but maintains that this access does not (for the most part) license 
necessary judgments. Kant's principal innovation, meanwhile, looks from this perspective 
like his departure from Hume's understanding of concepts. For the latter, concepts (or 
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ideas) are strictly derivative. To the extent that they come into play, they do so as 'copies' 
of antecedent impressions, or as arbitrary syntheses of antecedent impressions (e.g. 
golden mountain). According to Kant, however, concepts need not be tethered to 
empirical intuition in this way. We can allow that certain kinds of concepts might 
actually be logically prior to empirical intuition, either in the sense that they are 
conditions for the coherence of empirical intuition; in the sense that they are constituted 
(or defined) in a place that is 'outside of' experience (as in mathematics).  
 By allowing that concepts need not arise originally on the basis of empirical 
intuition, Kant makes possible a kind of question that would not have been meaningful 
from a Humean perspective. In short, it becomes possible to inquire into the conditions 
for the intuitive realization of a given concept. Since certain concepts have content 
independently of, and prior to intuition, we can ask what it would mean for such concepts 
to be instantiated in space and time. The answers to these questions will be synthetic, in 
the sense that they will enlarge our understanding of the concept in question. And they 
will be a priori, because concept-instantiation is subject to the a priori structure of 
intuition. Kant's theoretical objective—that of explaining how empirically significant 
judgment can be made with necessity—will have been realized on the basis of a re-
evaluation of the status of concepts relative to empirical intuition.  
 Note that this solution also makes possible a different kind of question: namely, 
what properties does a given concept have in and of itself? What sub-concepts, or 'marks' 
does the concept substance have, independently of its intuitive realization? The answers 
to these questions will be analytic, in the sense that they will arise just from the analysis 
of the concept in question. And they will be a priori, because the concepts in question 
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stand apart from the flux of experience, and can thus be expected to remain constant. 
Analytic (a priori) judgment will have become possible as a by-product of a theoretical 
scheme oriented primarily around synthetic a priori judgment.  
 Consider, however, what our account of the first Critique would look like if we 
supposed that Kant was concerned to supply the synthetic component of a priori 
judgment—if we supposed, in other words, that he took for granted the possibility of a 
priori judgments, and simply wanted to know how those judgments could acquire 
empirical significance. In this light, Kant's principal interlocutor would be Leibniz: as we 
saw above, Leibniz maintains that the truth-value of all propositions whatsoever is 
exhaustively determined by inter-propositional relations of concept containment. Kant's 
principal innovation, meanwhile, would be the claim that conceptual relations 
underdetermine the truth-value of epistemologically significant propositions, and that it is 
necessary to acknowledge distinct sources of truth-determining content in pure and 
empirical intuition.48 This would suggest a different way of understanding analytic 
judgment and its place within the first Critique. Analytic judgment would look less like a 
by-product than a point of departure. It would be the comparatively empty form of 
judicative necessity that we can access just insofar as we think in terms of concepts, but 
which we must surpass en route to a more robust, empirically substantial form of 
necessity. Kant's invocation of analytic judgment would have a kind of rhetorical affinity 
to Locke's invocation of trifling propositions, in the sense that analytic judgment would 
be invoked as a way of motivating an epistemologically fruitful direction of inquiry.  
                                                
48 This point will become quite important in Chapter Four when we consider the question 
of whether general logic is analytic, according to Kant.  
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 These different ways of understanding the first Critique present a composite 
picture of the theoretical basis for, and the rhetorical function of, analytic judgment in 
Kant's landmark text. On the one hand, analytic judgment looks like an artefact of the 
epistemological edifice that Kant constructs in order to vindicate the possibility of 
synthetic a priori judgment; on the other hand, it looks like the insubstantial species of 
necessity that we must surpass en route to a substantial, genuinely informative brand of 
necessity. With reference, once again, to Kant's predecessors, let's consider whether a 
stronger reading of analytic judgment and its precise epistemological role is available.  
 
Analytic Judgment as a Model of Truth 
An initial suggestion would be that analytic judgment functions along the lines of 
Leibniz's truths of reason, offering a model of truth relative to which other kinds of true 
proposition can be understood. Recall that for Leibniz, truths of reason have a kind of 
normative status relative to true propositions in general. Although propositions like 
'Usain Bolt won the race' seem to owe their truth to some contingent empirical state of 
affairs, and to be verified by means of external perception, Leibniz maintains that such 
propositions are actually true in just the same way that mathematical and logical truths 
are true: by virtue of an inter-propositional relation of concept containment. The question 
now is whether analytic truth has the same paradigmatic status relative to other kinds of 
propositional truth. Perhaps analytic judgment makes visible the deep semantic structure 
of all true propositions whatsoever. Of course, it would be very difficult to make this case 
with regard to synthetic a posteriori truths. Nothing that Kant says about statements like 
'the sky is overcast' suggests that these statements are, at base, purely conceptual truths. 
On the other hand, Kant seems to suggest in places that synthetic a priori judgments are 
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true in the same way as analytic truths—necessarily, and by virtue of concepts alone. 
Thus, for example, Kant remarks that synthetic a priori judgment allows us to grasp 
predicates that "do not lie in [the concept triangle] but still belong to it" (A718/B746). 
 What, then, of Kant's identification of such truths as 'synthetic'. This seems to 
indicate quite clearly that synthetic a priori truths are not purely conceptual in nature. 
Here, perhaps, we can follow Jaakko Hintikka in reading the syntheticity of synthetic a 
priori truth as a matter of epistemic access. As Hintikka argues in the context of 
mathematics specifically, syntheticity does not mean that a pair of concepts are 
fundamentally distinct and only conspire to form a necessary truth through the medium of 
pure intuition. Rather, it means that we are unable to grasp the necessary connection 
between those concepts just by inspecting the concepts themselves.49 Thus, 7 + 5 = 12 is 
ultimately true by virtue of the concepts 7  + 5 and 12. It is synthetic just to the extent 
that it cannot be proven from those concepts alone. It is necessary to invoke "particular 
representatives" of the concepts in question in order to complete the proof.50 Before 
taking on the relationship between the analytic and synthetic a priori in general, let's first 
consider these claims with respect to the synthetic a priori judgments of mathematics.  
 Hintikka's argument, we might say, has both a positive and negative dimension: 
on the one hand, he wants to show that intuition plays a narrow, strictly inferential role in 
Kant's theory of mathematics; on the other hand, and largely in the interest of propping 
up his principal campaign, he attempts to disqualify the widely held view that, for Kant, 
                                                
49 Jaakko Hintikka, "Kant's Theory of Mathematics Revisited", pp. 202, 211. 
50 Analytic judgments, in these terms, are distinguished by the fact that they can be 
apprehended as true without appeal to particular representatives. According to Hintikka, 
this formal feature of analytic judgments (or analytic "argument steps") best captures 
what Kant intends by analyticity (Logic, Language-Games, and Information, p. 137). 
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mathematical propositions depend for their truth and necessity on pure intuition. Among 
the evidence that Hintikka adduces in support of this secondary claim are a number of 
suggestive passages from the first Critique, passages that resonate with the one just cited 
above. Thus, in the Introduction, Kant remarks that the necessary connection between 
subject and predicate in a mathematical judgment "already attaches to the concepts" 
(B17). And earlier, in the Preface, he informs us that mathematics entered on to the 
"secure path of a science" when the geometer recognized that "he had to ascribe to the 
[isosceles triangle] nothing except what followed necessarily from what he himself had 
put into it in accordance with its concept" (Bxii, my italics).51  
 As to whether these passages indicate that mathematical truths are independent 
from pure intuition as regards their truth and necessity, I submit that they do not. What 
they point to, rather, is a kind of inconsistency in Kant's way of talking about 
mathematical concepts relative to other kinds of concepts. When Kant talks about the 
pure concepts, he represents the concept as such as encompassing just those properties 
that the corresponding object has independently of space and time. Thus, when Kant talks 
about the concept substance, he understands this to exclude the property of persistence, 
which substances take on in the context of temporal intuition (A147/B186). When he 
talks about mathematical concepts, on the other hand, he does not exclude the spatio-
temporal determinations of the corresponding objects. On the contrary, a mathematical 
concept is only admissible as a mathematical concept, according to Kant, insofar as it has 
been determined "in accordance with the conditions of...pure intuition" (A718/B746). 
                                                
51 We could add to this list a passage from the Transcendental Methodology, in which 
Kant remarks that synthetic a priori judgment allows us to "go beyond" the concept 
triangle, and to grasp predicates that "do not lie in this concept but still belong to it" 
(A718/B746). 
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The concept triangle is only valid as a mathematical concept insofar as I have spelled out 
the properties that the triangle assumes in the context of spatial intuition. 52 
 When Kant says that the predicates of synthetic a priori judgments already attach 
to the concepts, therefore, I think that we can read him as saying that those predicates 
attach to the spatio-temporally determined (or "constructed") concepts. This, however, is 
as much as to say that the predicates attach to the actual spatio-temporal objects. And 
indeed, speaking with more precision than he does in the introductory passages cited by 
Hintikka, this is what Kant says. He explains that in a synthetic a priori judgment, one 
proceeds "from the concept to the pure...intuition corresponding to it in order to...cognize 
a priori...what pertains to its object" (A721/B749). Since a priority and necessity are 
equivalent notions for Kant (A2, B3-4), this means that the pure intuition allows us to 
grasp predicates that are necessarily connected with the object, but which cannot simply 
be discovered "in the [corresponding] concept" (B73). The synthetic a priori judgments in 
which this distinct, non-conceptual necessity finds expression, therefore, do not 
ultimately reduce to analytic judgments. The element of pure intuition is not merely what 
allows us to see that synthetic a priori judgments are true; it is what actually makes such 
judgments true.53  
                                                
52 Emily Carson makes this point in the course of arguing, against Hintikka, that intuition 
for Kant actually does perform a non-inferential role in the context of mathematics 
("Hintikka on Kant's Mathematical Method", p. 443). 
53  In marginal note to his own copy of the Critique, Kant spells out an additional formal 
feature of this second, non-analytic form of necessity. According to Kant, "space and 
time carry with them...necessity"; but, he adds, this is "not the necessity of a concept...for 
we can prove that their non-existence is not contradictory" (Critique of Pure Reason, p. 
159). In other words, there is no contradiction in simply denying the actuality of space 
and time. Beings having our particular representational faculties simply might not exist. 
In such a scenario, the propositions that we recognize as synthetic a priori could indeed 
be denied without contradiction. We could deny, for example, that 'the straight line 
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Analytic Judgment as a Standard of Necessity 
 
If analytic judgment does not represent a model for all propositional necessity 
whatsoever, perhaps we might venture a weaker reading, one that would see it 
functioning along the lines of Hume's relation's of ideas: as a standard of necessity 
relative to which other kinds of propositions could be measured. This reading has a 
certain prima facie plausibility: because analytic judgments are necessary, it is clear that 
they are modally stronger than synthetic a posteriori judgments; and because analytic 
judgments owe their necessity just to their constituent concepts, there is a sense in which 
they are more necessary than synthetic a priori judgments, which—as we have just 
seen—depend for their necessity on the contingent structure of human sensibility. Just as 
Hume employs relations of ideas as a way of marking of the absence of rational necessity 
in other categories of judgment, it might look therefore as if Kant invokes analytic 
judgment as a way of marking the absence of absolute necessity in other categories of 
judgment. 
 As it turns out, it is relatively easy to cash out this intuition in epistemic terms, 
namely, when we consider the steps that we need to run through in order to verify 
analytic and synthetic judgments, respectively. In the case of synthetic a posteriori 
judgments like 'the door is blue', verification requires, first, clarity with regard to the 
meanings of our terms, and second, epistemic access to the particular fact on which the 
truth or falsity of the judgment depends. In the case of synthetic a priori judgments, like 
'all events are caused', the process of verification becomes less demanding: we require 
                                                                                                                                            
between two points is the shortest', because there would be no spatial manifold relative to 
which this proposition would be necessarily true. Analytically necessary propositions are 
not conditional in this sense. They do not depend for their truth on extra-conceptual facts.   
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clarity with regard to the meaning of our terms, and epistemic access to any suitably 
representative fact whatsoever (A714-5/B742-3). In the case of analytic judgments, 
finally, the process of verification becomes less demanding still: just by virtue of 
knowing the meanings of the words 'body' and 'extended', I know that the judgment 
'bodies are extended' is true. Since, from an epistemic perspective, this is precisely what 
the 'absolute necessity' of 'bodies are extended' consists in—namely, in the fact that that it 
is verified at the level of meaning, without reference to experience54—there is a 
meaningful sense in which analytic judgment can be used as modal benchmark for other 
categories of judgment. Analytic judgment figures here as just the most easily verified 
category of judgment; as the category of judgment for which meaning clarification is a 
sufficient, rather than merely necessary, condition of verification. 
 It is also possible to show that analytic judgment represents a modal benchmark 
for synthetic judgment when modal properties are understood in a semantic sense. 
Consider the judgment 'the door is blue'. To say that this judgment is synthetic a 
posteriori, on Kant's way of seeing things, means to say that it is true for a particular set 
of observers at a particular time: given that he allows for different forms of sensibility, he 
necessarily concedes that the door need not appear blue for all observers; and given that 
human sensibility does not offer up intuitions of permanence, he necessarily concedes 
that the door might cease to appear blue. Next, consider the judgment 'all events are 
caused'. To say that this judgment is synthetic a priori, for Kant, is to say that it is true for 
a particular set of observers at all times: these judgments are limited in their scope to 
human beings, with our particular faculties of intuition, but they are eternally valid, 
                                                
54 See the discussion of apriority in Chapter 2.  
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because they are grounded precisely in those faculties of intuition themselves. Finally, 
consider the judgment 'all bodies are extended'. To say that this judgment is analytic, 
according to Kant, is to say that is true for all observers at all times: wherever, whenever 
and for whomever the concept body is instantiated, it is instantiated as extended. If the 
contingency of a synthetic a posteriori judgment entails subjective and temporal 
relativity, and if the necessity of synthetic a priori judgments entails subjective relativity 
alone,55 the absolute necessity of analytic judgments entails independence from any 
limiting subjective or temporal condition whatsoever (8:235, A594/B622). Analytic 
judgment stands with respect to other categories of judgment as the least relative category 
of judgment—as that category of judgment that is least restricted as regards truth.56  
 
Analytic Judgment as Concept Constituting 
If analytic judgment does not provide a model for synthetic judgment, therefore, it looks 
at least as if it provides a meaningful standard with relative to which synthetic judgment 
can be understood. Just as Hume's relations of ideas offer a high-water mark against 
which merely factual propositions can be measured, analytic judgment offers a way of 
                                                
55 Robert Hanna suggests an amendment on this score. For a judgment to be relatively 
necessary, Hanna explains, means for that judgment to be logically entailed by a set of 
"logically independent propositions", and thus to be at least potentially false when one or 
more members of that set come out false (Kant and the Foundations of Analytic 
Philosophy, p. 262). But synthetic a priori judgments, Hanna maintains, do not conform 
to this model. In particular, synthetic a priori judgments are never false: in appropriately 
structured 'possible worlds', the judgment 7 + 5 = 12 comes out as true; in worlds that are 
inappropriately structured, 7 + 5 = 12 just comes out just as truth-valueless. Its 
constituent concepts simply are not instantiated ("Mathematics for Humans", p. 334). 
56 To say that analytic judgment is the 'least' restricted category of truth, of course, is not 
to say that it is simply unrestricted. Against the thought that analytic judgments are true 
'in all possible worlds', I will argue in the next chapter that they hold just for beings that 
are disposed to think in terms of the basic categories that we ourselves employ in 
synthesizing the empirically given manifold.   
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representing the epistemic and semantic properties of merely synthetic propositions. Of 
course, it still possible to be dissatisfied with this way of understanding the relationship 
between analytic and synthetic judgment. For all that we have shown, analytic judgment 
might still be a merely hypothetical maximum, rather than a form of judgment that serves 
some essential cognitive or epistemological purpose. By way of completing our survey of 
Kant's predecessors, therefore, let's see if a stronger role for analytic judgment can be 
drawn from our discussion of Locke's trifling propositions. Just as the latter express the 
minimal semantic content that we should grasp in order to operate with a given idea, 
perhaps we could see analytic judgments as conveying the conditions for the possession 
of, and hence the synthetic amplification of, a given concept. On this view, I could learn 
that gold is susceptible to rust only if were antecedently prepared to affirm the analytic 
judgment 'gold is a yellow metal'. The analytic judgment would have the status of a 
'concept-constituting' proposition relative to the concept gold. 
 To return briefly to Locke, we may see his position on this matter as growing out 
of an apparent paradox: although complex objects like general substances and 
mathematical entities are not directly given in experience, our talk about such objects 
exhibits a high degree of stability. We do not actually perceive gold or triangles, but our 
ideas of gold and triangles seem quite consistent, both intensionally and extensionally. 
Locke resolves this paradox, we might say, by identifying semantic stability with 
conscious decision. The word 'gold' owes its meaning not to some fixed, natural essence, 
but to a collectively constituted, complex idea. The word 'triangle' owes its meaning not 
to some frequently encountered shape, but to a consciously formulated, geometrical idea. 
Since these ideas are in some ways nothing more than arbitrary placed markers, Locke is 
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doubtful that reflection on them will bear any real epistemological fruit. I have suggested, 
on the other hand, that the apparent triviality of the resulting, merely explicative 
propositions belies a deeper significance: since general substances and mathematical 
entities are individuated by their associated ideas, it looks as if we gain epistemic access 
to general substances and mathematical entities precisely through those very ideas; 
trifling propositions, in turn, can be seen as encompassing just those propositions that we 
should affirm in order to gain access to the objects in question. 
 Our question at this point is whether something similar is going on in Kant. In the 
first place, is there a sense in which the objects of epistemological interest for Kant are 
individuated by concepts? And if so, can we claim that assent to certain key concept-
constituting propositions is a necessary condition for meaningful reflection on those 
objects? 
 At first glace, Kant's position as regards mathematical objects seems quite close to 
that of Locke. In mathematics, Kant explains, I begin on the basis of definitions. I do not 
first receive a kind of obscure presentiment of triangles which I then formalize 
conceptually; to the extent that I have any conception of triangles whatsoever, it is a 
conception that already includes the essential attributes of triangles.57 The priority of 
definition relative to experience can be brought out more clearly by considering some of 
the slightly more esoteric inhabitants of the mathematical universe. Thus, in the 
Blomberg Logic, Kant takes up the issue of definition in mathematics with reference to 
the octagon, a geometrical object of which we do not plausibly have any consistent or 
                                                
57 Kant distinguishes in his logical writings between essentialia and attributa. With 
respect to triangles in particular, he species that the sides are essentialia, while the angles 
are attributa (9:61, 24:115) 
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clear experience: "all mathematicians' definitions are nothing but ideas prototypas, e.g., 
the concept of the octagon is not borrowed from experience; instead, the mathematician 
thinks such a thing through his pure reason. He represents a figure that has 8 lines and is 
enclosed by them" (24:254). 
 Of course, the mathematician does not remain at the level of definition. Instead, 
she "hurries immediately to intuition" (A715/B743), in which context the objects that 
result from definition can be interrogated as to their mathematically significant 
properties. What is relevant for our purposes is simply that this reference to the 
intuitively realized object would be impossible if were not mediated by the antecedently 
grasped definitions.58 As Kant remarks in the context of synthetic objects, meaning 
objects, like triangles, that are consciously and deliberately constituted: "the object is 
given a priori only through [its] definition, and [only] through this definition is it 
possible to think it" (24:920). 
 On a first pass, this seems to confirm the hypothesis that we set out to test. It 
looks like we gain epistemic access to triangles only insofar as we are prepared to affirm 
a proposition along the lines of 'triangles are three-sided rectilinear figures'. Note, 
however, that while this proposition satisfies our basic expectations regarding analytic 
judgments—in the sense that it takes subject-predicate form, and attributes to its subject 
concept an element of the subject concept itself—Kant does not actually say that analytic 
judgments have any role to play in this context. He claims consistently that our access to 
                                                
58 Reference to the intuitively realized object would be similarly impossible if it were not 
mediated by an antecedently produced schema. There is good reason to think, however, 
that the schema itself depends on the concept of which it is a schema. Thus, Kant defines 
a schema as a "rule for the determination of our intuition in accordance with a certain 
general concept" (A141/B180). Shortly after this, he remarks that "the schema of sensible 
concepts....must be connected with the concept" (A142/B181).  
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mathematical objects runs through definitions specifically. In order to see whether this is 
merely an accident of terminology, or whether it points to something more fundamental, 
it will be worth looking quickly at Kant's understanding of definition.  
 Definition, according to Kant, is possible in essentially two different ways. 
Definitions are 'synthetic' when the concept that is defined is actually produced by the 
definition itself, as in mathematics; and definitions are 'analytic' when the concept to be 
defined is 'given' independently of the definition, as in metaphysics or morals (24:914-
916).59 As Lewis White Beck indicates, this twofold theory of definition corresponds to a 
twofold role for analytic judgment.60 In the case of synthetic definitions, analytic 
judgment is possible on the basis of the definition itself: given the definition of a 1000-
sided figure, I can produce analytic judgments stating the predicates that have been 
inscribed in the subject concept. In the case of analytic definitions, on the other hand, 
analytic judgments are actually instrumental in the formation of the definition: by 
analyzing the concepts that are given to the understanding, we approach an exhaustive 
definition of the same.61 
 This glimpse at the distinct, complementary roles of definition and analytic 
judgment explains why it would be a mistake to conflate these distinct kinds of 
                                                
59 Here I am concerned just with the different ways in which definitions come to be. Kant 
also distinguishes between ways in which definitions relate to their objects. A 'nominal' 
definition suffices just for distinguishing an object externally from all other objects. A 
'real' definition captures the internal properties of the corresponding object (24:919-920)  
60 Lewis White Beck, "Kant's Theory of Definition", p. 191. 
61 Since definition is subject to a rigorous standard of completeness, according to which a 
definition should "exhibit originally the exhaustive concept of a thing within its 
boundaries" (A727/B755, my italics), the possibility of a genuine analytic definition is 
actually somewhat uncertain, according to Kant (24:916). There is simply no guarantee 
that a concept that is 'given' to us will offer itself up completely to analysis. The 
possibility of obscure predicates cannot be entirely ruled out (A728/B756, 24:272, 
24:918). 
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proposition-forming activity, and why Kant consistently declines to do so. In the case of 
mathematics, this would be to put the cart before the horse: it would be to take the 
analytic activity that trails in the wake of definition as an original form of concept-
constitution in its own right. In the case of metaphysics, it would be to mistake a means 
for an end: it would be to take the partial, analytic judgments that are that oriented toward 
comprehensive definitions as definitions in their own right.  
 This in turn suggests that there is no real need to pursue the parallel with Locke as 
far as general substances. Although analytic judgment function somewhat differently in 
the context of mathematics than it does in metaphysics, what is common to both fields of 
endeavor is the fact that analytic judgment intervenes only after the fact. Analytic 
judgment seizes on concepts that are antecedently available—whether they are made 
available on the basis of definition or through the nature of the understanding. Analytic 
judgment is not responsible for instituting concepts in the first place, or even for 
enforcing the boundaries of concepts that have already been instituted.   
 
General Substances 
On the other hand, a question does arise concerning general substances when we try to 
apply this newfound understanding of analytic judgment to Kant's famous example, 'gold 
is a yellow metal'. Evidently, the possibility of analytic judgment presupposes the 
antecedent availability of some concept; but it is not clear how the concept gold comes to 
be antecedently available to us—at least in a sufficiently stable form as to offer itself up 
for analytic judgment. Since gold is an empirical concept, it follows that it is not just 
defined into existence, like mathematical concepts. But it is equally clear that the concept 
gold is not simply provided to us on the basis of the understanding: Kant is not 
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committed to the claim that our repertoire of empirical concepts is in any way rationally 
necessary.   
 One course of action would be to appeal to a different kind of definition than the 
ones we have encountered so far. Instead of supposing that empirical concepts are 
defined in a synthetic a priori fashion, as in mathematics, or analytically, as in 
metaphysics, we could suppose that they are defined in a synthetic a posteriori fashion—
meaning that they are assembled on the basis of predicates harvested from empirical 
intuition. In that case, we could account straightforwardly for the analyticity of 'gold is a 
yellow metal'. It would be a second-order judgment made possible on the basis of the 
gradually assembled, and collectively ratified definition of 'gold'. Unfortunately, it looks 
like this line of interpretation is closed. According to Kant, empirical concepts simply 
never crystallize into definitions at all. In the first place, they are subject to variation 
between individuals (24:757); second, we simply cannot become "acquainted with all the 
possible marks that experience can teach concerning an object" (24:918); finally, such 
concepts are inherently dynamic: when we operate with an empirical concept, the point is 
precisely to improve our understanding of the corresponding subject, which means that 
the concept itself is susceptible to revision (A728/B756). Seen in light of these 
considerations—especially the first and third—it is unclear how we are to account for the 
analyticity of 'gold is a yellow metal'. Supposing that the concept gold were the subject of 
a widespread consensus as regards meaning, we might understand 'gold is a yellow metal' 
as a report on our current conceptual practices. But it could not be understood as an 
analytic judgment, because it might cease to reflect those conceptual practices, meaning 
that it was only contingently true to begin with.  
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 As it turns out, it is possible to salvage the analyticity of propositions like 'gold is 
a yellow metal' by looking more closely at Kant's disclaimers concerning empirical 
concepts. When we do, we find that Kant assumes that empirical concepts are indeed 
subject to a basic, non-definitional form of conceptual stability, and that it is this basic 
conceptual stability that underwrites the possibility of analytic judgments having 
empirical content. Thus, at the same time that Kant notes that a concept might vary 
between individuals, he identifies a particular set of predicates as an intensional baseline: 
"in the concept gold one person might think, besides its weight, color, and ductility, its 
property of not rusting, while another might know nothing about this" (A727/B755, my 
italics). Likewise, when Kant suggests that empirical concepts are subject to 
augmentation or amendment on the basis of increased understanding, he suggests that 
such amendment occurs against the backdrop of a fixed, skeletal concept:  
in any case what would be the point of defining [an empirical] concept? - since 
when, e.g., water and its properties are under discussion, one will not stop at 
what is intended by the word "water', but rather advance to experiments, and the 
word, with the few marks that are attached to it, is to constitute only a 
designation [Bezeichnung] and not a concept of the thing; thus the putative 
definition is nothing other than the determination of the word (A728/B756, my 
emphasis). 
 
In both cases, I think that we can see this constraint on the range of intensional variation 
as basically pragmatic in nature. If two individuals associated entirely different meanings 
with the word 'gold', then the possibility of communication involving that word would be 
out of the question. Likewise, if experiments carried out on water were not oriented 
around a basic, 'designative' concept, then there would arguably be nowhere to 'put' the 
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predicates garnered through experiment. As Kant remarks, we "define an empirical 
concept in order to add something to it afterward per synthesin" (24:271).62 
 As for how this initial, designative concept comes to be formed, here we 
encounter an interpretative problem. On the one hand, it is natural to think that such 
concepts would be formed in response to sensory promptings. Certain empirical 
regularities would be manifest in our external environment, and we would inscribe these 
regularities into a basic repertoire of concepts. On the other hand, it is just this account of 
concept formation that has lately come under some strain. Philosophers such as John 
McDowell have denied that Kantian empirical concepts originate with proto-conceptual 
intuitive content, on the grounds that our empirical intuitions are never in fact proto-
                                                
62 The nature and function of the 'designative' concept has been somewhat obscured in the 
secondary literature. Thus, Lewis White Beck remarks that the meaning of the 
designative concept "var[ies] with experience" ("Can Kant's Synthetic Judgments Be 
Made Analytic", p. 176), missing the fact that it is the designative concept itself that 
makes meaningful variation possible (insofar as it, precisely, does not vary). Dascal and 
Senderowitcz make what is in some ways the opposite mistake when they suggest that 
"the only thing that stays stable in the evolution of [empirical] concepts is the word". For 
these authors, the fixity of the concept water is not achieved on the basis of a minimal, 
non-negotiable set of predicates; invoking the theories direct reference developed by 
Kripke and Putnam, they suggest that it is achieved on the basis of an immediate relation 
between the word 'water' and the actual substance water ("How Pure is Pure Reason? 
Language, Empirical Concepts, and Empirical Laws in Kant's Theory of Knowledge", p. 
141). But this flies in the face of the very passage that the authors cite in support of their 
position, where Kant remarks that we "attach" a "few characteristics" to the word 'water', 
and that it is precisely these characteristics that we "think" along with the word 
(A728/B756). Some support for interpretation that I have advanced comes from Umberto 
Eco: "unfortunately, using an overly strong expression, Kant said that...empirical 
concepts "cannot even be defined". They cannot be defined once and for all...but admit of 
a first nucleus around which successive definitions will gel (or arrange themselves 
harmoniously)" (Kant and The Platypus, p. 87). 
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conceptual. According to McDowell, empirical intuitions are always shot through with 
conceptual content.63  
 Fortunately, it is not necessary to address the difficult issue of concept formation 
at this point. Whether empirical concepts arise on the basis of essentially non-conceptual 
empirical intuitions, or on the basis of some more or less spontaneous cognitive process, 
what is crucial is just that they are stabilized by means of a minimal, designative core. 
This in turn explains in what sense propositions 'gold is a yellow metal' are possible as 
analytic judgments. As it turns out, the possibility of thinking about and learning about 
general substances presupposes that the corresponding concepts are fixed by means of 
minimal, designative concepts. It is those minimal, designative concepts that are available 
for analytic judgment.  
 Finally, therefore, while we have failed to show that analytic judgments perform a 
concept-constituting role in natural science or mathematics, we have nevertheless 
managed to explain in what sense analytic judgments are possible in those areas. In both 
cases, analytic judgment is possible as an artefact of the conceptual fixity that both forms 
of inquiry presuppose, and that is realized in the first case through definition, and in the 
second case, through the quasi-definitional mechanism of designation.  
 It also possible to reach a conclusion here concerning the value of analytic 
judgment in the areas of mathematics and natural science. Since both fields of endeavor 
presuppose the availability of fixed, transparent concepts, it looks like there is ultimately 
very little for analytic judgment to do. Whereas philosophical concepts like substance 
and right might be obscure for some person at some moment (A43/B61), and might for 
                                                
63 John McDowell, Having the World in View, p. 43; Hannah Ginsborg, "Kant and the 
Problem of Experience", p. 80. 
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that reason be fruitfully subjected to analysis, the concepts triangle and gold will be 
invariably be transparent to whoever possesses those concepts, meaning that conceptual 
analysis can only be redundant. Kant makes this clear in the case of empirical concepts 
specifically:  
I do not define a concept of experience so that I can become familiar with the 
object by means of analysis. I do not define any concept of experience, e.g., gold, 
in order to infer something therefrom and to draw consequences from this 
definition[,] but instead only in order to establish the word-meaning of the 
definitum" (24:271). 
 
He makes it similarly clear in the area of mathematics, insofar as he never actually says 
that mathematical judgments like 'all triangles are three-sided' qualify as analytic.64 For 
Kant, this kind of judgment is possible as analytic; but it is methodologically valuable 
just as a definition. 
 
Analytic and Synthetic A Priori Judgment 
In comparing Kant's theory of analytic judgment with the theories of necessary judgment 
developed by his predecessors, we have arrived at the following conclusions. As regards 
its theoretical genesis, it looks as if analytic judgment can be seen as an artefact of the 
discursive model of cognition, with its strong distinction between intuition and concept. 
As regards its rhetorical function, meanwhile, the idea of analytic judgment can be seen 
                                                
64 This is in contrast to Sebastian Gardner, who cites exactly this judgment as an 
apparently representative example of a Kantian analytic judgment (Kant and the Critique 
of Pure Reason, p. 36). But it is in agreement with Willem DeJong, who notes that Kant 
"never applies the distinction between analytic and synthetic judgments to definitions in 
mathematics, i.e. to synthetic definitions as the pre-critical Kant already dubbed them. 
These definitions do not extend cognition or clarify a concept; they introduce or construct 
a concept by representing it in intuition a priori " ("The Analytic/Synthetic Distinction 
and the Classical Model of Science: Kant, Bolzano, and Frege", p. 248). 
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as a way of underscoring—by dint of its comparatively modest epistemic value—the 
significance of synthetic judgment.   
 Our attempts to define a more positive rhetorical function for analytic judgment 
have not so far met with success. Because Kantian judgments take two fundamentally 
different forms, we cannot use one species of judgment as a semantic model for the other; 
and because the necessity that characterizes analytic judgments is in a certain sense 
opaque to us, we cannot invoke these judgments as a modal benchmark against which 
other kinds of proposition can be measured.  
 Similarly, when we tried to show that analytic judgments might perform a kind of 
concept-constituting role, and might in this sense represent an epistemic condition of 
possibility for synthetic judgments, we came up short. As it turns out, concepts in 
mathematics and natural science are fixed not by analytic judgments, but by definitions. 
The latter represent the necessary epistemic condition for synthetic predication. Analytic 
judgment comes on the scene here just as an epistemologically redundant, merely formal 
possibility.   
 In what follows, I will try to show that a stronger role for analytic judgment is 
available than the ones we have so far encountered. Appropriately enough, this role 
emerges at precisely the point where Kant's theory of judgment breaks most sharply from 
the theories passed down from his predecessors—namely, in the theory of synthetic a 
priori knowledge.  
 
Justifying Syntheticity 
According to Kant, the judgment 'every event has a cause' is a synthetic a priori judgment 
(B3). As we know, this means that the predicate having a cause does not belong to the 
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concept event, but is conjoined with it in the act of judgment. Suppose, however, that a 
skeptic challenges Kant's analysis of this judgment. For the skeptic, the judgment 'every 
event has a cause' does not emerge out of a complex operation involving the 
understanding and pure intuition; it is a straightforward case of the partial identity of 
concepts. The concept event simply contains the concept of causation as a component; we 
achieve insight into the necessity of the judgment not by drawing on pure intuition, but 
simply by analyzing the concept event. On this reading, it is true that events are 
necessarily caused, but this truth is first and foremost conceptual. It is not a substantial, 
metaphysical truth. Kant's entire enterprise comes to look like a trivial exercise in 
unpacking basic concepts.  
 Consider now how Kant can defuse this challenge. At a minimum, he needs to 
show that the concept of causation does not belong to the concept event. This will 
succeed in demonstrating that the judgment, if it can be made at all, is synthetic—
meaning, at minimum, that concept and predicate are in a certain sense foreign to one 
another, and need to be brought together in an act of judgment.65 How can this be 
demonstrated? Obviously, Kant cannot take what might look to be the simplest path 
available. He cannot argue that the concept in question—the concept which bundles 
together events and casuation—is experientially unmotivated. Kant admits that our actual 
experience of events is invariably accompanied by a representation of causation 
(A192/B237). If concepts are entirely beholden to experience for their content, therefore, 
                                                
65 It is possible to doubt whether this criterion is sufficient for a judgment's being 
synthetic (e.g 
Henry Allison Kant's Transcendental Idealism, p. 90; Moltke Gram, "The Crisis of 
Syntheticity", pp. 156-157). My argument requires just that this criterion be necessary for 
a judgment's being synthetic.  
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we have excellent grounds for including the concept of causation within the concept 
event.  
 Instead of referring the problem directly to experience, therefore, Kant will 
undertake a more subtle strategy. He will argue that we can reflect coherently on the 
concept event without calling to mind the idea of causation (A9/B13). That being so, he 
will claim that the latter does not belong to the former in an immediate sense, but 
represents a kind of addendum, something added to the concept from without. This, in 
turn, means that the judgment every event has a cause cannot be a straightforward 
conceptual truth, as our (not altogether) hypothetical challenger maintains. Since we can 
coherently think the concept event without at the same time thinking the predicate having 
a cause, it cannot be the case that the latter simply falls out of the former. If they are 
necessarily conjoined, as our challenger maintains, and as Kant himself recognizes, then 
there must be some explanation for this fact beyond simple conceptual identity. Providing 
this explanation is the task of the first Critique, and the doctrine of synthetic a priori 
judgment more specifically.  
 Of course, this does not yet show that analytic judgment per se plays any role in 
clarifying the status of synthetic a priori judgment. It seems clear that some kind of 
conceptual reflection is required if we are to demonstrate that putative synthetic a priori 
judgments really are synthetic a priori. But it is not yet clear that this process of 
conceptual reflection should be identified with analytic judgment. This doubt can be 
motivated by observing that we have not yet shown whether the conceptual reflection in 
question involves insight into the concept in question—that is, into the intension (Inhalt) 
of the concept. For all that I have shown, it might be possible to determine that causation 
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falls outside of the concept event without having any notion of the predicates that belong 
inside the latter. In that sense, it might look like we can identify a judgment as synthetic a 
priori without being in a position to form what we typically think of as analytic 
judgments, that is, judgments that articulate the content of a given concept.66 
Consideration of what we actually do when we reflect on a concept, however, suggests 
that this is not the case. In the case of an empirical concept like event, what we do is call 
to mind the intuitive content that we associate with the concept; and this means 
summoning to mind certain intuitively given properties. Plausibly, some of these 
properties will prove to be necessary conditions for the representation of the concept. 
Thus, Kant argues that we cannot represent a body to ourselves without representing 
some region of space for the body to occupy (B5). Likewise, we cannot represent an 
event without situating that event at some determinate moment, some determinate starting 
point. From here, it is a short step to the insight for any given event, there must a time 
before the event gets underway (A9/B13).67 In order to experience something as an event, 
it is necessary that we represent for ourselves a time that precedes the event. An event 
that was always already underway would not be recognizable as an event.68 
 Having thus established a very basic intuitive representation of events, we are in a 
position to clarify the status of other properties vis-à-vis the phenomenon in question. 
                                                
66 As we will see in the next chapter, Kant also includes under the banner of analytic 
judgment those judgments which articulate the 'anti-intension' of concepts. He calls such 
judgments 'negative analytic judgments'. 
67 "If I perceive that something happens, then the first thing contained in this 
representation is that something precedes..." (A198/B243). 
68 Kant makes this point indirectly in the first Analogy: "If you assume that something 
began to be, you would have to have a time in which it did not exist" (A188/B231). 
Arthur Melnick paraphrases this helpfully as follows: "If a comes to be, it must come to 
be or begin to exist at some time t', and it must be the case that it did not exist (or obtain) 
at some time t previous to t'" (Kant's Analogies of Experience, p. 60). 
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Thus, granted that events must be preceded by some stretch of time, and must occur at 
some relatively well-defined point in time, we can ask whether events must occur in a 
particular place. In other words, are events necessarily determined in both time and 
space? For the purposes of this cursory demonstration, the answer to this question 
appears to be no. We can easily call to mind things that happen, but which do not happen 
in a particular place. Any purely mental episode, such as an imagining, or a remembering, 
would seem to fit the bill. Similarly, and closer to our immediate concerns, it becomes 
possible at this point to recognize that events need not stand in relation a cause. We know 
that events must be preceded by some stretch of time; but it is at least possible to imagine 
that this time might be empty, devoid of anything like a cause.  
 Therefore, it looks like it is necessary to have insight into conceptual intension in 
order to identify judgments as synthetic a priori. In order to justify the claim that 
causation does not belong to the concept event, we require insight into the predicates that 
do belong necessarily to this concept. 
 By way of summing up, let's consider what we've just seen in more general terms. 
Kant, as we know, wants to show that it is possible to form necessary judgments that do 
not owe their necessity to concepts alone. He wants to show that it is possible to go 
'outside' a given concept, and to discover a predicate that coheres necessarily with that 
concept. Our skeptic, on the other hand, thinks that necessary predication is always and 
only conceptual predication. If am able to conjoin a given subject and predicate with 
necessity, the predicate must simply belong to the subject. Kant, in response, must supply 
a method for showing that necessary predication is not always conceptual predication—
that a subject and predicate concept might cohere necessarily without being identical. As 
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we saw, Kant cannot proceed by pointing to a counter-example in experience, meaning 
an instance in which the objects picked out by the subject and predicate are manifestly 
dissociated; the necessary coherence of those objects is presupposed as a basic faktum. 
Instead, he must show that we can attend to particular concepts, and determine with 
authority that a given predicate falls outside of the concept. What I have tried to show 
above is that we do this by reflecting on a given concept and recognizing that the 
predicate in question is not implied by the predicates that arise naturally in conjunction 
with the concept. This presupposes that we can become conscious of the predicates that 
do arise naturally in conjunction with the concept—or, in Kant's terminology, that we are 
capable of analytic judgment. The legitimacy of the idea synthetic a priori judgment, we 
can conclude, presupposes the possibility of analytic judgment. 
 We might add that what we have said applies equally to the relationship between 
synthetic a posteriori judgment and analytic judgment. Supposing that a skeptic were to 
claim that the idea of being-overcast is actually included in the concept sky, and that the 
proposition the sky is overcast is consequently tautological, it would be necessary to 
demonstrate that the concept sky does not include the predicate being-overcast, which 
would mean becoming clear about what does belong to the concept sky. What makes this 
particular process of conceptual clarification quite trivial is that it can be carried out with 
reference to the object in question. We simply need to wait until the sky is no longer 
overcast and to impress upon the skeptic their continued willingness to refer to it as 'the 
sky'. In the case of synthetic a priori judgments, on the other hand, this option is not 
available, because the object invariably exhibits the property that is in question: bodies 
are always extended, space is always three-dimensional, etc. The kind of conceptual 
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clarification that I have identified with analytic judgment is thus indispensible if the 
category of synthetic a priority is to have any authority.  
 
The Methodological Role of Analytic Judgment in Metaphysics 
Though Kant is by no means unconcerned with the problem of justifying synthetic a 
priori judgments as synthetic a priori judgments, he does not acknowledge the particular 
justificatory role that analytic judgment can and does play in this effort. To the extent that 
he acknowledges that the justification of synthetic a priority presupposes conceptual 
clarification at all, it is in a strictly negative, Humean sense. He acknowledges that we 
must be able to demonstrate the non-identity of two concepts if we are to classify the 
judgment that unites them as synthetic (B15-16). He does not go as far as to argue that a 
demonstration of non-identity requires insight into the content of either concept.  
 This does not mean, however, that Kant fails to acknowledge that analytic 
judgment plays any presuppositional role whatsoever relative to synthetic a priori 
judgment. On the contrary, he indicates in several places that analytic judgments perform 
a kind of preliminary, clarificatory function relative to their synthetic counterparts. Thus, 
in the Introduction to the Critique, Kant says that analytic judgments are "important and 
necessary...for attaining that distinctness of concepts that is requisite for a secure and 
extended synthesis as a really new acquisition" (B23). Elsewhere, Kant says that analytic 
judgments "provide the means" to the synthetic a priori judgments that properly comprise 
metaphysics. By formulating "several" analytic judgments with regards to a given 
concept, and in that way "approach[ing]" its definition, we make possible subsequent, 
"synthetic propositions" concerning that concept (4:273-274). Regrettably, Kant does not 
indicate in either of the passages just cited exactly how analytic judgments enable the 
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formation of synthetic a priori judgments. In order to get a sense of what he has in mind, 
let's consider an example.  
 In the same section of the Prolegomena that I just cited, Kant offers an example 
of clarificatory analytic judgment: 'substance is that which exists only as subject' (4:273). 
Elaborated slightly, this means that the concept substance is instantiated just as a subject 
of predication, never as a property, or accident, that could be predicated of some other 
thing (B129). Expanded still more, it means that substance is a necessary ground for any 
real predication whatsoever: as Beatrice Longuenesse puts it, "all concepts of real 
determination are attributed in judgment" to substance.69 Having established a certain 
kind of insight into the concept in question, we can now attempt to specify the synthetic 
propositions that can be advanced concerning that concept. Again, Kant neither indicates 
how such propositions are to be produced, nor does he specify in the Prolegomena which 
synthetic propositions follow from the analytic judgment cited above. Fortunately, we 
have already encountered a proposition concerning substance that Kant counts as 
synthetic a priori: 'in all change of appearances substance persists, and its quantum is 
neither increased nor diminished in nature' (B224). Supposing that the analytic judgments 
we have assembled are relevant to this judgment, our question reduces to the following: 
in what sense do those analytic judgments enable, or make possible, their synthetic a 
priori counterpart? The answer seems to be as follows. The analytic judgments establish 
the basic meaning of the concept substance; the synthetic a priori judgment then 
                                                
69 Beatrice Longuenesse, Kant and the Capacity to Judge, p. 331. Longuenesse explains 
that for Kant, the concept of substance is stripped of ontological significance and defined 
entirely with respect to judgment: " the Copernican revolution achieved in the Critique 
means that the categories of substance and accident arise from our acts of discursive 
reflection, our acts of judging applied to the sensible given" (p. 329). 
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elaborates this meaning within the context of human sensibility. The analytic judgments 
tell us that all real predicates refer to a substratum; the synthetic judgment adapts this 
principle to the conditions of temporal intuition, explaining that this condition also holds 
when the predicates in question arise non-simultaneously. 
 Someone might wonder, of course, whether it is necessary to withdraw to such an 
abstract distance in order to grasp the insight that is here at issue. They might think that 
humans are capable of grasping basic, phenomenological facts about their experience—
such as the fact that changes occur against the backdrop of self-identical substrata—
without entering into an antecedent process of concept clarification. This worry rests on a 
cogent vision of empirical insight; crucially, however, this vision does not represent a 
challenge to Kant's claims. On the contrary, it articulates the Humean position that Kant 
takes for granted, and that he is eager to surpass (A91/B123-4). It conveys our ability to 
grasp regularities, but does not explain whether, or how, we are able to grasp the 
corresponding class of judgments with necessity. The demonstration we just rehearsed, 
whereby the concept substance was clarified as regards its essential content, and then 
amplified in the context of spatio-temporal sensibility, supplies this explanation.  
 At the same time, this demonstration clarifies the precise form of necessity that 
characterizes propositions like substance persists. In showing that substance makes no 
reference to the idea of persistence, or indeed to temporal duration in any sense, it helps 
to motivate the insight that the idea of persistence derives from pure, temporal intuition. 
This in turn indicates that the judgment is not true in all possible worlds, but is true—at 
most—in worlds structured in terms of time, i.e. for those forms of cognition that are 
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constrained to experience reality in temporal terms. This, finally, indicates that the 
judgment is synthetic a priori.  
 Though the remark is somewhat allusive, I think that Kant has precisely this kind 
of semantic and modal clarification in mind when he says that analytic judgment is 
"requisite for a secure and extended synthesis as a really new acquisition". A synthetic 
judgment may be performed in relative ignorance of the nature and origin of its 
constituent concepts, and with only an uncertain sense of its modal force. But to install a 
given judgment as a really new acquisition within the systematic body of propositions 
that for Kant, represents the ideal shape of metaphysical inquiry, means understanding 
exactly why and to what extent that judgment is true. 
 
The Methodological Role of Analytic Judgment in Geometry 
Before concluding, it is worth mentioning another remark that Kant makes concerning 
the methodological role of analytic judgment. In the Introduction to the second edition of 
the first Critique, he notes that geometry presupposes "a few" analytic judgments as part 
of its "chain of method" (B16-17). Kant's examples, 'a = a' and '(a+ b) > a', make it easy 
to see what he has in mind. Ideally speaking, any proof in Euclidean geometry will 
include a premise stating that geometrical magnitudes are equal to themselves, and a 
premise stating that the addition of two magnitudes yields a magnitude greater than the 
first. The price of denying the first premise would be incoherence; and the price of 
denying the second premise would be to admit the possibility of negative magnitudes 
(which neither Euclid nor Kant are prepared to do).70 
                                                
70 Kant employs the expression 'negative magnitudes' in a strictly relative sense. The 
number -7 is a negative magnitude relative to the number 7 insofar as it can only be 
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 Having established in relatively short order that the sub-axiomatic base of 
geometry is comprised of analytic judgments, and that the latter are therefore distant but 
necessary conditions for whatever synthetic a priori judgments the geometer might 
produce, it is tempting to simply move on to our conclusion. Unfortunately, we are 
brought up short by an apparent inconsistency in Kant's account—namely, by the fact 
that he denies that 'a = a' and '(a+ b) > a' qualify as analytic, only a few lines after stating 
quite clearly that they do:  
And yet even these, although they are valid in accordance with mere concepts, 
are admitted in mathematics only because they can be exhibited in intuition. 
What usually makes us believe here that the predicate of such apodictic 
judgments already lies in our concept, and that the judgment is therefore analytic, 
is merely the ambiguity of the expression. We should, namely, add a certain 
predicate to a given concept in thought, and this necessity already attaches to the 
concepts. But the question is not what we should think in addition to the given 
concept, but what we actually think in it... (B17). 
 
On the other hand, perhaps Kant only seems to deny that  'a = a' and '(a+ b) > a' are 
analytic in this passage. According to Mark Siebel, what Kant is doing here is something 
quite different: he is reshaping the definition of analytic. He is saying that  'a = a' and '(a+ 
b) > a' qualify as analytic judgments even though they are not analytic according to the 
containment criterion.71  
 While agreeing with Siebel as far as the claim that Kant is not simply 
contradicting himself, I part company with him on the question of what exactly Kant is 
saying here. From my perspective, the key sentence in the above-cited passage is the first 
one, where Kant remarks that 'a = a' and '(a+ b) > a' are admitted in mathematics "only 
                                                                                                                                            
combined with the latter in such a way that the latter is cancelled (7 + (-7) = 0). Kant 
denies that a magnitude could be in some way intrinsically negative (2:175). Like Euclid, 
he regards magnitudes as essentially spatial, thus as essential positive (Michel Friedman, 
Kant and the Exact Sciences, p. 112). 
71 Mark Siebel, ""It Falls Somewhat Short of Logical Precision": Bolzano on Kant's 
Definition of Analyticity", p. 113. 
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because they can be exhibited in intuition". What this means, I think, is that while 'a = a' 
and '(a+ b) > a' are analytic by virtue of the standard criteria for analyticity, they have 
application within the context of geometry only because they happen to articulate a 
necessary feature of spatial intuition. (Other analytic judgments, like 'gold is a yellow 
metal', fail to articulate any necessary features of spatial intuition, and so have no 
application within the context of geometry). This means that in the context of geometry, 
the judgments 'a = a' and '(a+ b) > a' actually do not have the status of analytic judgments: 
they are more akin to synthetic a priori judgments, in the sense that they capture a 
relation of real, rather than purely conceptual, necessity.72 Kant's apparent denial that 'a = 
a' and '(a+ b) > a' are analytic would then come down just to the claim that we cannot 
have analytic insight into real necessities: we cannot know a priori that extended spatial 
magnitudes are equal to themselves, or that two extended magnitudes combine to produce 
a larger magnitude. To claim such insight would be to overstep an epistemic boundary 
that Kant is quite concerned to defend. 
 No doubt, the proposed line of interpretation still faces some challenges. The 
passage in question is quite obscure, and it is not clear whether there is an altogether 
coherent meaning to be extracted from it. What is salient for our present purposes is just 
that the passage gives no real support to the thought that analytic judgment has some 
essential role to play in the context of geometry. Like geometrical axioms themselves, the 
sub-axiomatic principles 'a = a' and '(a+ b) > a' turn out to be essentially synthetic a priori 
                                                
72 In Chapter Four, having gotten clearer on the criteria for analyticity, I will argue that 
the judgments in question are not in fact analytic. For the moment, I am concerned 
simply to understand how Kant himself views these judgments.     
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in nature. They have application in the context of geometry just because they conform to 
the structure of pure spatial intuition.  
 
Conclusion 
Let's conclude by reviewing what we have seen over the course of this chapter 
concerning the relationship between analytic and synthetic judgment. First, it emerged 
that analytic judgment can be viewed as a coherent, but incidental, by-product of an 
epistemological scheme oriented toward the justification of synthetic a priori judgment. 
The semantics of synthetic a priori judgment require a strong distinction between concept 
and intuition; this in turn makes it possible to inquire into concepts just in themselves; the 
result is analytic judgment.  
 Next, it emerged that analytic judgment performs a contrastive, rhetorical function 
relative to synthetic judgment. Because analytic judgments owe their necessity just to 
their constituent concepts, Kant can invoke the idea of analytic judgment as a way of 
underscoring the empirical significance of the other class of necessary propositions that 
he introduces: synthetic a priori judgment.  
 As it turned out, analytic judgment also performs a second, more or less rhetorical 
function. Precisely because the concepts in an analytic judgment are bound together 
necessarily, the idea of analytic judgment can also be invoked as a way of underscoring 
the contingent bond between the subject and predicate concepts in a synthetic a posteriori 
judgment, and the only relatively necessary bond between the subject and predicate 
concepts in a synthetic a priori judgment. Analytic judgment can function as a kind of 
lens through which the epistemic and semantic peculiarities of both kinds of synthetic 
judgment can be viewed.  
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 With an eye to a stronger methodological role for analytic judgment, we asked 
whether analytic judgments in geometry or natural science could be regarded as concept-
constituting propositions, and thus, whether they could be seen as supplying the basic 
conditions of possibility for synthetic predication in those areas. While tempting, we 
concluded that this line of speculation is misguided, and that the role of concept 
constitution is performed by definitions, rather than analytic judgments. The latter are 
possible in geometry and natural science, but just as recapitulations of already-established 
definitions, which means that their methodological value is effectively null.  
 Methodologically significant roles for analytic judgment came to light in 
connection with the central innovation of the first Critique—namely, synthetic a priori 
judgment. First, analytic judgment is required for the justification of synthetic a priori 
judgments as synthetic a priori judgments. In order to show that the judgment 'x is y' is 
synthetic a priori, I necessarily need to unpack the concept x as regards its content. 
Otherwise, it is open to the skeptic to claim that 'x is y' is a trivial, conceptual judgment. 
Finally, analytic judgment plays an important role in the consolidation of synthetic a 
priori judgments as genuine items of knowledge. By clarifying the essential, analytic 
content of our concepts, we are able to describe the precise manner in which those 
concepts are adapted to our spatio-temporal sensibility. 
 In conclusion, therefore, it looks like analytic judgment plays a much more 
important epistemological role than might be expected. Far from simply an empty by-
product of the theoretical system erected in the first Critique, analytic judgment proves to 




Kant's Theory of Analytic Judgment 
In the last chapter, I attempted to clarify the epistemological role that analytic judgment 
performs in the context of Kant's critical philosophy. Against the tendency to dismiss 
analytic judgment as an uninteresting by-product of Kant's critical system, I tried to show 
that it performs an important series of functions within that system. First, analytic 
judgment performs a meta-theoretical, or justificatory role relative to synthetic a priori 
judgment, in that the possibility of defending a given judgment as synthetic a priori 
presupposes that we have analytic insight into its constituent concepts. Second, and most 
importantly, analytic judgment enables the formation of synthetic a priori judgments in 
the area of metaphysics. By analyzing the concepts that are given to us by the 
understanding, it becomes possible to form synthetic a priori judgments bearing on the 
same concepts.   
 The last chapter also enabled us to clarify the precise sense in which analytic 
judgment can be regarded as a trivial by-product. Both natural science and geometry, on 
Kant's reckoning, are obliged to avail themselves of definitions. In the case of natural 
science, this has to do with fixing some minimal phenomenal concept that can in turn be 
synthetically augmented; in the case of geometry, it has to do with establishing a skeletal 
concept that can be 'constructed' in pure intuition and interrogated in the context of 
empirical intuition. Since both sciences presuppose the construction of minimal concepts, 
both sciences hold out the possibility of analytic judgment. But whereas analytic 
judgment manages to clarify obscure representations in the context of metaphysics, 
analytic judgment in the context of natural science and geometry only manages to 
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recapitulate established definitions. In this sense, it is epistemologically redundant, and 
Kant is accordingly reluctant to advertise the possibility of analytic judgment in these 
areas. 
 To summarize, therefore, we might say that while analytic judgment is possible in 
the context of metaphysics, natural science, and geometry, it is methodologically 
valuable just in the context of metaphysics. In the third and fourth chapters, it will 
become possible to augment this conclusion in an important way. What we will see is that 
analytic judgment is only fully defensible in the context of metaphysics. Only given 
certain facts about the concepts that feature in metaphysical judgments is it possible to 
construct a coherent picture of analytic judgment.  
 What I want to do in the present chapter is to lay the groundwork for this 
conclusion, namely, by giving a more detailed account of what exactly analytic judgment 
is. I begin, in Section 1, by citing some of Kant's definitions of analytic judgment, and by 
extracting from those definitions a list of the criteria that Kant expects an analytic 
judgment to satisfy. I take some preliminary steps toward clarifying those criteria, ruling 
out some of the more problematic interpretations to which they might be (and indeed 
have been) subject. In Section 2, I make note of the questions and problems that arise 
from the lengthy and varied list of criteria that he associates with analytic judgment. 
Picking up on the claim that an analytic judgment is necessarily true, I ask whether 
analyticity and truth are indeed compatible. I note that there are two reasons to be 
skeptical in this regard: first, it is not clear that any judgment can be known as true just on 
the basis of a relation between its subject and predicate concept; second, it is not clear 
that any judgment can actually be true just by virtue of a judgment-internal relation 
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between concepts. Next, picking up on Kant's claim that an analytic judgment is 
necessarily a subject-predicate judgment, I draw on Bernard Bolzano and Jerrold Katz to 
show that this requirement can plausibly be undermined, indeed, that it can be 
undermined on the basis of Kant's own assumptions. As regards Kant's containment 
criterion, according to which the subject concept in an analytic judgment necessarily 
'contains' the predicate concept, I make note of the well-known objection that the idea of 
containment itself is unclear, or 'metaphorical', and I consider Lanier Anderson's attempt 
to render this notion more tangible. Moving on to Kant's identity criterion, I note that 
Kant himself is ambivalent as regards its exact formulation—that he oscillates between 
the claim that explicitly identical judgments like 'man is man' are analytic, and the claim 
that such judgments are not in fact analytic, because they fail another criterion for 
analyticity: the criterion according to which an analytic judgment necessarily clarifies its 
subject concept. Finally, concerning the requirement that the subject concept in an 
analytic judgment be 'already thought' in the predicate concept, I follow Gram and Beck 
in suggesting that this requirement sits awkwardly with Kant's apparently logical criteria 
for analyticity (containment, identity, contradiction). Whereas the latter admit judgments 
as analytic just insofar as their constituent concepts are necessarily related, the former 
seems to admit judgments as analytic only as insofar as this necessary relation between 
concepts is realized in consciousness. 
 
1. Defining Analytic Judgment 
In lieu of a single, canonical definition of analytic judgment, I propose to begin our 
examination of this concept with a series of key, more-or-less definitional passages from 
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Kant's critical period. The first of these has already been excerpted briefly at the outset of 
this study; it comes from the Introduction to the first edition of the Critique: 
In all judgments in which the relation of a subject to the predicate is thought...this 
relation is possible in two different ways. Either the predicate B belongs to the 
subject A as something that is (covertly) contained in this concept A; or B lies 
entirely outside the concept A, though to be sure it stands in connection with it. In 
the first case I call the judgment analytic, in the second synthetic. Analytic 
judgments (affirmative ones) are thus those in which the connection of the 
predicate is thought with identity...One could call [them] judgments of 
clarification...since through the predicate [these judgments] do not add anything 
to the concept of the subject, but only break it up by means of analysis into its 
component concepts, which were already thought in it (though confusedly)  
(A6-7/B10-11). 
 
The second passage comes from Kant's Prolegomena of 1783: 
All analytic judgments rest entirely on the principle of contradiction and are by 
their nature a priori cognitions, whether the concepts that serve for their material 
be empirical or not. For since the predicate of an affirmative analytic judgment is 
already thought beforehand in the concept of the subject, it cannot be denied of 
that subject without contradiction; exactly so is its opposite necessarily denied of 
the subject in an analytic, but negative, judgment, and indeed also according to 
the principle of contradiction. So it stands with the propositions: Every body is 
extended, and: No body is unextended (simple) (4:267). 
 
The third passage comes from a polemical work of 1790, and elaborates on the example 
just cited: 
That all bodies are extended is necessarily and eternally true, whether they exist 
now or not, and whether that existence is brief or lengthy, or goes on throughout 
all time, i.e., eternally. The proposition says only: these truths do not depend 
upon experience (which must occur at one time or another), and are therefore not 
limited by any temporal conditions (8:235). 
 
Finally, a relatively succinct definition from the Jäsche Logic, a text compiled in 1800:  
Propositions whose certainty rests on identity of concepts (of the predicate with 
the notion of the subject) are called analytic propositions (9:111). 
 
Between them, these four passages manage to characterize analytic judgment in terms of 
a surprising array of criteria. We are told that an analytic judgment is distinguished by the 
relation that obtains between the thought of the subject concept and the thought of the 
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predicate concept, by the logical relation that holds between the subject and predicate 
concepts themselves, by a relation that the judgment as a whole bears to the principle of 
contradiction, by the degree of truth that characterizes the judgment, by the degree of 
certainty that attends the judgment, and so on. In order to get clarity on the nature of 
analytic judgment, it will be necessary work through these different criteria, to draw 
attention to the ways in which they are unclear or problematic individually, and to the 
ways in which they might conflict. Before making a start on this project, though, it looks 
as if it is necessary to make sure that our basic question has been defined appropriately.  
 
Judgment and Proposition 
While the task of the present chapter has been defined as an investigation into the nature 
of analytic 'judgment' (Urteil), the last passage cited indicates that Kant is also prepared 
to talk about analytic 'propositions' (Satzen). This creates the suspicion that our field of 
study has been defined too narrowly, and that what is really at issue is a property—
analyticity—that is realized by two different kinds of statement. As it turns out, this 
suspicion is unwarranted. In the first place, propositions are not a category of statements 
apart from judgments. A proposition is simply a judgment that can be characterized in 
modal terms as assertoric, meaning a judgment that positively asserts that X is Y (as 
opposed to a judgment that embeds 'X is Y' within a hypothetical, viz. 'if X is Y, then Z', 
or a judgment that embeds 'X is Y' within a disjunction, viz. 'X is Y or X is Z') (9:109, 
24:934). Second, and most importantly, it is precisely such assertoric statements that 
Kant has in mind when he speaks of analytic judgments. As we will see in more detail in 
Chapter Four, analytic judgments are necessarily positive assertions; they are never 
 81 
merely hypothetical or conditional. This means, finally, that the class of analytic 
judgments is identical with the class of analytic propositions. 
 
Quality 
Having clarified our field of interest, let's begin by asking after the most basic 
determinations of analytic judgments. As regards what Kant calls 'quality', it is clear from 
the first two passages cited above that he allows for both affirmative and negative 
analytic judgments. Affirmative analytic judgments ascribe to the subject concept a 
predicate that is "already thought" in the subject concept (A154/B193). Negative analytic 
judgments, meanwhile, deny to the subject concept the "opposite" of one of its predicates 
(4:267). Thus, because the concept body includes the predicate concept being-composite, 
the judgment "all bodies are composite" counts as an affirmative analytic judgment; and 
because being-composite "conflicts with" the predicate being-simple, the judgment "no 
body is simple" counts as a negative analytic judgment (29:789). As for whether we can 
point to analytic judgments that are neither affirmative nor negative, there is at least some 
reason to think that we can. In his catalogue of the different possible forms of judgment, 
Kant indicates that judgments divide qualitatively into three distinct forms: affirmative, 
negative, and infinite (9:103). Before moving on to the question of truth, let's see whether 
we can speak sensibly of infinite analytic judgments. 
 At first blush, infinite judgment does not appear to be meaningfully distinct from 
negative judgment: where negative judgment takes the form, generically speaking, of 'no 
X is R', infinite judgment takes the form 'X is not-R'. According to Kant, however, the 
distinction between negative and infinite has real intensional significance: what the 
negative judgment says, he explains, is that X is excluded from the sphere of R; what the 
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infinite judgment says, on the other hand, is that X in included in the infinite (and 
indeterminate) sphere of not-R. For our purposes, what is crucial is what Kant goes on to 
tell us here, namely, that the distinction between negative and infinite judgments has no 
logical significance (9:104). Logically speaking, the judgments 'no X is R' and 'X is not-
R' are effectively equivalent: both affirm that X is excluded from the sphere of R. Since it 
is just such relations of inclusion and exclusion that are relevant in assessing analyticity 
and syntheticity (as Kant's language of 'containment' already suggests, and as we will see 
in more detail over the course of this chapter) this means that the distinction between 
negative and infinite judgments is redundant in this context. An infinite analytic 
judgment would be indistinguishable from a negative analytic judgment: it would be a 
judgment that excluded the 'opposite' of a given concept from the sphere of that concept. 
We can thus conclude that the categories of affirmative and negative exhaust the possible 
qualitative determinations of analytic judgment.  
 
Truth and Falsity 
On the question of whether analytic judgments can be both true and false, we find 
conflicting indications in Kant's texts. On the one hand, Kant seems to take for granted in 
his major works that analytic judgments are universally true: when the topic of truth 
arises at all, as in the third passage cited above, it is seemingly just to specify the way in 
which analytic judgments are true. On the other hand, Kant does offer an example of a 
false analytic judgment in his unpublished notes—an example, moreover, that allows us 
to explain the way in which such judgments might work. Kant's brief example runs as 
follows: "Wenn ich sage... ein ruhiger Korper ist bewegt, so heißt das...insofern ich als 
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ruhig denke, ist er bewegt, und Urteil wäre analytisch und falsch" (18:648).73 In other 
words, when I predicate movement of a body at rest, I generate a false analytic judgment. 
As for why this judgment is analytically, rather than just obviously false, this is a matter 
of logical opposition: the judgment "a moved body at which is at rest", Kant explains 
elsewhere, "is a contradiction" (29:271).  
 This, however, suggests that the logic of the false analytic judgment is 
comparable to that of the true negative analytic judgment. Just as the negative analytic 
judgment 'no body is simple' depends for its analyticity on the relation of opposition 
between the concepts body and being-simple, the false analytic judgment 'a body at rest is 
moving' depends on the opposition between body at rest and body in motion. When we 
reflect that Kant's sole example of a false analytic judgment could even be transformed 
into a true negative analytic judgment, namely, 'no bodies at rest are moving', the basis 
for drawing a sharp theoretical distinction between true and false analytic judgments 
comes to look even more tenuous. False affirmative analytic judgments are convertible 
into true negative analytic judgments and false negative analytic judgments are 
convertible into true affirmative analytic judgments.  
 
Logical Form 
As for logical form, it is at least strongly implied in the first passage cited above that only 
judgments having subject-predicate form qualify as analytic. Passages like the second one 
cited, meanwhile, are typical in taking this apparent restriction for granted; that is, in 
assuming that an analytic judgment is a judgment that involves a relation between two 
                                                
73 On this particular example, see also: Ian Proops "Kant's Conception of Analytic 
Judgment", p. 590; Konrad Marc-Wogau, "Kants Lehre vom analytische Urteil", pp. 141-
2. 
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terms, called 'subject' and 'predicate', respectively. Unfortunately, Kant never offers an 
explicit defense of this restriction (and even seems to suggest in one passage that no such 
restriction holds (4:266)). On the other hand, he does point to a pair of basic differences 
between subject-predicate judgments and all other kinds—differences that may prove 
decisive as regards this particular issue.  
 In the category of relation, Kant's table of judgment recognizes three basic kinds 
of judgment: categorical (or subject-predicate), hypothetical, and disjunctive. According 
to Kant, categorical judgments are distinct from hypothetical and disjunctive judgments 
in a fundamental respect: whereas the former involve a relation between concepts, 
hypothetical and disjunctive judgments involve a relation between judgments (A73/B98, 
24:932). Thus, when I judge that 'if X, then B', according to Kant, I am not asserting a 
relation between the concepts X and B; I am asserting a relation between the judgments 
'X is the case' and 'B is the case'. Likewise, when I judge that 'X is B or C', I am not 
asserting a relation between X, B, and C, but between the judgments 'X is B' and 'X is C'. 
 With this distinction between categorical judgments and the two other kinds of 
judgment in place, it is possible to draw attention to a further difference, one on that I 
have already lightly sketched above. According to Kant, categorical judgments can be 
characterized in modal terms as assertoric. This means that they are performed in such a 
way that "the assertion or denial…is considered actual (true)" (A74/B100). In other 
words, when I judge that 'X is B', I am judging that X actually is B. The judgment is 
more than an abstract juxtaposition of concepts; it makes a claim concerning the 
objective correlate of 'X'. Hypothetical and disjunctive judgments, meanwhile, are 
comprised of problematic judgments, meaning judgments "in which affirmation or 
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negation is taken as merely possible (optional)" (A74-5/B100).74 Thus, when I form the 
hypothetical judgment 'if X, then B', I am not asserting that X is the case; nor I am 
asserting that B is the case. I am putting forward the judgments 'X is the case' and 'B is 
the case' as candidates for affirmation or negation; that is, as judgments could potentially 
make a claim on reality, but which do not do so insofar as they are embedded in a 
hypothetical (or disjunctive) judgment. In Chapter Four, it will be possible to determine 
whether this fact about hypothetical and disjunctive judgment entails that no such 
judgments can qualify as analytic.  
 
Containment 
Of course, even if it turns out that an analytic judgment is necessarily a categorical 
judgment, this does not mean that every categorical judgment is analytic. A judgment 
like, 'the cat is on the roof' has subject-predicate form, but is not analytic, since the 
predicate concept being-on-the-roof has only a contingent relationship with the subject 
concept, the cat. Based on what we know of analytic judgment so far, it is clear that 
analytic judgments require a much stronger relation between subject and predicate. In the 
first passage cited above, Kant indicates that this relation takes the form of containment: 
in an analytic judgment, the predicate concept is actually 'contained in' the subject 
concept.  
                                                
74 This apparently psychological characterization of what it means for a judgment to be 
problematic is a reflection of Kant's own remarks on this score. He says that "problematic 
judgments are those in which affirmation or negation is taken as merely possible 
(optional)" (A74-5/B100, my emphasis). This language, in turn, reflects Kant's 
understanding of modality. He explains that a judgment's modal properties are unrelated 
to the "content of the judgment" (A74/B100), but concern rather "the way in which 
something is maintained or denied in judgment" (9:108, my emphasis). 
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 What therefore does Kant mean by containment? On the one hand, containment 
seems to denote an essentially psychological relation. It looks as if a concept X is 
contained in another concept Y when reflection on Y in some way entails reflection on X. 
This psychological reading is reflected in the claim that an analytic judgment spells out 
what is 'covertly' contained in the subject, insofar as the idea of covert containment 
evokes the idea of a mental representation that is less than fully transparent. It is more 
strongly reflected in a passage from the Transcendental Methodology, in which Kant 
represents containment in explicitly psychological terms, explaining that an analytic 
judgment presents just what is "actually contained in the thought" (A721/B749). But this 
way of understanding containment is slightly out of step with remarks that Kant makes 
elsewhere. Thus, Kant says in the Prolegomena that what is contained to a concept is 
what belongs to the "logical essence" of that concept (4:294). Logical essence, in turn, is 
not a matter of what this or that person happens to think in conjunction with a concept; it 
encompasses "all the necessary marks of a thing" (9:61).75  
 This logical construal of containment gains further strength from Kant's 
distinction between two different forms of containment. According to Kant, a concept 
contains other concepts "within itself" to the extent that the latter are constitutive of the 
former. Thus, the concept substance is contained in the concept body; the first concept 
forms part of the 'content' (Inhalt) of the second.76 Conversely, a concept contains other 
concepts "under itself" to the extent that it is contained in those concepts as a constituent 
part (B40). Thus, the concept body contains the concepts potato, armchair, and meteorite 
                                                
75 Lewis White Beck also remarks on this ambiguity in the containment criterion ("Can 
Kant's Synthetic Judgments Be Made Analytic", p. 171). 
76 See also Michael Friedman's discussion of 'containment-in' and 'containment-under' in 
Kant and the Exact Sciences (p. 67). 
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under itself; these narrower concepts form one small part of the 'extension' of the concept 
body. In order now to see why this distinction should weigh in favor of a logical 
understanding of containment, it suffices to make two observations: first, that Kant 
understands containment-in and containment-under as reciprocal (9:95), so that any 
relationship of containment-in (e.g. substance is contained in body) can be expressed in 
terms of a relationship of containment-under (e.g. body is contained under substance); 
and second, that only one member of this reciprocal pair can be understood in 
psychological terms: while it is at least plausible that reflection on a given concept entails 
reflection on what is contained in that concept, it is highly implausible that reflection on a 
concept entails reflection on everything that is contained under it (e.g. when I think of the 
concept body, it is unlikely that I think simultaneously of the innumerable concepts 
denoting bodies of one kind of another). Since the proposed reciprocity between 
containment-in and containment-under thus places considerable strain on a psychological 
construal of containment, it seems that we should conclude for the time being that this 
criterion should be understood in logical terms, meaning that it should be understood in 
terms of the relations that obtain between concepts taken in an ideal sense. 
 
Concept Complexity 
As a corollary to this last criterion, it is worth noting the basic assumption about concepts 
that it rests upon. In short, if Kant thinks that analytic judgments exhibit a relation of 
containment between subject and predicate, then he evidently thinks that at least some 
concepts—namely, those that can function as subject concepts in analytic judgments—
can be said to contain other concepts. In other words, certain concepts are such that they 
embody one or more distinct sub-concepts within themselves and such that they can be 
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"resolved" (aufgelöst) into those sub-concepts by means of analysis (4:266). In a lecture 
course from 1783, Kant confirms that the availability of such concepts is a necessary 
condition for analytic judgment and he gestures in the process toward a specifically 
mereological understanding of containment: "one can pass analytic a priori judgment on 
all concepts which allow of dissection; if they are simple, then they cannot be dissected, 
e.g. being, something." (29:793).  
 
Identity 
Initially, the next criterion seems quite straightforward. A judgment is analytic, Kant 
explains, when its subject and predicate concepts are either explicitly identical, as in the 
judgment 'man is man', or implicitly identical, as in the judgment 'man is a rational 
animal' (9:111, 24:937). But questions arise when we try to flesh out the identity 
criterion. First, what is it that counts as identical in these judgments? If we try to answer 
this question in light of the first judgment alone, we might conclude that Kant's 
invocation of identity targets the linguistic form of judgments. But on this way of 
understanding things, we would have to conclude that 'man is a rational animal' is a non-
identical judgment, because the word 'man' is not identical with the words 'rational' or 
'animal'. Better then, to conclude that what Kant has in mind when he speaks of identity 
is conceptual form, even in the case of linguistically symmetrical judgments like 'man is 
man'.77 The claim that this judgment is explicitly identical then comes down to the claim 
that its surface linguistic form perfectly reflects an underlying relation of concept 
identity. The claim that the judgment 'man is a rational animal' is implicitly identical, 
                                                
77 Hanna, Kant and the Foundations of Analytic Philosophy, p. 142. 
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meanwhile, comes down to the claim that its surface linguistic form imperfectly reflects 
an underlying relation of concept identity.   
 As for how concept identity itself should be understood, here we seem to be 
brought back to the idea of containment, that is, the idea that one concept can be said to 
embody another concept, or set of concepts. Drawing on this idea, we can say a concept 
is completely identical to another concept when everything contained in the first is 
contained in the second; and we can say that a concept is partially identical to another 
when not everything that is contained in the first is contained in the second. Thus, the 
concept man is completely identical with the concept man in that everything which 
belongs to man belongs to man; and the concept man is partially identical to the concept 
animal in that animal belongs to but does not exhaust the content of man. Kant allows 
that both kind of identity, complete and partial, can form the basis of analytic 
judgments.78 
 The next question is whether the distinction between explicit and implicit identity 
is the same as the distinction between complete and partial identity. The answer, it seems, 
is no. It is possible to imagine an explicitly identical judgment that would not at the same 
time be completely identical, such as 'all red cars are red'. Conversely, it is possible to 
imagine an implicitly identical judgment that would indeed be completely identical: 'gold 
is a yellow metal' is implicitly identical, in the sense that its outer linguistic form gives no 
                                                
78 Given that for Kant, most concepts are not susceptible of complete analysis, there is a 
sense in which he actually has no choice but to admit analytic judgments based on the 
partial identity of subject and predicate. To do otherwise—to insist that an analytic 
judgment draw out its subject concept in its entirety—would be to concede that analytic 
judgment is only possible in the context of natural science and geometry, that is, in those 
contexts in which it is methodologically least valuable.  
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hint of its underlying identity, but it plausibly exhausts the concept gold, which means 
that it is plausibly a completely identical judgment.  
 
Contradiction 
Importantly, Kant restricts the range of the identity criterion just to affirmative analytic 
judgments (A7/B10, cf. 29:789). By definition, the subject and predicate concepts in a 
negative analytic judgment are precisely non-identical. This in turn allows us to 
understand why Kant suggests in the same passage that the principle of contradiction is 
the "general principle of all analytic judgments" (my emphasis, cf. 4:267, 20:278, 
20:323, 29:789). Although negative analytic judgments are distinct from affirmative 
analytic judgments from the perspective of identity, they are similar in the sense that both 
give rise to contradiction when negated. Thus, the affirmative analytic judgment 'all 
bodies are extended' gives rise to a contradiction when we consider its negation, 'a body 
is not extended'; and the negative analytic judgment 'no unlearned man is learned' gives 
rise to contradiction when we consider the judgment 'an unlearned man is learned' 
(A153/B192). 
 As for how contradiction itself should be understood, here we face a situation 
similar to the one we encountered above. Judging by the second example, we might 
conclude that contradiction is a matter of surface logical form: 'X is not L and L' is 
already contradictory, regardless of the meanings that we attach to 'X' and 'L'. On this 
way of understanding things, however, we would have to conclude that 'a body is not 
extended' is non-contradictory, since the logical schema that this judgment instantiates, 'X 
is B and not E', has many true substitution instances (e.g. Dogs are mammals and not 
crustaceans). That it is therefore necessary to consider the underlying conceptual form of 
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judgments in assessing contradictoriness is borne out by Kant's explicit remarks on this 
subject. He explains that "a contradiction occurs in a judgment only if I abolish a 
predicate therein, and yet retain in the concept of the subject a predicate identical with 
this" (20:304, my emphasis; cf. A150/B190). Thus, if the judgment 'a body is not 
extended' is contradictory, it is because the judgment 'abolishes' the predicate concept 
extension, while simultaneously 'retaining' that concept in the subject concept, body. 
Rather than 'X is B and not E', the judgment has the structure 'X is B(E) and not E'. It is 
contradictory at the level of conceptual, rather than linguistic form. 
 Like the narrower identity criterion, therefore, it turns out that a consistent 
application of the contradiction criterion presupposes the existence and the accessibility 
of complex concepts. Except for a few exceptional cases, like 'no unlearned man is 
learned', the negation of which can be recognized immediately as contradictory, we will 
for the most part require some kind of insight into the content of our concepts in order to 
see that a given judgment can be negated only on pain of contradiction.  
 
A Priority 
In the passage cited above from the Prolegomena, Kant indicates that analytic judgments 
are a priori "by their nature". What, therefore, does it mean to say that a judgment is a 
priori? According to Kant, it means that the judgment in question has a pair of 
"inseparable" properties: strict universality and necessity. Strict universality is an 
expression of the validity of a judgment.79 For a judgment to be valid with strict 
                                                
79 Validity, for Kant, is an expression of how widely a concept or intuition applies, or 
how widely a given judgment holds. Thus, Kant says that space and time, as pure 
intuitions, are "valid…no further than for objects of the senses, hence only for 
experience"; and he contrasts space and time in this regard with the categories, which 
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universality means that "no exception" to what it asserts "is allowed to be possible" (B4). 
Necessity turns out to be slightly more elusive. Despite the centrality of this idea in 
Kant's epistemology, he does not actually explain what it means for a judgment to be 
necessary in a general sense.80 On the other hand, he does spell out the two different ways 
in which a judgment can be necessary, a distinction that will allow us to get at the form of 
apriority that is proper to analytic judgments. 
 In judgments like 7 + 5 = 12, Kant thinks, the subject and predicate concepts are 
necessarily related. Importantly, though, he maintains that the source of this necessity 
cannot be located in the judgment itself. To the extent that 7 + 5 and 12 are necessarily 
conjoined, their conjunction is realized within the context of our spatio-temporal 
experience. In other cases, however, judicative necessity flows from a relation internal to 
the judgment. In judgments like 'gold is a yellow metal', the necessary conjunction 
between the subject and predicate concept is a function of the relation between the 
concepts gold, yellow, and metal. This is borne out by the fact that a denial of 'gold is a 
yellow metal' results in contradiction. While we can coherently doubt that 7 + 5 is equal 
to 12, the thought that a gold might not be yellow conflicts with the concept gold, 
meaning that the thought simply cannot be coherently entertained. Insofar as necessity 
can be evaluated in terms of contradiction, it is 'absolute'. Since it is this stronger brand of 
necessity that is relevant in the context of analytic judgment, we can summarize with 
Kant by saying that analytic judgments are a priori in that they are "valid with strict 
universality and absolute necessity" (20:323). 
                                                                                                                                            
"extend to objects of intuition in general" (B148, my emphasis). I take up the issue of 
validity again in Chapter Three (ftn.5). 
80 Richard Robinson, "Necessary Propositions", p. 293. 
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 It is also worth acknowledging the more common acceptation of the term 'a 
priori'. According to much of the post-Kantian philosophic tradition, apriority has the 
sense of a validity or a knowability that is in some way 'independent of experience'. This 
standard acceptation finds an echo in Kant's own remarks with respect to apriority. He 
says that "we will understand by a priori cognitions...those that occur absolutely 
independently of all experience" (B2), and that "I already have all the conditions" for an 
(analytic) a priori judgment "before I go to experience" (A7/B12). If Kant is nevertheless 
set apart from the post-Kantian tradition on this issue, it is because the relation between a 
priori judgment and experience is best seen from Kant's perspective as a peripheral 
feature of apriority. Strictly speaking, an a priori judgment is a judgment that is valid 
with strict universality and necessity. The notion that such judgments are valid 
independently of experience is made possible by an additional claim concerning the 
nature of experience, to the effect that empirical intuition cannot underwrite a judgment 
that is valid with strict universality and necessity.81 Empirical intuition can tell us that 
some state of affairs obtains in this place at this moment; but it cannot tell us that some 
rule, or state of affairs obtains everywhere and across all time (B3, A7/B11, B14, 
A91/B124, A112, A258-9/B314, A353, 4:268, 17:617, 20:323). Supposing that 
judgments having a priori validity are possible, therefore, it follows that they must be 
based on something other than empirical intuition; and supposing that such judgments are 
knowable a priori, it follows that they must be knowable without reference to experience.   
                                                
81 Although this arguably captures the logical relation between Kant's formal definition of 
apriority and the idea of experience-independence, a representation of their dialectical 
relation might proceed in the opposite direction. We might say that Kant begins from an 
essentially Humean claim as regards the kinds of claims that can be licensed by 
experience, and that he defines an a priori judgment in terms of this initial claim, as the 
kind of judgment that cannot be licensed by experience.  
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 The epistemology of a priori judgments, finally, provides a way of understanding 
the distinctive phenomenology of a priori judgments—the fact that an a priori judgment 
is "coupled with the consciousness of its necessity" (20:265, 20:273, B3). Since a priori 
judgments are known without reference to experience, they are known simultaneously as 
judgments that cannot be falsified by any empirical counter-example, thus as judgments 
that have the force of necessity. 
 
Clarification 
In our discussion of the methodological role of analytic judgments, we found that analytic 
judgment performs an important clarificatory role relative to synthetic a priori judgment. 
A synthetic a priori judgment can be established as a "really new construction" only 
insofar as its subject concept has been subjected to analysis. What we want to know now 
is the following: first, to what extent is this clarificatory role constitutive of the idea of 
analytic judgment; and second, what precisely does this clarification entail? As regards 
the first question, Kant gives a fairly unequivocal answer in the first passage cited above 
when he identifies analytic judgments as "judgments of clarification". Later in the 
Critique, he again places this clarificatory function at the center of the idea of analytic 
judgment: "in the analytic judgment", Kant explains, "I remain with the given concept in 
order to discern something about it" (A154/B193). Finally, in his Preisschrift essay of 
1791, Kant elevates clarification to the level of a criterion for analyticity: according to 
Kant, explicitly identical judgments (like 'man is man') are not actually analytic, since 
they fail to "elucidate' their constitutive concepts (20:322).  
 Supposing for the time being, therefore, that an analytic judgment only qualifies 
as such to the extent that it clarifies or elucidates its subject concept in some way, we can 
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try to shed more light on what clarification entails. As it turns out, it involves something 
more than 'making clear' a given concept. For a representation to be clear, according to 
Kant, just means for that representation to be conscious. Thus, an object is clear just to 
the extent that I am perceptually aware of the object; and a concept is clear just to the 
extent that it is minimally, perhaps just verbally, present to consciousness. Since knowing 
that there is an object in front of me is consistent with not knowing what kind of object it 
is, and since awareness of some concept is consistent with not knowing what it contains, 
it is clear that a higher degree of transparency is required. Kant calls this higher degree of 
transparency 'distinctness'. According to Kant, a representation is distinct when all of its 
partial determinations are themselves clear (7:135). Thus, an object is distinct to the 
extent that I can identify its individual parts; and a concept is distinct when I can identify 
its constituents. Supposing that analytic judgment is essentially oriented toward some 
kind of clarification, therefore, it looks as if it is oriented specifically towards 
distinctness. Indeed, according to Kant, it is just insofar as analytic judgment provides for 




At first blush, the next, and most frequently invoked criterion for analyticity seems to rub 
awkwardly against the notion that analytic judgments have as their function the making-
distinct of concepts. If a judgment qualifies as analytic just insofar as it says "nothing in 
the predicate except what was actually thought already in the concept of the subject" 
(4:266, cf. A6-7/B10-11, A154/B193, A164/B205, A259/B314, 8:232, 9:59), then it is 
difficult to see exactly to see in what sense such judgments are clarificatory. Far from 
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rendering my concept internally transparent, the analytic judgment would seem just to 
spell out my already transparent concept. We get initial clarity on this issue from a rider 
that Kant appends to the passage just cited: while the predicate is 'already thought' in the 
subject, it is thought neither as "clearly nor with the same consciousness". In other words, 
while the predicate is in a certain sense present in our pre-theoretical reflection on the 
concept, it is not, properly speaking, distinct. The function of the analytic judgment, in 
this sense, can be understood as the making-distinct of the predicate that we indeed think, 
but that we think obscurely. 
  Setting aside additional complications, it is worth making two points. First, since 
Kant obviously cannot suppose that when I think of a concept, I necessarily think of 
constituents that the concept in question does not have, he stipulates that this way of 
characterizing analytic judgments applies just to affirmative judgments (A7/B10). In 
other words, he does not way to say that 'no bodies are simple' spells out what is 'already 
thought' in the concept body. Second, it is worth noting that Kant also invokes the idea of 
what is 'already thought' as a negative criterion for synthetic judgment: since "the concept 
of twelve is by no means already thought" in the concept of 7 + 5, Kant concludes that 
the judgment 7 + 5 = 12 is synthetic in nature (B15, cf. A164/B205).82 
 
2. Possible Concerns 
What I want to do now is to consider some of the problems that arise in connection with 
Kant's conception of analytic judgment. Since these problems arise not just at the level of 
exact detail, but at a much more general level, I will temporarily sideline the issue of the 
                                                
82 The containment criterion has a similar function. According to Kant, we are assured 
that a given judgment is synthetic when we find that the predicate concept is not 
contained in the subject concept (B15, 17:617). 
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various criteria that Kant associates with analyticity, and consider an epistemological 
concern that bears on the idea of analytic judgment in general.  
 
Negative Judgments 
Above, I concluded that analytic judgments are either affirmative or negative. Here, I 
want to point to an asymmetry between these two categories, one that points in turn to an 
assumption about meaning, and our access to meaning, that Kant will be obliged to 
discharge. In short, negative analytic judgments involve a higher epistemic standard than 
affirmative analytic judgments. Whereas our justification for the latter derives just from a 
priori insight into the meaning of terms, justification for negative analytic judgments 
derives from a priori insight into the meaning of terms and into the relations of semantic 
or logical opposition in which our terms are involved. We have a priori justification for 
the judgment 'no bodies are simple' insofar as we know, first, that the concept body 
contains the being-composite as a constitutive mark, and second, that being-composite is 
essentially opposed to being-simple.83 Absent this insight, our justification for the 
judgment 'no bodies are simple' could only plausibly be a posteriori, meaning that it 
would depend on knowledge of the empirical fact that no bodies are simple.84 
                                                
83 Ian Proops sets this epistemic standard at a misleadingly low mark. He says that when 
Kant speaks of the "opposite" of some concept, he means the "negation of one its 
constituent marks; so, for example, the concept "unextended" counts as an "opposite" of 
the concept "body," as does the concept "non-substance"" ("Kant's Conception of 
Analytic Judgment", p. 591). But this suggests that we have access to relations of logical 
opposition just insofar as we capable of attaching negative prefixes to our terms—which 
cannot be the case, since Kant thinks that the concept simple is logically opposed to the 
concept composite. 
84 This epistemic standard also applies to false affirmative analytic judgments. If we did 
not know that the concept body at rest was essentially opposed to the concept body in 
motion, then we would not know that the judgment 'a body at rest is moving' is false in an 
analytic sense. Judgments that are simultaneously negative, false, and analytic, on the 
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Truth: Epistemic Concerns 
Though we have yet to adequately clarify Kant's understanding of analytic judgment, it 
looks as if a judgment qualifies as analytic for Kant just when its subject and predicate 
concepts stand in a particular kind of relation to one another. This being the case, there is 
a temptation to think of analyticity as a property that a judgment has by virtue of a 
particular internal relation; and there is a corresponding temptation to think that we have 
performed, or grasped, an analytic judgment when we have enacted, or made distinct, an 
internal relation of this kind. On the other hand, Kant seems to think that analytic 
judgments are universally true (and that when they are not true, they are nevertheless 
convertible into truths). This suggests that performing or grasping an analytic judgment 
involves more than simply enacting or making-distinct a judgment-internal relation; it 
means grasping a truth. What we want to know, then, is how we get from the apparently 
internal relation of concept containment to the richer, and apparently external relation of 
truth. Invoking his own example of (ostensibly Kantian) analytic judgment, Laurence 
Bonjour argues that for Kant, knowledge of concept containment is sufficient for 
knowledge of truth: 
once the proposition that all brothers are male is seen to be analytic, the 
epistemological question of how I can be justified in believing that it is true 
without any appeal to experience is regarded by [Kant] as entirely solved. All 
that is required, says Kant, is to "extract" the predicate from the subject "in 
accordance with the principle of contradiction" (B12); that is, since the predicate 
concept merely repeats part of the subject concept, so that the denial of the 
proposition would result in an immediate contradiction, anyone can see at once 
that such a proposition must be true.85 
 
                                                                                                                                            
other hand, do not involve this standard. Just by knowing that the concept body contains 
the predicate being-composite, we know that 'no bodies are composite' is a false analytic 
judgment.  
85 Laurence Bonjour, In Defense of Pure Reason, pp. 20-1. 
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According to some recent authors, however, the view that is attributed to Kant here 
cannot be correct. Just because I know that 'body' means 'extended thing'—and hence, 
that the judgment 'bodies are not extended' is contradictory—I am not thereby entitled to 
the claim that 'bodies are extended' is true. Justification for this claim presupposes 
epistemic access to the fact that bodies actually are extended things.86 That kind of 
epistemic access might well presuppose basic conceptual competence as a necessary 
condition: in order to see whether bodies are extended, it is reasonable to suppose that I 
should first be clear on the meanings of 'body' and 'extended'. But conceptual or linguistic 
competence is not plausibly sufficient for epistemic access to the extendedness of bodies. 
Insight into this fact presupposes some kind of extra-linguistic acquaintance with the 
world. 
 
Truth: Semantic Concerns 
And the issue of truth has more than merely epistemic dimensions. Not only does Kant 
maintain that we can know that an analytic judgment is true just on the basis of its 
meaning; he seems to believe that an analytic judgment is true just by virtue of its 
meaning. This much is signaled in the third passage cited above, in which Kant says that 
the judgment 'all bodies are extended' is "necessarily and eternally true", whether or not 
                                                
86 Margolis and Laurence raise this concern in the context of Paul Boghossian's 
'epistemic' model of analyticity, according to which our a priori access to the meaning of 
certain sentences entitles us to hold those sentences as true ("Analyticity Reconsidered", 
p. 380). Margolis and Laurence note that this epistemic model of analytic judgment is 
subject to the same objections generally brought against the 'metaphysical' model of 
analytic judgment: just as the meaning of a given sentence alone does not confer truth or 
falsity on that sentence, the meaning of a sentence alone does not entitle us to hold that 
sentence as true ("Boghossian on Analyticity", p. 294).  
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any bodies actually exist. Along with Gilbert Harman,87 we can express the worry that 
grows out of this apparently 'metaphysical' conception of analytic truth as follows. In 
short, how could it be the case that a given judgment is true just by virtue of its meaning 
and independently of "the way the world is"? Could we even imagine the kind of case 
that Kant seems to allow for—the case in which a given judgment is true, and indeed 
necessarily so, but nevertheless fails to line up with any existential facts? Shouldn't we 
maintain, with Paul Boghossian,88 that a proposition S is true when S means that p and p? 
In order to see what kind of response Kant can offer to these questions, it will be 
necessary in Chapters Three and Four to subject his views of concepts, truth, and analytic 
truth in particular, to scrutiny. 
 
The Instability of Categorical Form 
As regards logical form, the basic concern is that the restriction that Kant imposes on 
analytic judgments cannot be sustained. Proceeding on the basis of essentially Kantian 
assumptions, it looks as if it is possible to produce analytic judgments that are not 
categorical as regards their logical form. The philosophic tradition bears witness to two 
main strategies for extending the class of analytic judgment beyond the bounds of 
categorical form. The first strategy originates with Bolzano, and has its point of departure 
in the claim that what is genuinely 'important' in the idea of analytic judgment is the fact 
that the truth-value of an analytic judgment "remains the same no matter what changes 
are made" in its constitutive concepts. Thus, the judgment 'all bodies are composite' 
                                                
87 Gilbert Harman, "Quine on Meaning and Existence", p. 128. 
88 Paul Boghossian, "Analyticity Reconsidered". p. 364. 
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suffers no change in truth-value when we put any other, appropriately complex concept in 
place of body, and any other element of that complex concept in place of composite.89  
 But if the validity of an analytic judgment is independent of the "particular ideas" 
of which it is constituted, and is in fact just a function of its underlying propositional 
form, then we are already entitled to abandon the restriction to subject-predicate form. 
The judgment 'all men are learned or not learned' is not a subject-predicate judgment; but 
it remains true no matter terms are substituted for 'man' and 'learned', and so qualifies an 
analytic according to Bolzano's definition.  
 The second strategy for extending the class of analytic judgments reflects a 
different understanding of what makes analytic judgment true. According to Jerrold Katz, 
an analytic judgment is not distinguished by its truth-preserving propositional or logical 
form. It is distinguished by the fact that it is semantically redundant. Thus, 'all bodies are 
extended' is analytic in the sense that it merely draws out the "sense structure" of the 
concept body. That this judgment also happens to take subject-predicate form is 
incidental as regards its status as analytic, a claim that Katz illustrates by providing 
examples of judgments that do not have subject-predicate form, but which are 
nevertheless redundant in the appropriate sense, for instance, 'John walks with those with 
whom he strolls'.90 
 In sum, therefore, we have two essentially different strategies for undermining the 
restriction of analytic judgment to judgments having subject-predicate form. Picking up 
on the logical inflections of Kant's theory, Bolzano broadens the class of analytic 
judgment to include all judgments that are true by virtue of underlying propositional 
                                                
89 Bernard Bolzano, Theory of Science, p. 197 (Sec. 148). 
90 Jerrold Katz, Cogitations, p. 62. 
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form. Picking up on its semantic inflections, on the other hand, Katz broadens analytic 
judgment to encompass all judgments exhibiting a relation of concept containment.91 In 
the next chapter, we will see whether Kant is able to defend the claim that analytic 
judgments are necessarily subject-predicate judgments in the face of these challenges.  
 
Containment 
As noted above, there is a way in which the containment criterion can be understood in 
psychological terms. The claim that X is 'contained' in Y can be treated as if it were 
equivalent to the claim that X is 'thought' in Y, which is to say, as a claim about the 
content of our mental representations. On this way of understanding containment, which 
a number of commentators have embraced, largely without comment92, it is subject to a 
                                                
91 The view that concept containment can be generalized beyond the bounds of 
categorical judgment, and that analytic judgments need not therefore take subject-
predicate form, is a view taken by a number of authors (e.g. Hans-Ulrich Hoche, 
Nichtempirische Erkenntnis, p. 11; Robert Allison, The Kant-Eberhard Controversy, p. 
56; Robert Hanna, Kant and the Foundations of Analytic Philosophy, p. 144-5). The view 
that the analytic-synthetic distinction generalizes beyond the bounds of categorical 
judgment has also received support from several commentators, who have noted that 
Kant places existential judgments on the synthetic side of the ledger, while 
simultaneously denying that existence is a predicate (A598/B626) (Richard Robinson, 
"Necessary Propositions", pp. 296-7; Newton Garver, "Analyticity and Grammar", pp. 
398-399). On this line of reasoning, the judgment "Barack Obama exists" would qualify 
as a synthetic judgment, but not as a subject-predicate judgment, because it lacks a 
predicate. Ian Proops helpfully singles out the confusion underlying this proposed 
extension of the analytic-synthetic distinction. He notes that Kant does not say that 
existence is not a predicate tout court, but just that it is not a real predicate. According to 
Proops, this just means that when we predicate existence of a given subject, we do not 
narrow the extension of the subject-concept with respect to any possible world ("Kant's 
Conception of Analytic Judgment", p. 592). Predicating existence of a subject is therefore 
akin to predicating the subject of itself: just as there is no possible world in which the 
concept Barack Obama is instantiated but in which Barack Obama does not exist, there is 
no world in which Barack Obama is instantiated but in which Barack Obama is not self-
identical. Existence and self-identity, Kant indicates, are logical rather than real 
predicates (A598/B626). 
92 e.g. James Van Cleve, Problems from Kant, p. 18. 
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number of problems. Most glaringly, it seems to make analyticity relative to individuals: 
if I happen to think X and Y, then 'X is Y' is analytic for me; but it is non-analytic for 
someone who fails to think X and Y together. I will take up this and similar problems in 
my discussion of Kant's more explicitly psychological criterion below. In the meantime, 
it is worth recalling our provisional conclusion from the first section, to the effect that 
containment is more plausibly understood in logical terms. This much is signaled by 
Kant's distinction between 'containment-in' and 'containment-under', which suggests an 
image of concepts as arranged objectively in terms of relations of hierarchy and 
subordination. By developing this image in detail, Lanier Anderson pushes back against 
what is probably the best known objection associated with Kant's containment criterion: 
Quine's complaint to the effect that Kant leaves the idea of containment "at a 
metaphorical level".93,94  
 According to Anderson, we can understand Kant's talk of 'containment' in terms 
of the stratified conceptual 'trees' developed in antiquity by Porphyry and in the modern 
period by Linnaeus.95 On this model, to say that the concept body 'contains' the concepts 
substance and extension is to invoke the subordinate position of body on the conceptual 
tree that begins at the top with the genus substance and that proceeds downwards to body 
                                                
93 Willard van Orman Quine, From a Logical Point of View, p. 21. Quine presents this 
complaint alongside another: that the containment criterion only applies to subject-
predicate judgments. His account is typical in assuming that Kant has no defensible 
reason for imposing this restriction.  
94 Quine's objection as regards the 'metaphorical' nature of the idea of containment is 
anticipated by Bolzano, who describes containment as a "figurative [form] of expression" 
(Theory of Science, p. 196). 
95 Anderson is picking up here on a suggestion originally put forward by Willem de Jong. 
According to De Jong, Kant's idea of 'containment' should be understood in the context of 
the "conjunction model of concepts", a "view of concepts that enjoyed wide acceptance in 
the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries" ("Kant's Analytic Judgments and the 
Traditional Theory of Concepts", p. 623).  
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via the differentia extended. This model also allows Anderson to explain what Kant 
means when he says that a concept belongs to, but is not contained in, another concept. 
What he means, evidently, is that while the conjunction between subject and predicate is 
empirically attested, the subject and predicate concepts cannot be located on the same 
conceptual tree. Thus, the angle-sum property is correctly predicated of triangles, but is 
neither a genus nor a differentia above the concept triangle, and so is not contained in the 
latter.96 
 Unfortunately, if Anderson succeeds in rendering the idea of containment less 
metaphorical, he does so by significantly weakening the Kantian notion of analyticity. 
Having explained conceptual content in terms of classificatory schemes that have no 
claim to invariability, and will in many cases change in accordance with our evolving 
understanding, Anderson is obliged to admit that an ostensibly analytic judgment might 
lose that status, because it might cases to reflect our classificatory schemes. Thus, while 
the judgment 'whales are mammals' might qualify as a purely analytic judgment today, in 
the sense that it reflects our current understanding of whales, it might cease to reflect our 
understanding of whales, and thus cease to qualify as analytic judgment. According to 
Anderson, this problem is not fatal: at least as they apply to empirical concepts, we can 
simply drop the requirement that analytic judgments be valid a priori; we can embrace the 
prospect of revisable analytic judgments. According to Ian Proops, however, Anderson's 
account of containment is indeed fatal: apriority cannot be divorced from analytic 
judgment without collapsing the Kantian notion of analyticity altogether. In light of these 
considerations, Proops concludes that Quine's original objection is sound, and that the 
                                                
96 Anderson, "Kant's Analytic Judgments and the Traditional Theory of Concepts", p. 48.  
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Kantian idea of containment fails to rise above the level of metaphor.97 In the next 
chapter, we will try to determine whether there is a way to avoid sacrificing apriority 
while simultaneously illuminating the idea of containment.  
 
Concept Complexity  
Perhaps the most basic threat to the idea of containment comes not from the vagueness of 
the metaphor, but from the assumption embedded in it: the assumption that at least 
certain concepts can be regarded as complex in the first place. Supposing that this 
assumption has not been justified, then neither Kant nor anyone else can give an account 
of propositional necessity in mereological terms. The complex conceptual 'wholes' that 
would underwrite such an analysis will be unavailable.  
 In a recent article, Fodor and Lepore help to motivate this concern by pointing out 
that the "usual way" of justifying claims about concept complexity is by appealing to 
analyticity itself. Thus, the usual way of arguing that bachelor contains the concepts 
unmarried and man is by appealing to the analyticity of 'bachelors are unmarried men'. 
But this strategy, they observe, simply begs the question: in identifying a judgment as 
analytic, we have already presupposed that its constituent concepts are in some 
intertwined at the level of content. What is required, they suggest, is a justification of 
containment claims that is independent of claims about analyticity.98 
 
Identity 
As regards our next criterion, a concern arises from Kant's contradictory remarks 
concerning the status of explicitly identical judgments. Certain texts suggest that Kant 
                                                
97 Proops, "Kant's Conception of Analytic Judgment", p. 600. 
98 Jerry Fodor and Ernest Lepore, "Analyticity Again", p. 119. 
 106 
allows for explicitly identical analytic judgments: he cites the judgment 'a = a' as an 
example of analytic judgment in both the Critique and the Prolegomena, and states 
clearly in both the Jäsche Logic and the Vienna Logic that analytic judgments can be 
either explicit or implicit. Other texts suggest that Kant rejects the possibility of explicitly 
identical analytic judgments. Thus, in a passage that we have already encountered, Kant 
remarks that explicitly identical judgments are not analytic because they fail to render 
their subject concepts distinct (20:322). Likewise, in a lecture course from 1790, he 
remarks that 'tautological' judgments fall outside of the analytic-synthetic distinction 
altogether, since they tend neither toward the distinctness of concepts nor the growth of 
knowledge (24:667).  
 As for why Kant's ambivalence on this question should create an interpretive 
problem, it is because the status of identical judgments like 'a = a' will affect our 
understanding of analytic judgment overall. In short, if 'a = a' is not analytic, then it will 
look as if analyticity is subject to an epistemological or psychological criterion. A 
judgment will not qualify as analytic just insofar as it its subject and predicate concepts 
are identical; a judgment will qualify as analytic insofar as its subject and predicate 
concepts are identical and insofar as this identity is at least potentially opaque to a person 
confronted with the judgment.  
 
Contradiction 
Famously, Kant describes the principle of contradiction in the Critique as the "universal 
and completely sufficient principle of all analytic judgment" (A151/B191, cf. 
A150/B190), seeming to suggest that any judgment that gives rise to contradiction when 
negated qualifies as analytic. As critics have observed, however, this apparent 
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endorsement forces Kant into conflict with himself. Since mathematical judgments are 
cognizable according to the principle of contradiction (B14), Kant would have to admit 
that they are analytic, contrary to his identification of such judgments as synthetic a 
priori. Since certain statements having non-subject-predicate form give rise to 
contradiction when negated, Kant would have to admit that analyticity spills out beyond 
the bounds of categorical form. Finally, since certain existential statements ('there is no 
married bachelor') can be drawn into contradiction through negation ('there is a married 
bachelor'), Kant would have to conclude that at least some existential judgments are 
analytic.99 
  Fortunately, this problem can be resolved quite straightforwardly. Contrary to 
Kant's somewhat inflated claims on behalf on the principle of contradiction, it is easy to 
conclude on the basis of his more measured remarks that he does not believe that all 
judgments whose negations are contradictory are analytic. Just a few lines above the 
famous identification of contradiction as "completely sufficient" for analyticity, Kant 
says that "if the judgment is analytic...its truth must always be able to be cognized 
sufficiently in accordance with the principle of contradiction" (A151/B190, my 
emphasis). Supposing a judgment actually is analytically true, in other words, then that 
judgment can be grasped as analytically true just insofar as we see that its negation is 
contradictory. Kant is not saying that a judgment that cannot be negated on pain of 
contradiction is necessarily an analytic judgment. He is making a comparatively weak 
epistemic claim: he is saying that for a certain class of true judgments, knowledge of truth 
runs just through a grasp of conceptual content. In this sense, the issue of contradiction 
                                                
99 This example comes from Mark Siebel ("It Falls Somewhat Short of Logical 
Precision": Bolzano on Kant's Definition of Analyticity", p. 114). 
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dovetails neatly with the epistemic issue raised above. It brings us to back to the question 
of how knowledge of conceptual content could possibility sufficient for knowledge of 
truth. In Chapter Four, it will be necessary to see if Kant has an answer to this question.  
 
Clarification 
The main concern that arises in connection with the clarification criterion can be glossed 
quite succinctly. In short, if we follow Kant in insisting that a judgment qualifies as 
analytic only if it succeeds in clarifying its subject concept, then analyticity comes to a 
look like a transient property of particular acts of judgment. The judgment 'bodies are 
extended' will qualify for me as analytic if I am not antecedently aware that bodies are 
extended; but a verbally identical judgment performed subsequently will fail to qualify as 
analytic, since it will simply reiterate what I already know about bodies. One way to 
defuse this concern might be to embrace a less subjective understanding of clarification. 
We could say that a judgment is 'potentially clarificatory' when a person could 
conceivably learn something on the basis of that judgment. The property of being 
potentially clarificatory, in turn, could be identified with the property of being implicitly 
identical. Since the subject and predicate concepts in an implicitly identical judgment 
bear no outward mark of their underlying identity, it is reasonable that such a judgment 
might prove enlightening to a person not already acquainted with the subject concept at 
the level of exact content.   
 
Already Thought 
Kant's apparently psychological criterion for analyticity, the criterion that defines a 
judgment as analytic when its predicate concept is 'already thought' in its subject concept, 
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has given rise to a number of concerns as regards its actual epistemic utility. According to 
Moltke S. Gram, for instance, this criterion is all but useless as a means of distinguishing 
between analytic and synthetic judgments: a judgment might seem synthetic to me, in the 
sense that I do not think the predicate concept in the subject concept; but this is consistent 
with the same judgment being analytic, because it does not foreclose the possibility that 
the subject and predicates concepts are actually identical..100 
 Lewis White Beck raises a related problem when he notes that the set of 
judgments that qualify as analytic according to Kant's psychological criterion (which 
Beck calls his 'phenomenological' criterion) is not plausibly identical with the set of 
judgments that qualify as analytic according to Kant's apparently logical criteria for 
analyticity (containment and identity). One crucial area of non-identity, he indicates, is 
made up by analytic judgments that take as their predicate concept an 'analytic attribute' 
of the subject concept. Since analytic attributes are derivable from the "primitive and 
constitutive marks" of a given concept, according to Kant (9:61), the judgments that draw 
out these attributes will qualify as analytic according to the logical criteria of containment 
and contradiction.101 But since we do not plausibly 'think' these attributes each and every 
time we reflect on the concepts that logically entail them, the same judgments will not 
qualify as analytic according to the psychological criterion.102 Contrary to Kant's 
                                                
100 Moltke S. Gram, "The Crisis of Syntheticity", pp. 156-7. 
101 Beck maintains that the contradiction criterion is sufficient for analyticity. As we will 
see below, there is reason to be skeptical as regards that claim.  
102 Lewis White Beck, "Can Kant's Synthetic Judgments Be Made Analytic?", p. 170; 
Lewis White Beck, "Analytic and Synthetic Judgments Before Kant", p. 97.  
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mistaken assumption that "what was analytic by one would be analytic by the other",103 it 
looks as if the psychological criterion is narrower in scope than the logical criterion.104 
 
Conclusion 
Let's sum up what we have seen in this chapter. In Section 1, I tried to construct a basic 
picture of analytic judgment. As regards 'quality', I found that analytic judgments are 
either affirmative or negative. The fact that there exists no third qualitative determination 
reflects a more general logical constraint on subject-predicate judgments: according to 
Kant, a subject-predicate judgment can only affirm or deny the inclusion of one concept 
in the sphere of another concept. Next, I found that analytic judgments are necessarily 
true: where they express false propositions, they are nevertheless convertible into true 
statements. In terms of logical form, I found that while it is unclear whether an analytic 
judgment must be a subject-predicate judgment, there is some reason to think that this 
requirement might be defensible, since Kant attributes distinctive formal and modal 
properties to subject-predicate judgments. I found that Kant's well-known containment 
criterion, according to which a judgment is analytic when the predicate concept is 
'contained' in the subject concept is best understood in logical, rather than psychological 
terms. Thus, we should not read Kant as saying that a judgment is analytic when the 
predicate concept is contained in the thought of the subject concept, but that a judgment 
                                                
103 Lewis White Beck, "Lovejoy as a Critic of Kant", p. 480. 
104 James Van Cleve raises a related point when he notes that the psychological criterion 
for analyticity fails to capture the logically equivalent, contrapositive counterparts of 
judgments that qualify as analytic according to the psychological criterion itself. Thus, 
'ABCD is A' is analytic by the psychological criterion; but its contrapositive counterpart, 
'a non-A is non-ABCD', fails to qualify as analytic according to the psychological 
criterion. Obviously one can "think of something as non-A without taking any thought of 
B, C, or D" (Problems from Kant, p. 19).  
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is analytic when the predicate concept is contained in the subject concept as such, 
meaning the subject concept considered as a intersubjectively accessible object. As a 
corollary, I noted that that the containment criterion presupposes a crucial fact about 
concepts, namely, that there actually are concepts that contain other concepts as 
constituents. In terms of Kant's identity criterion for analyticity, I suggested that this 
criterion is reducible to the containment criterion: a judgment is identical tout court just 
in case everything that is contained in the predicate concept is also contained in the 
subject concept. What the talk about 'explicit' and 'implicit' identity contributes is the idea 
that facts about containment can be variously transparent and obscure at the level of 
linguistic form. Moving on to Kant's more general criterion for analyticity, contradiction, 
I found that this criterion, too, is oriented toward conceptual rather than linguistic form. 
When Kant says that a judgment is analytic just in case its negation is contradictory, he 
presupposes that we have insight into the complex concept with which the subject term is 
correlated. To deny this is to say, in effect, that only trivial judgments like 'man is man' 
are graspable as analytic, since it is only such trivial judgment whose negations can be 
recognized as contradictory at the level of linguistic form. As for apriority, I suggested 
that this should be understood just in terms of strict universality and necessity. I argued 
that the widespread epistemological acceptation of this term, according to which a 
judgment is a priori when it is knowable 'prior to' experience, reflects a logically 
independent claim concerning empirical intuition—namely, that empirical intuition 
cannot ground universal, absolutely binding principles. On the other hand, I admitted that 
analyticity does seem to be associated with an epistemological condition for Kant. He 
indicates that an analytic judgment will only qualify as such to the extent that it succeeds 
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in rendering its subject concept distinct. Finally, as regards the psychological criteria for 
analyticity, I found that an analytic judgment is necessarily such that the predicate 
concept is thought in the subject concept. Since this seems imply, however, that analytic 
judgments cannot conceivably render their subject concepts distinct, I added that for 
Kant, the predicate concept of an analytic judgment might be thought quite 'obscurely' in 
the subject concept.   
  In Section 2, I considered the slightly narrower challenges that can be raised in 
connection with Kant's doctrine of analyticity. First, I noted that the idea of negative 
analytic judgment involves an epistemic condition that seems, on its face, somewhat 
difficult to satisfy. Since Kant understands negative analytic judgments not just in terms 
of exclusion ('bodies are not feelings') but opposition ('bodies are not simple') it turns out 
that grasping a negative analytic judgment as such presupposes a priori insight into what 
our words necessarily do not mean. Next, we encountered a more tenuous epistemic 
assumption embedded in Kant's theory. We observed that Kant's theory presupposes, or 
seems to presuppose, that our knowledge of meanings and synonymy relations is 
sufficient for knowledge of truth. In other words, his theory assumes that if I know that 
'body' means extended thing, then I know, ipso facto, that the judgment 'bodies are 
extended things' is true. Nor is this the only presupposition that Kant appears to make 
with respect to truth. Kant seems to assume analytic judgments simply are true by virtue 
of the relationship between their subject and predicate concepts. Echoing Harman and 
Boghossian, I noted that this conflicts with our basic intuitions about truth, which suggest 
that a judgment is true when it corresponds in a particular way with a particular set of 
judgment-external facts.  
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 Further issues arose in connection with the assumption that enables 'implicitly 
identical' judgments like 'bodies are extended' to qualify as analytic: namely, the 
assumption that a concept can be said to 'contain' other concepts. For one, it is not clear 
that the idea of containment can be cashed out in non-metaphorical terms. Second, and 
more fundamentally, it is not clear why we should even treat concepts as 'containers' to 
begin with.   
 As for explicitly identical judgments, I noted that these judgments occupy a 
somewhat ambiguous position vis-à-vis analyticity. In his early work, Kant suggests that 
judgments like 'man is man' are analytic. In his later work, however, Kant denies that 
such judgments are analytic, seeming thereby to reiterate the epistemological requirement 
that an analytic judgment should succeed in clarifying its subject concept. To resist 
casting Kant's position in exaggeratedly psychological terms, I suggested that he might 
require just that a judgment be 'potentially' clarificatory. Thus, he would not be 
committed to the extremely relativistic claim that a judgment qualifies as analytic when it 
clarifies its subject concept; he could say that a judgment is analytic if it could potentially 
clarify its subject concept. Unfortunately, it is not as clear how the other, apparently 
psychological characterization of analyticity can be rendered unproblematic. Drawing on 
Gram and Beck, I noted that the requirement that the predicate concept in an analytic 
judgment be 'already thought' in the subject concept is inconsistent with Kant's logical 
criteria for analyticity, since the logical criteria will take in predicates that are not 





Two Questions About Concepts 
Temporarily setting aside the many difficult issues that arise from Kant's formulation of 
analytic judgment, what I want to do in this chapter is to consider a pair of concerns that 
are at the same time more basic and more potentially worrying. My expectation is that if 
we are able to understand how Kant might respond to these concerns, it will be possible 
to understand how he might respond to the issues raised in Chapter 2. In Section 1, I take 
up the first of these concerns. I ask how Kant might respond to the charge that 'analytic' 
and 'synthetic' are ultimately relative designations, because different people will associate 
different content with a given term. Extrapolating from a remark by Johann Schulz, I 
respond by showing that conceptual intension is not freely variable, but is determined by 
the distinguishing features of an objective correlate. To Desmond Hogan's concern that 
Kant cannot coherently insist on this external standard, because to do so is to introduce a 
synthetic element into ostensibly analytic judgments, I respond by arguing that the 
relation between a concept and its objective correlate is in some cases established a 
priori, meaning that the problem to which Hogan directs our attention does not arise in all 
cases. In Section 2, I consider another concern, one that arises around empirical concepts 
in particular. Against Kant's expectation that a natural substance will be associated with 
one concept and one concept alone, I suggest that his reasoning is compatible with the 
claim that natural substances are associated with a succession of concepts. Since this 
would mean that a judgment like 'gold is a yellow metal' might be analytic at one moment 
and non-analytic at the next, I ask whether Kant has some means of ruling out this form 
of conceptual variation. I suggest that the Kantian response is to insist on a limit on the 
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extent to which empirical concepts can vary. I suggest that an empirical concept, for 
Kant, is necessarily constituted in terms of predicates derived from our first-person, 
sensory encounter with objects, meaning that it is at least plausible that for any given 
natural substance, there is only one set of legitimate, distinguishing predicates. After 
noting that this response does not entirely succeed as a response to the problem at hand, I 
suggest in Section 3 that it nevertheless suggests an important general principle about 
concepts: namely, it suggests that any concept whatsoever for Kant is related to a single 
source of representational content. I conclude by showing that this principle sheds 
valuable light on the analytic-synthetic distinction.  
 
1. Objective Reality and Adequacy 
In the last chapter, I considered two problems that arise from Kant's apparently 
psychological criterion for analyticity. According to Gram, this criterion fails to provide 
meaningful access to facts about analyticity: provided just that I fail to 'think' a particular 
predicate concept in conjunction with a particular subject concept, then I will fail to 
recognize the judgment that conjoins those concepts as analytic. According to Beck, 
meanwhile, this criterion is simply too narrow: it fails to pick out analytic judgments 
having an analytic 'attribute' in the predicate position. Here, I want to consider a more 
naïve and more far-reaching objection that has been raised in connection with Kant's 
psychological criterion. According to J.G. Maaß, an early opponent of the critical 
philosophy, Kant's psychological criterion makes the analytic-distinction relative to the 
particular acts of judgments of particular individuals: a judgment will qualify as analytic 
for me if I happen to associate the predicate concept with the subject term, but it will 
qualify for someone else as synthetic, provided that they do not associate the predicate 
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concept with the subject term.105 In a response to Maaß penned at Kant's behest, Johann 
Schulz concedes the superficial cogency of Maaß's objection. He admits that the question 
of whether a given judgment is analytic or synthetic might be answered differently by 
different people, depending on the content that they happen to associate with a given 
term. But Schulz denies that this fact is dispositive. He suggests that where the analytic-
synthetic distinction is concerned, the question of conceptual intension is not to be settled 
by asking what content this or that individual associates with a given term, but by asking 
what "should be thought under the subject as well as the predicate". Thus, a person who 
happens to associate the predicate heaviness with the concept gold is not simply entitled, 
without further ado, to call the judgment 'gold is heavy' analytic. They are obliged to 
show that the concept gold actually does contain the predicate in question. Schulz gives 
us some sense of what such a demonstration might involve:   
First prove the objective reality of your concept, i.e. first prove that any one of its 
marks really belongs to a possible object, and then, when you have done that, 
prove that the other marks belong to the same thing that the first one belongs to 
without themselves belonging to the first mark.106 
 
Schulz then goes on to suggest that this second requirement belongs to a more general 
law of conceptual economy, to the effect that one should "not introduce more marks into 
a definition than are necessary for the distinction of the defined thing from all others".  
 It is easy to see how this second requirement, which appears in Kant's work under 
the heading of 'adequacy',107 can help us to resolve the problem at hand. In order to 
                                                
105 Henry Allison, The Kant-Eberhard Controversy, p. 175; cf. Bolzano, Theory of 
Science, p. 197 (sec. 148). 
106 Cited in: Henry Allison, The Kant-Eberhard Controversy, p. 175. 
107 According to Kant, a definition is adequate to its definitum when it is sufficient for the 
"distinction of the definitum from all other things" as well as the "cognition of its identity 
with other things" (24:265, 24:913). Adequacy, in turn, is a function of exhaustiveness 
(completudo) and precision (Abegemessenheit). A definition must contain enough 
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explain why the concept gold contains the yellowness and metallicity as constituents but 
not heaviness, all that I need to show is that heaviness is redundant from the standpoint of 
distinguishing gold. Since, by identifying all of the yellow metallic things, I will already 
have identified all of the gold, my concept simply does not need heaviness as a 
constituent.  
 Unfortunately, even if we allow that adequacy is a reasonable constraint on 
concept formation, and that gold is indeed distinguished from all other things on the basis 
of its yellowness and metallicity, our solution creates a new difficulty. In order to see 
this, suppose that some new substance is discovered that is identical to gold expect in 
regards to its weight. Whereas gold is heavy, this newly discovered substance is light. 
Evidently, we are obliged to amend our concept of gold. Having previously counted 
heaviness as a non-conceptual, synthetic predicate, we now need to count it as a 
conceptual predicate. And this in turn means that we need to count 'gold is heavy' as an 
analytic judgment, even though to do so is to acknowledge that analytic judgments are 
not absolutely a priori, as Kant requires. Kant could perhaps push back here by arguing 
that the taxonomy of natural substances is fixed, meaning that we will never in fact 
discover a new, gold-like substance, and that we will never be obliged to amend our 
definition of gold. But such a claim obviously transcends the boundaries of anything that 
is warrantedly assertable by Kant's standards.  
                                                                                                                                            
predicates so as to reliably distinguish the objects that are the target of the definition; but 
it must not contain so many predicates as to capture only a subset of those objects. Thus, 
the definition 'bodies are extended' is not exhaustive, because it fails to distinguish bodies 
from empty space; and 'bodies are extended, heavy things' is imprecise, because it 
narrows the extension of body to just those "bodies with which we are acquainted" 
(24:924). 
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 Considerations such as these inform Desmond Hogan's sense of what Schulz is up 
to in the passage cited above. According to Hogan, Schulz is not actually proposing a 
criterion that the conceptual constituents of analytic judgments must satisfy; he is 
performing a reductio ad absurdum on the view that any synthetic predicate whatsoever 
can be made analytic. He is saying that if I propose to make some synthetic predicate into 
an analytic predicate, it is not enough to simply lay this down definitionally, or to gesture 
to the internal consistency of the resulting concept. Rather, I need to show that the 
resulting concept is applicable to the same "feature of reality" as the initial, narrower 
concept. I need to show that the concept that I now associate with the word 'gold' picks  
out the same thing that the concept I previously associated with the word 'gold' picks out. 
But this sort of demonstration, Hogan notes, is "irreducibly synthetic".108 It ensures that 
my would-be analytic predicate cannot actually be made into an analytic predicate after 
all.   
 My understanding of what Schulz is doing is somewhat different. In the first 
place, I don't think that Schulz's rhetorical strategy is quite as Hogan characterizes it. As I 
read him, Schulz does not invoke the requirements of objective reality and adequacy as a 
way of showing that any claim on behalf of a 'new' analytic predicate involves an 
"irreducibly synthetic" process. Rather, as Schulz's entirely non-ironic presentation 
suggests, I think that he genuinely believes that a concept should be objectively real and 
adequate. His assumption seems to be that if concepts are only loosely tethered to objects, 
then they cannot meaningfully serve as the bases for analytic judgments. 
                                                
108 Desmond Hogan, "Metaphysical Motives of Kant's Analytic-Synthetic Distinction",  
p. 278. 
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 Perhaps Hogan would say that to read Schulz in this way is to make his position 
indefensible, because it would mean that for Schulz, the subject concept of any analytic 
judgment must be subjected to an "irreducibly synthetic" process. To this my response is 
that demonstrating the objective reality or the adequacy of a concept need not be an 
irreducibly synthetic process.109 In order to see this, let's look more closely at the idea of 
objective reality.  
 For Kant, as for Schulz, objective reality is that property in virtue of which a 
concept is related to an object of possible experience. Thus, in the Critique, Kant remarks 
that "if a cognition is to have objective reality, i.e. to be related to an object, and is to 
have significance and sense in that object, the object must be able to be given in some 
way" (A155/B194-5, my emphasis); and in his Preisschrift essay, he explains that a 
concept has objective reality when "a corresponding object can be given in experience" 
(20:266, my emphasis). 
 How do we show that the objective correlate of an empirical concept like gold can 
be given in experience? According to Kant, this is a matter of testifying to an actual 
instance of the concept. He notes that deduction is not necessary in the case of empirical 
concepts, because "we always have experience ready at hand to prove their objective 
reality" (A84/B117). Elsewhere, he strongly implies that in the case of empirical 
                                                
109 This is contrary to a line of interpretation that is prominently represented in the 
secondary literature. According to Henry Allison, "to claim that a concept has objective 
reality is to claim that it refers or is applicable to an actual object" (Kant's Transcendental 
Idealism, p. 135). Likewise, for Paul Guyer, a representation has objective reality when it 
has an "actual object" (Kant, p. 376).  
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concepts, the corresponding "object and its possibility" are given on the basis of the 
object itself and not through an a priori mechanism such as definition (A729/B757).110  
 The case of geometrical concepts is similar. Showing that a geometrical concept 
has objective reality, according to Kant, is a matter of "exhibiting an object 
corresponding to this concept" (A713/B741, 4:287-8). The difference lies just in what 
this exhibiting is supposed to show. By showing that gold has objective reality, what we 
show, according to Kant, is that gold agrees with the empirical conditions of possible 
experience. By showing that triangle has objective reality, on the other hand, what we 
show is that the triangle agrees with the a priori conditions of possible experience.  
 The case of the pure concepts of the understanding, meanwhile, is quite different. 
As Aaron Bunch has argued, what Kant is trying to do in the Transcendental Deduction is 
to provide an a priori demonstration of the objective reality of concepts like substance 
and cause. Instead of justifying such concepts by showing that that they pick out an 
objective correlate in fact, he proposes to justify them by showing that they represent 
necessary conditions of possibility for the representation of their objective correlates— 
meaning that a substance, for example, simply could not be given unless I already 
possessed the concept substance. The cost of failure in this regard, Bunch indicates, 
would be to trap the project of the first Critique in a vicious circle: 
 
                                                
110 Kant's example here is the concept chronometer. As Guyer and Wood explain in their 
edition of the first Critique, the chronometer was a measuring device that was first 
proposed in the early eighteenth century, but that was not actually realized until 1773 
(p.752). As such, it furnishes a helpful illustration of the relationship between definition 
and possibility in the case of empirical concepts. In the case of the chronometer, 
definition alone could act only as an indication of what the object would be if it were 
possible; demonstration of the actual possibility of the chronometer had to await the 
production of a real chronometer.   
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The Critical project of a priori legitimation must precede the application of the concepts it 
legitimates. But it cannot do so if part of the legitimation process (establishing the 
objective reality of the relevant concepts) must apply the very concepts in question in order 
to establish the actuality of their objects…111 
 
What about the second requirement that Schulz introduces, that of adequacy? Is it 
possible to show that the pure concepts of the understanding distinguish their objects 
adequately without subjecting those objects to an essentially empirical form of scrutiny? 
Indeed, I think that the adequacy of the pure concepts of the understanding follows 
trivially from the idea of the pure concepts of the understanding. Since the role of the 
pure concepts is to provide a logical architecture for experience that can be 'fleshed out' 
in different ways by pure and empirical intuition, the pure concepts necessarily provide 
just enough and not too much representational content. The concept substance furnishes 
us with the basic logical determinations of any substance whatsoever; but on pain of 
dictating precisely which substances can be given in experience, it does not furnish us 
with anything more than that.  
 Evidently, therefore, objective reality and adequacy can function coherently as 
criteria for concept-hood. Contrary to Hogan, it is not the case that to impose these 
criteria on the conceptual constituents on analytic judgments is to guarantee that those 
judgments will no longer qualify as analytic. At the same time, it is easy to see why Kant 
might want to impose these criteria on the conceptual constituents of analytic judgments. 
This ensures that analytic judgment cannot be a process wherein we unpack fanciful, 
arbitrary, or otherwise spurious concepts. It ensures that an analytic judgment will target 
                                                
111 Aaron Bunch, "'Objective Validity and Objective Reality in Kant's B-Deduction of the 
Categories", p. 77; cf. Michael Friedman, "Matter and Motion in the Metaphysical 
Foundations and the First Critique", pp. 58-61. 
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a concept that corresponds to a real object, meaning that an analytic judgment will 
actually tell us something—however trivial—about the world as given.  
 Finally, therefore, we can conclude that the conceptual constituents of analytic 
judgments—along with all other concepts whatsoever—are subject to the criteria of 
objective reality and adequacy. These criteria are probably more restrictive than Schulz 
suspects, because it looks as if it will be hard to satisfy these criteria coherently in the 
case of empirical and geometrical concepts; but if the Transcendental Deduction is 
successful, then they are not impossible to satisfy coherently, as Hogan assumes.  
 
2. Concept Change 
At this point, I want to consider another way in which empirical concepts create difficulty 
in the context of analytic judgment. The difficulty resides in the fact that there is no 
apparent necessity to the association between a particular natural substance and a 
particular empirical concept. Whereas we know why the pure concept cause must be 
constituted in the way that it is—because its being constituted in the way that it is 
represents a necessary condition for our experience of causation—it is less clear why the 
concept water must be constituted in the way that is. Even supposing that our concept of 
water must be perfectly adequate, we might think that we could define water adequately 
as a fluid body, as the substance found in lakes and rivers, or as H2O. Indeed, we might 
think that this kind of definitional variation is what actually happens, both within and 
without the natural sciences: whether prompted by some theoretical innovation or for no 
particular reason at all, it looks as if we periodically and collectively embrace a new 
concept of a given substance.  
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 How might Kant respond here? Drawing on the first chapter, it looks as if he 
would respond by insisting on the fixity of our initial, designative concept of water. He 
would say that in the natural sciences, we lay down an initial definition and do not 
subsequently revise it, because to do so would be to derail our investigation of the 
corresponding substance. But this response by itself fails to convince. Arguably, the 
theoretical objectives that are satisfied by an initial, designative concept can be served 
just as well by a succession of designative concepts. Provided just that we agree, at any 
given moment, on the properties that are constitutive of water, then there is no reason to 
worry that that water will be inadequately 'designated', or that there will be no basis for 
synthetic predication with respect to water, or that misunderstanding will ensue when 
someone utters the word 'water'. 
 As for why this might be a matter of concern, it is because it imperils the 
possibility of empirical analytic judgment. Supposing we cannot show that 'water' must 
be defined as a fluid body, as Kant suggests,112 then there is no way of showing that the 
judgment 'water is a fluid body' is genuinely analytic. We could admit that 'water is fluid 
body' had the status of a conceptual judgment for Kant and his contemporaries; but we 
would be unable to concede that 'water is the fluid' had the status of an analytic judgment 
for Kant and his contemporaries. This judgment simply could never have been absolutely 
a priori.  
 Given, then, that Kant himself defines water as a fluid body,113 let's see if he has 
some way of defending the uniqueness of this conception. One way of answering this will 
be to see if he has some way of ruling out the rival definitions that I suggested above: 
                                                
112 This definition comes from the Vienna Logic (24:914). 
113 This definition comes from the Vienna Logic (24:914). 
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'water is H2O' and 'water is the substance found in lakes and rivers'. A fruitful strategy for 
ruling out the first alternative is suggested by Robert Hanna's defense of Kant against the 
'scientific essentialism' of Saul Kripke. Contrary to Kripke's assumption that Kant was 
simply mistaken in his identification of 'gold is a yellow metal' as analytic, and that 
exposing Kant's mistake in this regard is as easy as invoking the 'genuinely' essential 
attributes of gold—namely, the chemical properties that are encapsulated in its atomic 
number—Hanna shows that Kant's position grows out of a defensible natural scientific 
epistemology. For Kant, natural substances are simply not accessible to us on the basis of 
a supposed 'real essence', which is to say, an essence that would transcend the framework 
of our specifically human, specifically sensory encounter with those substances. To the 
extent that such substances are cognizable, they are cognizable just on the basis of the 
macrophysical properties that are actually given in our experience of those substances, 
thus, in the case of gold, on the basis of its yellowness and metallicity.114   
 Without trying to adjudicate between Kripke and Kant on this issue, it will at least 
be clear on what grounds the latter can eliminate 'water is H2O' from contention as a 
definition of 'water'. Even supposing that water is constituted by its underlying chemical 
properties, and even supposing that those chemical properties are captured by the formula 
in question,115 there is no prospect of our experiencing water in terms of those chemical 
                                                
114 Robert Hanna, "A Kantian Critique of Scientific Essentialism", pp. 512-515. 
115 Hanna notes that the scientific essentialists do nothing to rule out the scenario in 
which gold turns out to have a deeper, more fundamental 'micro-microstructure' than the 
one that is captured in the definition 'gold is the element with the atomic number 79'. This 
in turn means that the essentialists are susceptible to the same attack that they direct 
towards Kant. Just as the essentialists can argue that yellowness and metallicity are 
inessential to gold, because there is a possible world in which the element with the atomic 
number 79 does not show up as yellow or metallic, the essentialist's opponent can argue 
that gold's being the element with the atomic number 79 is inessential to gold, because 
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properties, and so no basis for incorporating those properties into our definition. The 
function of a definition, for Kant, is not just to individuate the object of the definition, but 
to individuate that object within the framework of human sensory experience.  
 The case of our second candidate definition, 'water is the substance found in lakes 
and rivers', is slightly more difficult. Unlike the property H2O, the property of being 
found in lakes and rivers cannot be eliminated on the basis of its inaccessibility from the 
standpoint of sensory experience. The attribution of this property to water seems to arise 
precisely out of our sensory encounter with water. On the other hand, perhaps this 
property is too far removed from immediate sensory experience to qualify as a genuine 
predicate of water. Whereas the properties of yellowness and metallicity are plausibly 
given at the level of first-person sensory experience, the property of being found in lakes 
and rivers has no immediate sensory correlate. It is an abstraction that is formed on the 
basis of extended collective experience, and that presupposes the intelligibility of two 
constituent abstractions (lake, river).  
  What reason do we have to think that these considerations are decisive from 
Kant's standpoint? Initial anecdotal evidence on this score comes from the way in which 
Kant tends to define empirical concepts. With some exceptions, he defines empirical 
concepts in terms of predicates that are plausibly accessible on the basis of first-personal 
                                                                                                                                            
there is a possible world in the micro-microstructurally characterized substance is not the 
element with the atomic number 79 ("A Kantian Critique of Scientific Essentialism", pp. 
521-523). Approaching the same basic point from a different direction, Noam Chomsky 
notes that a definition of water as H2O may actually be too coarse-grained to qualify as 
genuinely essential, given what we are coming to understand about the complexities of 
water (Science of Language, p. 156, cf. Hilary Putnam, "The Development of Externalist 
Semantics", p. 198).    
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sensory experience.116 A more principled reason for thinking that there could not be a 
concept of water constituted by abstract, non-first-personal predicates emerges from the 
requirements that Kant imposes on concepts in general. 
 Above, we saw that a concept is a candidate for analysis only if it is related to an 
object of possible experience; and we saw that this relation can be established either a 
priori or aposteriori. The concept substance is related a priori to its objects in the sense 
that it makes possible the experience of substance; and the concept gold is related 
aposteriori to its objects in the sense that it arises from the actual experience of gold. 
What we want to do now is examine the idea of a relation to objects in more depth. In 
what does such a relation actually consist? According to Kant, it consists first and 
foremost in a relation to "empirical intuitions, i.e. to data for possible experience" 
(A239/B298). Because a mode of intuition which would actually 'produce' its own objects 
is impossible for us (B145), and because pure, a priori intuition can only impose form on 
objects that are antecedently given, the possibility of a relation between concept and 
object presupposes that a specifically empirical intuition be "given to" the concept. 
Evidently, though, this does not explain how the intuition itself comes to be related to the 
object. According to Kant, an empirical intuition is related to its object by means of 
'sensation' (A20/B34, cf. B147, 9:92), which is in turn defined as the "effect of an object 
on the capacity for representation, insofar as we are affected by it" (A20/B34), and 
elsewhere as a "perception that refers to the subject as a modification of its state" 
(A320/B376, cf. A374). There is probably no need to parse these definitions in detail. 
                                                
116 Exceptions to this rule include concepts that arise in the context of Kant's natural 
scientific writings, such as attractive force. According to Kant, an attractive force "is that 
moving force by which a matter can be the cause of the approach of others to it" (4:498). 
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Evidently, what Kant means is that a concept is related to an object just insofar as the 
latter is given at the level of the individual, embodied subject.117 The concept substance is 
related to an object insofar as I can encounter and be affected by substances; and the 
concept gold is related to gold insofar as the latter can be given within the framework of 
my individual, spatio-temporal experience.  
 So far, then, our hypothesis has been rendered plausible. According to Kant's 
basic assumptions, the concept water as constituted by the predicate being found in rivers 
and lakes cannot relate to an object, because the corresponding property cannot be given 
at the level of first person, embodied experience. While the fluidity of water is a clear and 
uncontroversial element in my first-hand experience of water, it is hard to see how the 
presence of water in lakes and rivers could enter into my first-hand experience at all. 
Ideally, we would reinforce this conclusion by appealing to some explicit statement from 
Kant himself. Unfortunately, to the best of my knowledge, Kant does not spell out the 
kinds of properties that can be given at the level of sensory experience. While we can 
perhaps assume that the range of legitimate sensible predicates coincides with the 
                                                
117 The second definition is perhaps slanted too heavily in the direction of individual 
subjectivity. In saying that a sensation "refers to the subject as a modification of its state", 
Kant can be understood as saying that a sensation is never the kind of thing that can be 
attributed to the object that is the occasion for the sensation itself. Thus, sensations would 
all be at the level of warmth, namely, in being 'modifications' of my state that "do not in 
themselves allow any object to be cognized" (A29/B44. cf. A376). As Beatrice 
Longuenesse points out, however, Kant does not consistently confine sensation within 
these parameters: "according to the Transcendental Analytic, sensation is certainly related 
to objects, since we know the degree (intensive magnitude) of qualities in objects by 
means of the degree of sensation" (Kant and the Capacity to Judge, p. 192). And in the 
Critique of Judgment, Kant himself makes it clear that the "way in the subject is affected" 
by a given object can be "carried over to the object" itself (20:221).  
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secondary qualities recognized by the empiricists, Kant does not actually delineate the 
bounds of sensation.118  
 This offers us a principled reason to think that 'water is a fluid body' cannot be 
supplanted by 'water is H2O' or 'water is the substance found in lakes and rivers' as a 
definition of water. As it turns out, neither of the proposed alternatives are appropriately 
scaled. 'Water is H2O' attributes a predicate to water that is 'too small' to be experienced 
at the level of individual sensory experience; and 'water is the substance found in lakes 
and rivers' is 'too big' by the same yardstick. 
 Ultimately, though, I do not think that this takes us past the goal line. It does not 
demonstrate that 'water' has the meaning that it has as a matter of strict necessity. 
Because even if we allow that the concept associated with 'water' must be perfectly 
adequate, and that it must be scaled to the dimensions of human sensibility, we have not 
yet eliminated the possibility of multiple appropriately scaled concepts. We have not yet 
shown that there could not be another entirely adequately concept of water made up 
exclusively of first-person predicates. Nor is really clear that this could be shown. While 
it is perhaps intuitive that a natural substance will admit of just one adequate definition, it 
is hard to see how this could actually be demonstrated. We would simply never reach a 
point at which we could declare that all possible alternatives had been exhausted.  
  What therefore can we retain from this? Evidently, we cannot lay claim at this 
point to a satisfying response to our most recent concern. Even having set aside the 
                                                
118 The closest that he comes, perhaps, is in identifying "sight, hearing, and feeling" as 
the source of the corresponding 'sensations' of color, sound, and warmth (A29/B45). Also 
suggestive is Kant's identification of color in particular as a 'modification' of the sense of 
sight (A28/B44). Since a sensation is defined generically as a modification that is 
produced in the subject (A320/B376), we may read this second remark as suggesting that 
such modifications occur at the level of the sensory organs.  
 129 
problems associated with adequacy, and even having granted the claim that empirical 
concepts must be scaled to the dimensions of human sensibility, we were unable to show 
there can only be a single concept of gold or water. On the other hand, just as our 
discussion of adequacy enables us to draw out an important principle concerning the 
conceptual constituents of analytic judgments, namely, that such concepts are subject to 
the criteria of objective reality and adequacy, our most recent discussion has enabled us 
to make clear an important claim concerning empirical concepts. What we have found is 
that a legitimate empirical concept has what content it has by virtue of sensory 
experience. Rather than a repository for whatever predicates we might happen to think in 
connection with the corresponding substance, an empirical concept is a repository for 
predicates harvested on the basis of empirical intuition. These predicates alone constitute 
the analytic core of the concept.  
 This in turn suggests a more general claim, to the effect that any concept 
whatsoever has what content it has by virtue of a particular source of cognition. A 
concept is not just any assortment of mutually consistent and non-redundant predicates. It 
is an assortment of mutually consistent and non-redundant predicates that originate either 
with empirical intuition, pure intuition, the understanding, or with reason. Before moving 
on the next chapter, I will try in the next section to flesh out and to justify this claim. 
 
3. The Nature of Concepts 
So far, we have encountered two basic constraints on the range of concepts that can enter 
into analytic judgments. We have seen that the subject concept in an analytic judgment 
must have objective reality and that such concepts must be adequate. Here, I want to 
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make the case for a constraint that impinges on concepts in general: the requirement that 
a concept be directly related to a particular source of cognition.  
 The case for empirical concepts has just been made above. We have seen that 
there cannot be a concept of water that escapes characterization in terms of human 
sensibility, and hence, that an empirical concept should be understood as an aggregate 
formed from specifically sensible predicates. By way of a minor qualification to this rule, 
it is worth noting that empirical concepts can contain predicates that do not actually 
originate with sensibility. Thus, the concept water contains the concept body as a 
constituent; and body originates with the understanding rather than empirical intuition. 
What is salient in this context, however, is that body is indeed instantiated at the level of 
sensible experience. Unlike, say, absolute possibility, which does not enter into our 
sensible experience in any form (A323/B285), the concept body is directly given in our 
experience, in the form, namely, of any discrete segment of the spatial manifold. There 
exists a clear 'empirical criterion' for recognizing when a body is given.119 
 As for mathematical concepts, here we initially confront a puzzle. Since concepts 
like octagon are not abstracted from sensible experience, or given to us a priori through 
the nature of the understanding, it is not clear that they correspond to any source of 
representational content whatsoever. Being 'arbitrary' constructions, it might look as if 
                                                
119 Insofar as an empirical concept purports to represent a certain kind of property-
bearing object, it is arguable that the concept will necessarily include predicates 
originating with the understanding, because it is only by virtue of the understanding that 
we are able to represent empirical reality in terms of property-bearing substances. 
Bolzano makes this point in a non-Kantian context. He says that "in order....to compound 
an idea out of mere ideas of its properties, b, b', b''..., it is still requisite that there be some 
other ideas as well, which serve to connect them. In order to represent the object that has 
the properties b, b', b''...in itself, one must form the idea "of a something which has (the 
properties) b, b', b''..." (Theory of Science, p. 98, my emphasis).  
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they emerge just from the mathematician's fancy. In an unpublished note, Kant provides a 
clue as to how such concepts should be understood. He explains that the mathematician 
"constructs arbitrary concepts of magnitudes as hypothetical conditions, from which 
consequences ought to be able to be drawn" (17:552, my emphasis, cf. A714/B742). 
Thus, in geometry, we construct concepts of particular kinds of extended magnitudes as 
rules for the actual generation of those magnitudes;120 and in arithmetic, we construct 
"operations (such as addition, subtraction, and also the extraction of roots) and concepts 
(above all the concept of ratio) for manipulating any magnitudes there may be".121 This 
suggests that concept formation in mathematics is subject to the following general 
principle: while our concepts (or operations) need not be abstracted from the experience 
of extended magnitudes in space and time, they are necessarily such that they can give 
rise to extended spatio-temporal magnitudes, or such that they can be applied to already 
given magnitudes. This in turn suggests that we should think of mathematical concepts 
not as arbitrary representations, unrelated to any source of representational content 
whatsoever, but as empirical concepts that, for methodological reasons, are produced a 
priori. If such concepts were not produced a priori, according to Kant, then they would 
not have the generality that mathematics demands; but if they could not be empirically 
instantiated, then they would not have the empirical significance that mathematics 
presupposes.  
 Our next pair of concepts, space and time, likewise present a puzzle, namely, as to 
whether they are even concepts to begin with. Kant's official position, we might say, is 
                                                
120 Kant identifies the concept of a triangle with its schema, suggesting that the concept 
itself can be thought of as a rule for the generation of triangles (A718/B746, cf. 
A164/B205). 
121 Michael Friedman, Kant and the Exact Sciences, pp. 113-4 (cf. A717/B745). 
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that space and time should be understood not as concepts, but as intuitions (B40, 
A31/B49, B136). This reflects the phenomenological claim that space and time both 
contain an "infinite set of representations" within themselves (B40, A32/B7) and are in 
that sense fundamentally distinct from our finite concepts; this also reflects Kant's sense 
that geometry "determines the properties of space synthetically", and thus presupposes a 
non-conceptual representation of space (B40-1). But the notion that space and time are 
not concepts conflicts with what we might call Kant's unofficial position, which is to say, 
his persistent habit of referring to space and time precisely as concepts (B38, B40, 
A40/B57, A31/B49, A37/B54). According to Charles Parsons, this apparent 
inconsistency can be made to disappear when we attend more closely to Kant's apparent 
disavowal of the concept-hood of space. When Kant says that "the original representation 
of space is an a priori intuition, not a concept" (B40), according to Parsons, he is not 
saying that space is not a concept, but that it is not 'originally' a concept, meaning that the 
intuition of space is logically prior to the conceptual thematization of the same. If this 
conceptual thematization is nevertheless necessary and inevitable, Parsons adds, it is 
because there "must be such a thing as the concept of space, to be a constituent of 
judgments concerning space".122 In other words, if the judgment 'space has three 
dimensions' is to be possible as a judgment, then space must be possible as a concept, 
because only a concept can be part of a judgment (A68/B93). For our purposes, what is 
most significant is Kant's sense as to where this concept derives its content. According to 
Kant, the concept cannot get its content just from the particular, empirical effects of 
space; rather, it must get its content from the representation that is the basis of these 
                                                
122 Charles Parsons, From Kant to Husserl, p. 14.  
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empirical effects (A23/B38, cf. A40/B57). "An a priori intuition", he explains, "grounds 
all concepts of [the all-encompassing space]" (A25/B39). Since precisely the same 
considerations apply to time, we may extend Kant's conclusion, and say that both space 
and time are derived, qua concepts, exclusively from pure a priori intuition.  
 Going forward, it becomes slightly easier to show that particular kinds of 
concepts are related to particular sources of representational content, and indeed, that 
they cannot admit of any 'impurities' in this regard. Thus, as the name already suggests, 
the pure concepts of the understanding have their origin "solely in the understanding" 
(A320/B377, my emphasis). Were this otherwise, Kant thinks, then the objectivity of 
experience would be impossible. If I did not already have the concept substance in 
advance of any experience whatsoever, then it would be impossible for me to experience 
empirical change in terms of the alteration of a subsisting object (A188/B231). If I did 
not already have the concept of causation, it would be impossible for me to distinguish 
between a merely subjective sequence of perceptions and a sequence of perceptions that 
is grounded in an object (B234).123 The necessity that characterizes the latter 
phenomenon cannot be given on the basis of empirical intuition (A112). 
 Finally, we arrive at those concepts that Kant calls 'transcendental ideas', and 
which have not so far entered into our discussion, being largely irrelevant from the 
standpoint of analytic judgment (owing to the fact they have subjective, rather than 
objective reality (A339/B397), and are not therefore legitimate constituents of analytic 
                                                
123 According to Robert Brandom, "Kant’s most basic transcendental question does not, 
as his own characterization of his project suggests, concern the condition of the 
possibility of synthetic knowledge a priori, but the conditions of the intelligibility of 
representational objectivity: of states or episodes that answer for their correctness to how 
it is with the objects they represent" ("Kantian Lessons about Mind, Meaning, and 
Rationality", p. 2).  
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judgments). According to Kant, such concepts are decidedly independent of the senses, or 
empirical intuition, as regards their content (A313/B370). There is simply no question, he 
thinks, of deriving a concept like virtue, or absolute possibility, from individual 
experiences. But the transcendental ideas are equally independent of the understanding as 
regards their content. Since the understanding is oriented exclusively toward the synthesis 
of particular, spatio-temporal experiences, and since neither virtue nor absolute 
possibility play any role in this regard, Kant concludes that they must originate with a 
different faculty, having a different function altogether, namely, reason (A338/B396). 
 With the partial exception of empirical concepts, therefore, it looks as if concepts 
for Kant are invariably related to particular sources of cognition. A concept, we might 
say, is an expression of the source of cognition to which it belongs. Relating this now to 
our central problem, that of analytic judgment, it becomes possible to explain why a 
synthetic a priori judgment like 'every event has a cause' cannot be an analytic judgment. 
Against C.I. Lewis, who insists that this judgment is in fact analytic, because he insists 
that the experience of causation is an essential constituent in our experience of events, 
and so must be included in the concept event, we can reply there cannot be a concept that 
combines the idea of causation alongside the idea of events, because such a concept 
would include content from two distinct source of cognition.124 It would include the 
empirical concept of an event alongside the pure concept of causation and would thus run 
contrary to the very nature and function of concepts.  
 Now, someone might object here that Kant has simply misconstrued the nature 
and function of concepts. Even supposing that for natural scientific purposes, we identify 
                                                
124 C.I. Lewis, An Analysis of Knowledge and Valuation, p. 162.  
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substances in terms of their manifest sensible properties, and even supposing that 
transcendental consciousness embodies a series of synthetic functions that are logically 
prior to empirical intuition, why should it be the case that our concepts actually reflect 
these facts? Why shouldn't we defer to a more intuitive, phenomenological image of 
conceptual representation, which would suggest that concepts are highly variable objects, 
both within and between individuals, and that they are by no means subject to the 
requirements that Kant imposes on them? The Kantian response, I think, is to say that 
both images of conceptual representation can be accommodated within a single frame. 
Thus, Kant admits that different people will associate different predicates with gold; as 
we saw in the first chapter, however, he insists that this variation is only meaningful as 
variation to the extent that it is set against the backdrop of an intensionally stable concept 
(A728/B756). Likewise, Kant admits that the idea of right need not always be thought in 
exactly the same way; from his perspective, however, this does not mean that everyone 
simply has their own concept of right; it means that "in common and practical use, one is 
not conscious" of everything that is entailed in the concept (A43/B61). Just as I can see 
the Milky Way without seeing it distinctly, I can think of, and even use a given concept 




I began this chapter by asking how Kant could defend himself against the critique 
associated with J.G. Maaß, the critique according to which the analytic-synthetic 
distinction is relative to the particular acts of judgment of particular individuals. By 
exploring the response offered by Schulz, which amounts to a sharp restriction on the 
range of possible intensional variation, it was possible to demonstrate an initial, 
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extremely important fact about concepts. It was possible to show that the subject concept 
in an analytic judgment must have objective reality and must be adequate to its object. I 
acknowledged that these conditions could not be coherently satisfied in the case of 
empirical or geometrical concepts, because knowing that such concepts have objective 
reality means attesting to the givenness of an actual objective correlate; but I argued that 
these conditions could be satisfied coherently in the case of the pure concepts of the 
understanding, because for these concepts, objective reality is secured a priori.  
 By way of drawing out another important fact about concepts, I then considered a 
second problem. I asked whether a natural substance might be associated with a 
succession of designative concepts, meaning, in effect, that a natural substance could 
never be the subject of a genuinely analytic judgment. I then presented what I took to be 
the best Kantian response to this worry. I suggested that for Kant, the range of possible 
conceptual variation is actually quite narrow. The concept of a natural substance cannot 
refer to microphysical properties, or to broad, contextual properties; it can only refer to 
properties attestable at the level of first-person experience. While conceding that this did 
not ultimately suffice as a response to our concern, because it did nothing to foreclose the 
possibility of multiple appropriately scaled designative concepts, I suggested that this 
response was nevertheless quite instructive as regards empirical concepts. It suggested 
that such concepts get what content they have from empirical intuition exclusively.  
 Subsequently, I showed that this claim generalizes, and that for Kant, concepts are 
invariably related to particular sources of representational content. I suggested that if we 
bear this principle in mind, it becomes possible to explain why an analytic judgment is 
necessarily analytic, and why a synthetic a priori judgment is necessarily synthetic. From 
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Kant's perspective, a judgment is analytic when it involves conceptual content originating 
from the understanding alone, and a judgment is synthetic a priori when it involves 
conceptual content originating from the understanding and from sensibility. To say that a 
judgment like 'every event has a cause' could somehow become analytic, therefore, is not 
just to say that the concept event could come to envelop the concept of causation; it is to 
say that this concept could somehow cease to be an empirical concept and become, like 
the concept of causation, a pure concept of the understanding. Even without remarking 
that for Kant, rational cognition is intrinsically non-temporal in nature, and so cannot be 
the basis for temporal concepts like event, the thought that a concept could somehow 
become a pure concept of the understanding is already sufficiently outlandish to discredit 
the proposed scenario. We are obliged to conclude that the boundary between the analytic 




A Kantian Defense of Analytic Judgment  
In this chapter, I consider the 'internal problems' brought to light in the second chapter. 
Drawing on the understanding of concepts developed in the previous chapter—and in 
particular, on the understanding that the conceptual constituents in analytic judgment 
necessarily have a priori objective reality—I show that these problems can largely be 
resolved, meaning that it is possible to construct a coherent Kantian theory of analytic 
judgment.  
 Section 1 of this chapter deals with the question of how we can know that a 
grammatically negative judgment is analytic. Section 2 considers the question of truth 
from both an epistemic and metaphysical angle. I ask how we can know that any analytic 
judgment whatsoever is true; and I ask how any judgment whatsoever can be true just by 
virtue of conceptual content. I show that both of these questions are to be answered by 
stressing the a priori relation between concept and object. Section 3 takes up the difficult 
issue of analytic judgment and logical form. I consider the different ways in which 
Bolzano, Frege, and Katz each try to sever the link between analyticity and subject-
predicate form and I show that none of these strategies has any prospect for success in a 
Kantian context. Section 4 attempts to shed light on the meaning of containment. I ask 
whether it is possible to clarify this notion in a way that preserves the necessity of 
containment relations. In Section 5, I tackle Kant's identity-criterion for analyticity and 
his clarification-criterion simultaneously. I show that the exclusion of explicitly identical 
judgments from the class of possible analytic judgments can be justified without 
reference to the clarificatory value of such judgments, and thus, that the clarification 
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criterion has no real work to do. I conclude, in Section 6, by considering the criterion 
which states than an analytic judgment is a judgment in which the predicate concept is 
'already thought' in the subject concept. I show that this criterion does not really impose a 
psychological condition on what it means to be an analytic judgment as it appears to do.  
 
1. Negative Analytic Knowledge 
In the Chapter Two, I noted that the category of negative analytic judgments is subject to 
a particularly high epistemic standard. While we can describe the affirmative judgment 
'all bodies are extended' as analytic just insofar as we know what is necessarily entailed in 
the concept body, we can describe the negative judgment 'no body is simple' as analytic 
only insofar as we know what the concept body does not entail—indeed, what the 
concept necessarily does not entail.  
 In trying to show how Kant can meet this epistemic standard, recall from the first 
chapter how Kant proposes to justify our insight into the content of the concept body. He 
says that when we abstract away from the empirical determinations of this or that body, 
we arrive at a substratum from which we can no longer abstract. This basic substratum 
consists just in the determinations of extension and figure, a discovery which licenses the 
claim that the word 'body' means an extended thing having a determinate figure. In order 
now to license the claim that 'body' does not mean a simple thing, we simply need to push 
this interrogation slightly further, and to ask what it means to say that something is 
extended. At minimum, what it means is to say that the thing is given spatially: according 
to Kant, extendedness is property that comes into being with pure spatial intuition. What 
then does it mean, then, to say that a thing is given spatially? For Kant, it means that the 
thing is given as a 'limitation' of space itself (A32, B39). Space, as a pure intuition, is 
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given as a whole comprising a potential infinity of parts (B40, 4:507); the parts 
themselves "can only be given through division, and thus not prior to the composite, but 
only in it" (4:508). This, finally, tells us why bodies cannot be simple. For something to 
be genuinely simple, Kant maintains, it would have exist independently of and prior to 
the composite in which it is involved (2:399); but bodies, as Kant's reflection on the 
givenness of bodies suggests, are not independent in this sense. They are wholly 
dependent on the pure intuition from which they have been carved out as parts.  
 Ultimately, therefore, if we can know that the judgment 'no body is simple' is 
analytic, it is not because we have an intuitive grasp of the different ways that the word 
'body' is employed. As Quine suggests, this kind of understanding would not get us as far 
as analyticity. Instead, we know that 'no bodies are simple' is analytic because we can 
pursue the meaning of 'body' in a quasi-phenomenological manner, and we can determine 
that the meaning of 'body' definitely excludes the idea of simplicity.  
 Admittedly, this kind of insight will come much cheaper in some cases, owing to 
the fact that we can construct perfectly tautological negative judgments just by arranging 
the 'logical terms' in the judgments appropriately. Thus, Kant's only other example of 
negative analytic judgment, 'no unlearned person is learned' (A153/B192), can be grasped 
as analytic just at the level of its surface grammatical form.125 What is important to 
emphasize is that our confidence in the analyticity of a grammatically negative judgment 
will not always or even usually come this cheaply. As we have just seen, Kant's doctrine 
of analytic judgment is consistent with judgments like 'no bodies are simple', or 'no 
                                                
125 This is not the claim that the judgment is true by virtue of its surface grammatical 
form. Indeed, Kant indicates that the analyticity of the judgment in question rests on the 
content of its constituent concepts.  
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substance exists as predicate', judgments which reveal themselves as analytic only insofar 
as we have insight into their underlying conceptual structure.  
 
2. Knowledge of Analytic Truth 
Having seen how Kant proposes to clarify the meanings of our terms, we have already 
gone some way toward responding to our next problem, the problem of how we come to 
know that analytic judgments are true. Indeed, since meaning clarification for Kant is not 
a matter of characterizing the usage of a given term, but of interrogating the object or 
phenomenon to which the term corresponds, it is clear that my knowledge of meaning is 
already the kind of understanding that is involved in the assessment of truth or falsity. In 
order to get some more clarity on Kant's position on this issue, it will be worth briefly 
restating the sense in which his position might seem somewhat dubious.   
 If Kant's position seems dubious, in short, it is because he seems to exaggerate the 
epistemic fruitfulness of the principle of contradiction. Once I know that 'S is not P' is 
contradictory, according to Kant, I know that 'S is P' is true. This conflicts with the 
intuition that suggests that we know that a claim is true just when we know that it 
accurately represents the object or state of affairs that it targets. As it happens, it also 
conflicts with what Kant has to say about truth, namely, that truth means the "agreement 
of cognition with its object" (A58/B82, cf. A157/B197, A293/B350, A820/B848, 9:50, 
24:56, 24:81, 24:718, 24:723, 24:822).  
 Why does Kant say, therefore, that analytic truth is "cognized sufficiently in 
accordance with the principle of contradiction" (A151/B190, 24:826)? In short, it is 
because he takes the objective reality of the subject concepts in analytic judgment for 
granted. Because the concept substance corresponds to an object of possible experience, 
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and because the nature of that object is reflected in the concept, it follows that we can 
learn about substances themselves simply by inspecting the concept. Just by seeing that 
the judgment 'substance does not exist as subject' is contradictory, we know that if a 
substance exists, then it exists as subject.126  
 Of course, if a concept has objective reality only insofar as it is related to an 
actual object, then Kant cannot afford to invoke objective reality in this context, however 
implicitly. Knowledge that an analytic judgment is true would presuppose acquaintance 
with the corresponding object or state of affairs, meaning that the judgment could not 
strictly speaking be an analytic judgment. Fortunately, as we saw above, there is at least a 
certain class of concepts for which objective reality is established without reference to 
actual existence. The objective reality of the concept substance does not rest on the actual 
givenness of actual substances, but on the fact that this concept is presupposed in all 
experience of empirical change whatsoever. Likewise, the concept of a thing that is fully 
determined does not owe its objective reality to the actual existence of a fully determined 
thing, but to the fact that it represents a "transcendental ideal...to which all thinking of 
objects in general must...be traced back" (A576/B604, 8:236). 
 Finally, therefore, if Kant thinks that knowledge of concept containment suffices 
for knowledge of truth, it is not because he simply disregards the question of objective 
significance. Rather, it is because he assumes the objective significance of the concepts 
with which he is dealing. It is this assumption that makes credible the notion that we can 
derive truths just from an analysis of concepts.  
                                                
126 Kant explains that the "unconditioned necessity of judgments" is equivalent to the 
"conditioned necessity of the thing". Thus, to cite Kant's own example, the judgment 'a 
triangle has three angles' does not tell us that a triangle exists necessarily. It tells us that if 
a triangle exists, then that triangle necessarily has three angles (A593-4/B621-2). 
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Analytic Truth as Such 
In the Chapter Two, I noted that Kant's problems as regards truth are not simply 
epistemological in nature. Quite apart from the question of how we can know that a 
judgment is true just insofar as we know what it means, I asked how Kant could justify 
the semantic claim that an analytic judgment simply is true by virtue of meaning, 
independently of "the way the world is". At this point, it looks like Kant is not actually 
obliged to support this claim. The reasonis that the meanings, or concepts, that constitute 
analytic judgments are not entirely untethered to objective facts, in the way that the 
polemical representations of 'metaphysical analyticity' seem to assume. On the contrary, 
the concepts that constitute analytic judgments, according to Kant, have objective reality. 
The concept body can becomes the subject of an analytic judgment just insofar as it bears 
a relation to an object of possible experience. This suggests that if Kant sometimes 
speaks of analytic judgments as if they are true just by virtue of their constituent 
concepts, he does not intend to say that they are true by virtue of concepts understood as 
indifferent intensional unities. Rather, he intends to say that that analytic judgments are 
true by virtue of concepts understood as objectively determinate. 
 So why doesn't Kant conclude, in concert with Gilbert Harman, Paul Boghossian, 
and others in the post-Quinean tradition of skepticism about analyticity, that so-called 
analytic truths are not actually analytic? Having admitted that analytic judgments must 
have objective import, hasn't Kant admitted that analytic truths depend substantially on 
the objects and states of affairs that they are about? The Kantian response to this problem 
involves an appeal to the same subtle feature of objective reality that I invoked above. In 
the case of concepts originating with the understanding, Kant thinks, objective reality is 
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established a priori. The objective reality of the concept causation is not secured on the 
basis of actually given causal relations; it is secured on the basis of transcendental 
deduction, which shows that the concept is a condition for any experience of causation 
whatsoever. This means that when we analyze concepts like causation, we are not 
reproducing the results of aposteriori inquiry; we are spelling out the understanding that 
we must have if a certain kind of object (or relation between objects) is to be represented 
empirically. This allows for a provisional clarification of the semantics of analytic 
judgment. For Kant, analytic judgments are indeed about objects, but they do not depend 
for their truth on those objects. Strictly speaking, they depend for their truth just on the 
concepts through which those objects come to be given in the first place.  
 
3. Analyticity and Logical Form 
In Section 2 above, I considered two ways in which the relation between analytic 
judgment and subject-predicate form could be rendered unstable. Following Bolzano in 
his emphasis on propositional form as the truth-maker for analytic judgment, it looked as 
if we could extend analyticity to any substitution instance of any truth-preserving 
propositional form. And following Katz in his emphasis on semantic redundancy as the 
distinguishing feature of analytic truth, it looked at if it was possible to extend analyticity 
to any appropriately redundant judgment, regardless of its underlying logical form.  
 Let's begin by taking up the challenge to Kant's position associated with Bolzano. 
As we saw, what sets this challenge in motion is Bolzano's re-characterization of the idea 
of analytic judgment. Bolzano suggests that what actually distinguishes an analytic 
judgment is the fact that its truth or falsity "remains the same no matter what changes are 
made" in its constitutive concepts. Thus, Kant's example, 'all bodies are composite', still 
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qualifies as analytic for Bolzano, because its truth-value remains constant under 
variation; but 'all men are learned or not learned' is also analytic from Bolzano's 
perspective, because its truth-value likewise remains constant under variation. 
 Supposing, then, that Kant still wants to say that 'all bodies are extended' is 
analytic and that 'all men are learned or not learned' is not, on what basis can he do so? 
An initial thought might be that 'all men are learned or not learned' does not seem to be 
'analytic' in the strict sense of the word. Since the concept man does not plausibly 
'contain' the disjunction of learned and unlearned, it is far from clear that the latter can be 
extracted analytically from the former. But this response misses the point. If 'all men are 
learned or not learned' counts as analytic, from Bolzano's perspective, it is not because 
this judgment follows from the mereological content of the concept man. Rather, as 
Alberto Coffa explains, it is because it follows from the non-mereological, essentially 
inferential content of its constituent logical concepts, predication and conjunction.127 
Bolzano's contribution, according to Coffa, was to have realized that conceptual content 
extends beyond the narrow boundaries acknowledge by Kant, and to have broadened the 
category of purely conceptual judgment accordingly.  
 Fortunately, since a direct response to Bolzano on this score would mean 
engaging difficult questions about the nature of logic and logical concepts, it turns out 
that there is an indirect, but far-reaching strategy available. Instead of trying to defend the 
non-analytic status of 'all men are learned or not learned' against a progressively more 
expansive understanding of conceptual content and conceptual analysis, Kant can argue 
that the judgment in question simply cannot satisfy the most basic condition associated 
                                                
127 Alberto Coffa, "Kant, Bolzano, and the Emergence of Logicism", p. 684, and The 
Semantic Tradition from Kant to Carnap, p. 35. 
 146 
with analytic judgment, indeed the most basic condition that Kant, Bolzano, and Frege all 
associate with analytic judgment. He can argue that 'all men are learned or not learned' 
cannot possibly be true—not in the sense that it is necessarily false, but in the sense that 
it cannot rise to the level of a full-fledged truth. In order to see how this argument might 
work, it will be necessary to see what Kant has to say about the nature of disjunctive 
judgments such as ‘all men are learned or not learned’.    
 As we saw in Chapter Two, both hypothetical and disjunctive judgments are 
analyzable in terms of a relation between individual judgments rather than concepts. 
Hypothetical judgments having the form 'if A is B, then A is C' are correctly viewed in 
terms of a relation of implication, or consequence, between the judgments 'A is B' and 'A 
is C'; and disjunctive judgments having the form 'A is B or not-B' are correctly viewed in 
terms of a relation of opposition, or exclusion, between the judgments 'A is B' and 'A is 
not-B'. Beginning on the side of disjunctive judgments, what I want to focus on is what 
Kant has to say about the modal properties of these individual judgments. 
 According to Kant, disjunctive judgments are comprised essentially up of 
'problematic' judgments. This means that in entertaining a disjunctive judgment, we 
remain agnostic as regards the truth or falsity of its disjuncts. They are put forward 
merely as judgments that someone "might assume", not as claims to which the judger is 
committed in one way or another. Nor is this in any sense a defect of the disjunctive 
judgment. From Kant's perspective, if I already know that the proposition 'A is B' is true, 
then no cognitive purpose is served by opposing it to 'A is not-B'. Having already found 
the true judgment, then there is no need to mark out the different possible paths toward 
truth that I could conceivably take (A75/B101).  
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 This gives us some, but perhaps not enough reason to conclude that disjunctive 
judgments fail to rise to the level of truth. Since the role of disjunctive judgment is 
arguably that of spelling out different candidates for truth, it would, from this angle, be 
somewhat perverse to say that a given disjunction is true in and of itself; but if that same 
disjunction succeeds in spelling out all of the candidates within some particular domain, 
then we might be tempted to conclude that the disjunction as a whole is true. Some 
support for this second, nowadays commonly accepted logical interpretation, comes in 
the Transcendental Dialectic, where Kant says that it is a basic principle of logic that for 
every concept, only one of two "contradictorily opposed predicates...can apply to it" 
(A571/B579). Hence, there is a sense in which we are entitled a priori to the judgment 'all 
men are learned or unlearned'. The judgment goes through merely insofar as it conforms 
to the "logical form of cognition". 
 Whether or not the judgment goes through logically, however, we still do not 
know that this judgment is true. We can agree that we are rationally obliged to affirm this 
judgment, since to do otherwise would be to fall out of sync with the "general and 
necessary rules of the understanding". But as we discovered above in connection with the 
principle of contradiction, Kant denies that conformity with the rules of the 
understanding is sufficient for truth (A59/B84, cf. A60/B85, A294/B350, 24:719). He 
maintains that truth is found "only in judgments, i.e. only in the relation of the object to 
our understanding" (A293/B350).  
 Someone who thinks that 'all men are learned or not learned' is true, of course, 
will respond here by saying that it fulfills Kant's material condition for truth as well. She 
will insist that the judgment in question agrees sufficiently with its object. But this, I 
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think, would be to adopt an overly broad interpretation of what Kant means by 
agreement. It would be to say that 'all men are learned or not learned' agrees with its 
object just in the sense that it does not contradict its object, whereas what Kant means by 
'agreement' seems to be a much stronger conformity between judgment and object—a 
conformity such that the judgment reflects, through its predicate concept, a property that 
positively distinguishes the object corresponding to the subject concept (A53/B83, 2:397, 
24:826). Since disjunctive judgments predicate only indeterminately (1:392), no 
disjunctive judgment can be said to agree with its object in this strong sense.  
 In light of these considerations, it already seems somewhat doubtful that Kant's 
third category of judgment, hypothetical judgment, can rise to the level of truth. Because 
truth amounts to the agreement between predicate and property, hypothetical judgments, 
having neither subject nor predicate, seem to be ruled out in advance. But what if it were 
possible to convert hypothetical judgments into subject-predicate judgments? In that case, 
we might be tempted to say that the former are implicitly subject-predicate judgments, 
and hence, that they are implicitly the kinds of judgments that can turn out to be true. 
This would have significant consequences at the level of analyticity. Since there would be 
no barrier to considering hypothetical judgments as true, we would be thrown back on the 
possibility that some hypothetical judgments might be true automatically, just by virtue 
of the inferential content embodied in their constituent logical concepts.  
 At least in principle, Kant has a way of ensuring that this line of interpretation 
remains closed. Against the current philosophic consensus, he denies that hypothetical 
judgments are equivalent to subject-predicate judgments (9:105, 24:933), meaning that he 
denies that they can simply inherit the truth conditions of their subject-predicate 
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counterparts. Kant's argument turns, once again, on the modal status of the propositions 
that comprise hypothetical judgments.  
 According to Kant, the antecedent and consequent in a hypothetical judgment 
have the status of problematic propositions (A75/B100). As we saw in Chapter Two, this 
means that in 'maintaining' a hypothetical judgment, we remain uncommitted to the truth 
of either the antecedent or the consequent. What we are committed to is that if the 
antecedent is true, then the consequent is true as well. We affirm the "correctness of the 
connection" [Richtigkeit der Verknüpfung] between antecedent and consequent (9:106, cf. 
24:934). In this respect, hypothetical judgment contrasts quite sharply with categorical 
judgment. To judge that 'if something is a body, then it is divisible', according to Kant, is 
to say that on the condition that a body exists, then that body is divisible. It is to make a 
claim whose 'correctness' is independent of the existence of an actual body. To judge that 
'all bodies are divisible', on the other hand, is to say that bodies actually are divisible 
(A75/B100, 9:105-8, 24:934). It is to make a claim that is true if all of the objects falling 
under the subject concept also fall under the predicate concept, and false if at least some 
of the objects falling under the subject concept do not fall under the predicate concept. 
 From Kant's perspective, therefore, the attempt to reduce hypothetical judgments 
to categorical judgments cannot succeed, because these forms of judgments say 
something quite different. The hypothetical judgment says that given a particular state of 
affairs, a distinct state of affairs follows. The categorical judgment says the objects 
falling under a particular subject concept also fall under a particular predicate concept. 
This in turn explains why hypothetical judgment is not susceptible of truth, and why the 
categorical judgment is. On Kant's analysis, hypothetical judgments are expressly 
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unrelated to any real object or state of affairs. Categorical judgments, on the other hand, 
are intrinsically oriented toward a corresponding object or set of objects. What a 
categorical judgment seeks to do, from Kant's perspective, is to articulate one of the ways 
in which the empirical manifold has been invested with conceptual form. Supposing that 
it succeeds in doing so (e.g. supposing that the set of objects that is thought under the 
concept man is also thought under the concept being mortal) then it is true.128  
 Here, a defender of the view that hypothetical judgments can qualify as analytic 
might object as follows. If Kant's case turns on the notion that hypothetical judgments fall 
short of truth and falsity, she might say, then Kant has failed to make his case, since he 
has admitted that hypothetical judgments can be 'correct'. Kant's response, which can be 
distilled from a pair of brief remarks concerning the range of possible hypothetical 
judgments, is that correctness (Richtigkeit) is a much wider and much weaker property 
than truth (Wahrheit) (9:105, 24:933, cf. 24:89). Consider the judgment 'if a triangle is a 
four-sided rectilinear figure, then the internal angles of a triangle sum to 360 degrees'. 
This judgment is correct, in the sense that the consequent follows from the antecedent; 
but even if we leave aside the requirement that true, or potentially true judgments, must 
have subject-predicate form, it would nevertheless be inappropriate from Kant's 
perspective to say that the judgment in question is true, because it cannot be corroborated 
empirically. Its constituent propositions are patently false. By way of a slightly different 
case, consider the judgment 'if x is a closed, two-sided figure, then x is biangular'. Again, 
                                                
128 Longuenesse makes a similar point about the implicit object-orientedness of 
categorical judgment: "objectivity, in the full sense of a conformity to the object of the 
combination of representations is what the activity of judgment tends to achieve. This is 
the immanent norm, as it were, of judgment..." She adds that the realization of the 
objective relation is Kant's benchmark for truth (Kant and the Capacity to Judge, p. 82).  
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this judgment is correct, because if a closed two-sided figure is given, then it is 
presumably given as biangular; but a closed two-sided figure cannot be given, so there is 
no way of verifying that the judgment agrees with its object, in a material sense, and so 
no basis on which to decide whether the judgment is true or false.  
 Shifting gears slightly, our objector might respond here by saying that it is 
irrelevant to her position whether judgments like the ones just cited are true, in the strong, 
Kantian sense. The fact that such judgments are correct, and can be known as such a 
priori, is all that she requires. From her perspective, this already demonstrates that purely 
conceptual knowledge can be expressed in non-subject-predicate form. Against this, I can 
only repeat what I have stressed over the course of the previous two chapters, namely, 
that analytic judgment, for Kant, is not a matter of articulating the content of concepts 
taken as autonomous quasi-objects; it is a matter of articulating the content of concepts 
that perform an actual role in the cognition of appearances. A theory of analytic judgment 
that would admit a judgment like 'if x is a closed two-sided figure, then x is biangular' is 
therefore far too ecumenical, from Kant's perspective. It is to mistake what can be 
asserted a priori for what can be asserted a priori of the logical structure of appearances. 
By keeping analytic judgment within the boundaries of subject-predicate form, thus, 
within the boundaries of a propositional form that necessarily makes a claim to 
objectivity, Kant manages to rule out this mistake in advance.  
 Finally, it is worth generalizing a point that I made above with respect to 
disjunctive judgments. In short, if Kant denies that disjunctive or hypothetical judgments 
are susceptible of truth, and if this denial then becomes the basis of the claim that such 
judgments cannot be analytic, it is not because these forms of judgments are defective 
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relative to subject-predicate judgments. On the contrary, it is because they perform a 
distinct function with respect to cognition overall. The role of disjunctive judgments is 
that of enumerating different ways the world might be, independently of the way the 
world actually is; the role of hypothetical judgments is that of considering the relations 
between distinct states of affairs, independently of which states of affairs happen to 
given. To insist, in the face of these differences, that such judgments can rise to the level 
of truth, and perhaps even to the level of analytic truth, is, from Kant's perspective, to 
flatten the diversity of human cognition. 
 
Analyticity and Logical Truth 
Before moving on to consider Katz's understanding of analytic judgment, it is worth 
making note of a consequence that arises from our discussion of Bolzano. In short, it 
looks like the principles that we have brought forward in our attempt to block Bolzano's 
re-interpretation of analytic judgment succeed equally well against Frege's even more 
radical reformulation of analytic judgment. In order to see in what sense this is the case, 
and what implications it might have for our understanding of analytic judgment, it will be 
necessary to look briefly at what Frege has to say on this subject.   
 In the literature, Frege's doctrine of analyticity is often presented as a successor to 
Bolzano's.129 With Bolzano, we get the claim that analyticity amounts to truth in virtue of 
propositional form, and the important accompanying claim that certain truth-preserving 
propositional forms are comprised just of logical variables and logical connectives. A 
half-century later, with Frege, we get the claim that analyticity simply is logical validity: 
                                                
129 e.g. Juhl and Looms, Analyticity, p. 13.  
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Frege defines an analytic judgment as a judgment that can be proven just on the basis of 
"general logical laws and definitions".130 
 Significantly, since Frege thinks that this formulation captures what "earlier 
authors, Kant in particular" understood by analytic judgment, it does provide a way of 
explaining in what sense canonical examples like 'all bodies are extended' qualify as 
analytic. Supposing that a definition of body is granted, we can reduce this judgment to 
the logical law 'A which is B is B'. More importantly, Frege's definition allows us to 
show that every logically valid proposition whatsoever is analytic, since logical validity 
just means derivability from basic logical laws. (In principle, Frege’s definition also 
allows us to show that every arithmetical proposition is analytic, since, according to 
Frege, all such propositions can be proven on the basis of logic).131  
 There are a number of ways in which the Kantian response to Frege could unfold. 
Following Hintikka, we could respond by addressing the differences between Kantian 
and Fregean logic. We could argue that Frege's quantificational logic imports existential 
commitments into logic, and thus crosses over from the purely analytic to the 
synthetic.132 But this would be to grant too much to Frege, I think. It would be to assume 
that on some construal of logic, the class of logically valid statements comes out as 
                                                
130 Frege, Foundations of Arithmetic, p. 4.  
131 Frege, Foundations of Arithmetic, p. 99. The proposed reduction of arithmetic to logic, 
of course, turns out to be impossible. Famously, Gödel showed that there is no set of 
logical axioms on the basis of which all true arithmetical propositions can be proven.    
132 According to Hintikka, Kant would have said that quantification theory in general 
"hinges on 'non-logical', intuitive methods", since he would have heard a reference to 
individuals in both universal and existential quantification (Logic, Language-Games, and 
Information, pp. 139-140).  
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analytic.133 Kant's real response to Frege, I want to suggest, would run along the same 
lines as his response to Bolzano. It would consist in the argument that since logical 
validity is insufficient for truth, it is ipso facto insufficient for analyticity. By way of 
showing that this is a plausible interpretation of Kant, it will be necessary to say a few 
words about what general logic is—and is not—from his perspective.  
 According to Kant, pure general logic represents the "science of the necessary 
laws of the understanding and of reason in general..." (9:13, cf. 24:24, Bix, A53/B77), 
meaning the laws of thought that we are obliged to observe insofar as our thought is to be 
internally consistent. At its most general level, then, pure general logic encompasses the 
law of contradiction, which states that a "cognition is false if it contradicts itself" 
(24:826); it encompasses the closely related law of excluded middle, which says that 
given a contradictory pair, only one member of that pair can be true at a given moment 
(9:130, A571/B599); and it encompasses law of identity, which is also closely related to 
the law of contradiction, and which says that objects are necessarily self-identical. At a 
slightly lower level of generality, logic encompasses the basic forms of valid inference. 
Thus, it encompasses the principle which states that we can infer 'immediately' from 'all 
As are B' to 'some As are B' (9:116, A303/B360); it encompasses the principle of 
                                                
133 The notion that Kant is committed to the analytic status of logic is a consistent theme 
in the secondary literature. Thus, when Frege and Ayer define analytic judgment as truth 
by virtue of logic plus definitions, both authors suggest that they are paraphrasing (or 
clarifying) Kant's original formulation (Foundations of Arithmetic, p. 3; Language, Truth, 
and Logic, p. 78). Arthur Pap, for his part, simply asserts without further ado that "all 
logical truths" are analytic according to Kant ("Are All Necessary Propositions 
Analytic?"). He is seconded in this blunt assertion by John MacFarlane and Edgar 
Morscher ("Frege, Kant, and the Logic in Logicism", p. 25; "The Great Divide Within 
Austrian Philosophy", p. 250). More recently, Lanier Anderson has offered a qualified, 
textually sensitive endorsement of the view that Kant regards "formal general logic" as 
analytic ("The Wollfian Paradigm and its Discontents", pp. 42-6).  
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mediate, or syllogistic inference which says that given 'all As are B' and 'C is A', we can 
infer 'C is B'; and it encompasses the basic forms of hypothetical inference, modus 
ponens and modus tollendo tollens (9:129).134 
 What we want to know now is just whether these basic laws of thought are true. 
Assuming that truth is to be understood in terms of conformity to objects, this is 
equivalent to the question of whether these laws of thought agree with some object or set 
of objects. But what kind of object could fit the bill? Naturally, the best candidate is the 
totality of all objects whatsoever. We could say that logic agrees with all objects 
whatsoever in the sense that it describes the parameters within which every object and set 
of objects is given. Thus, the law of contradiction would reflect the fact that objects are 
not simultaneously red and not red, or shiny and not shiny; and the law of identity would 
reflect the fact that things actually are self-identical. The notion that general logic 
represents a theory of "all objects in general" does find some support in Kant's texts 
(9:15). But Kant's texts also offer us a very compelling reason to be suspicious as regards 
the agreement between general logic and the totality of objects. Consider the following 
example from Kant's Transcendental Amphiboly.  
 From the standpoint of "logical reflection", Kant explains, things which are 
internally identical are identical tout court. If there is no way of distinguishing between 
one raindrop and another on the basis of their internal properties, then there is no logical 
basis for distinguishing between them. But transcendental logic dictates that things which 
                                                
134 At least according to the letter of Kant's texts, general logic does not extend to 
encompass every theorem that is derivable from the basic laws of logic. This reflects the 
fact that Kant does not understand logic as a kind of calculus from which infinitely many 
indefinitely complex theorems can be derived. As indicated, logic for Kant is strongly 
tied to actual human cognition, which, in a practical sense, is plausibly restricted to just 
the limited stock of inferential laws that Kant sets out.   
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are internally identical can nevertheless be numerically distinct, provided that they are 
"intuited in different places at the same time" (A264/B319). In other words, if two 
raindrops are in different places, then they are different raindrops.  
Consider another example. In general logic, according to Kant, "realities (as mere 
affirmations) never logically oppose each other" (A273/B328). In other words, we can't 
derive a contradiction from two purely affirmative concepts. But transcendental logic 
recognizes that the objective correlates of affirmative concepts can indeed cancel one 
another out, provided that they are opposed to one another in some material sense—say, 
because they are moving in opposite directions.135 
 These examples prove to be quite instructive as regards the issue at hand. Since 
general logic evidently falls out of step with spatio-temporal objectivity in certain 
instances, it turns out that we cannot invoke the agreement between general logic and the 
totality of objects as a way of showing that the former is true. This suggests that we 
should attempt a different strategy. Instead of trying to show that general logic is true in a 
material sense, we should try to show that Kant's general logic is true in a non-material, 
strictly formal sense.  
 At first glance, Kant seems to allow for just such a formal variety of truth. In the 
Vienna Logic, he notes that "in logic, truth is an agreement of cognition with the laws of 
the understanding" (24:824); and in the Jäsche Logic, he suggests that logic contains "the 
necessary rules of all (formal) truth" (9:16). As it turns out, though, these apparently 
categorical assertions belie a more nuanced conception of the role of the formal logic 
                                                
135 Expressed in symbolic terms, we could say that the following inferences are valid in 
general but not transcendental logic: ∀x∀y(PQRx ∧ PQRy → x = y), ∀x∀y(x,y → x ∧ 
y). 
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relative to truth. Kant is not saying that there is a distinct, purely logical variety of truth. 
What he is saying is that the possibility of truth presupposes the satisfaction of a certain 
formal or logical condition. In order for any judgment whatsoever to qualify as true, it 
needs to agree, first, with the basic laws of the understanding, and second, with the object 
of the judgment (24:823, A59/B84, B115). If a given judgment cannot be coherently 
entertained, then there is no question of assessing its conformity with an object. 'Gold is 
not a yellow metal' can neither agree nor disagree with its object, since it is already 
contradictory at the level of its constituent concepts (supposing of course that the concept 
gold is constituted by predicates yellow and metallic). Ultimately, then, what we should 
take from this is just that our judgments need to be logically inoffensive if they are to be 
susceptible of truth. Kant's invocation of formal or logical truth has given us no reason to 
think that strictly logical judgments are true in and of themselves. To conclude, it will be 
instructive to contrast the case of logic with that of mathematics.  
For Kant, mathematical judgments are indeed susceptible of truth and falsity, 
because mathematical judgments are related to objects, namely, to the pure intuitional 
correlates of their constituent concepts. This explains why Kant is prepared to situate 
mathematics in terms of the analytic-synthetic distinction. Because mathematical 
judgments are related to objects, he thinks that it is meaningful to ask whether they spell 
out our antecedent understanding of those objects, or in some way augment our 
understanding of the same. This in turn provides some context for Kant's failure even to 
pose this question in the case of logic. My suggestion is that Kant's failure in this regard 
does not reflect an assumption that logical simply must be analytic. It reflects the claim 
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that pure general logic, unlike mathematics, does not rise to the level of objective 
significance at which the analytic-synthetic distinction becomes meaningful.  
 
Semantic Redundancy 
Moving on to Jerrold Katz, there is a strong sense in which we should see his attempt to 
extend the formal boundaries of analytic judgment as symmetrical to Frege’s attempt. 
Both Katz and Frege begin from a claim concerning the essence of Kant’s doctrine of 
analyticity; and both use this claim as a way of broadening the class of judgments that 
will qualify as analytic. Frege, for his part, takes Kant to have understood analytic 
judgment primarily in terms of logical validity. Frege’s own contribution consists in the 
observation that the class of logically valid judgments is broader than the class of subject-
predicate judgments. Katz, meanwhile, thinks that Kant was equivocal between a logical 
and a semantic characterization of analytic judgment, but suggests that the oft-invoked 
‘metaphor’ of concept containment is best understood in terms of semantic redundancy, 
specifically, the redundancy that obtains when one term in a syntactically simple 
proposition functions as “a microcosm of the whole proposition”.136 Katz’s contribution 
consists just in the observation that this relation can exist in judgments that are not 
subject-predicate in form, for instance, in the two-place judgment ‘John walks with those 
with whom he strolls’.137 According to Katz, the concept of someone walking is 
contained in the concept of someone strolling, meaning that this judgment is redundant in 
precisely the same sense as ‘all bodies are extended’.  
                                                
136 Cogitations, p. 64. 
137 Cogitations, p. 62. 
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 Let’s suppose, then, that Kant would be resistant to admitting ‘John walks with 
those with whom he strolls’ as analytic. On what basis can he justify this exclusion? The 
most obvious strategy would be to target the particular containment relation Katz wants 
to assert here. Kant could say that the concept of someone strolling does not actually 
contain the concept of someone walking. In a broad sense, I think that this argument is 
sound: the concept of someone strolling cannot be said meaningfully to contain the 
concept of someone walking. But that is not because the concept of someone strolling can 
be said to positively exclude the concept of someone walking; rather, it is because the 
concept of someone strolling is just not the kind of concept, or representation, that 
determinately includes other concepts or representations in the first place. As I suggested 
in the first chapter, determinate conceptual content for Kant is an artifact just of explicit 
definition and apriority. For Kant, it is possible to say that a concept X includes Y just 
when X has been stipulated to include Y, or when the inclusion of Y in X is a matter of 
cognitive necessity. Thus, since the concept of strolling is not obviously subject to 
explicit definition, and is clearly not a matter of a priori, cognitive necessity, it looks as if 
there is no appropriately Kantian reason to think that this concept has any determinate 
content whatsoever, let alone the precise content that Katz ascribes to it.  
 This suggests an obvious course of action. We should identify a concept that does 
have determinate content, according to Kant, and try to show that it can be cast in the 
form of a two-place, relational proposition. Let’s begin with the concept gold, which, as 
we know, is comprised of the predicates yellowness, metallicity, and corporeality. An 
initial thought is that we could unpack this concept in terms of the two-place relation ‘if, 
then’, as the judgment ‘if something is gold, then it is a yellow metal body’. But this 
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option has already been ruled out for reasons explored above: being hypothetical, the 
judgment cannot be true, which means that it cannot be analytic. Another thought is that 
this concept could be expressed relationally as the proposition ‘gold is equal to a yellow 
metal body’. But this is out of keeping with the way that Kant seems to understand 
equality, namely, as a relation that obtains between spatio-temporal magnitudes (e.g. 
B16, A164/B204-5, A179/B222, A716/B744, 4:284-5, 4:320, 4:370). To say that gold is 
identical with a yellow metal body, likewise, is slightly out of keeping with Kant’s usage. 
As a predicate, identity seems to bear either on the relation between concepts (as in, ‘the 
concept gold is identical with the predicates yellow, metallic, and corporeality) or on the 
relation between particular objects (as in, ‘this raindrop is identical to that raindrop’). In 
any case, it is not clear that ‘gold is identical to a yellow metallic body’ represents a 
meaningful example of a non-subject-predicate analytic judgment.  
 In the face of these initial difficulties, perhaps it is worth looking more closely at 
Katz’s example, and asking how he is able to generate a judgment is both redundant and 
relational. He does so, in short, by asserting a relation of containment between concepts 
that are themselves relational: the concepts person who strolls with ( ) and the concept 
person who walks with ( ). Perhaps what we want, therefore, is a properly Kantian 
concept that is both determinate and relational. In that case, we could generate an 
analytic, two-place proposition by exploiting the relation internal to that concept. Let’s 
take the concept causation, which is one of the three relational concepts that Kant 
includes in his table of categories. According to Kant, this concept contains the idea of a 
relation between two things, one of which follows necessarily from the other “in 
accordance with a rule” (A90/B122, cf. B168, A243/B301). This suggests that we are 
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entitled to the relational judgment ‘X follows in accordance with a rule from that which 
causes X’. Since the category of causation fully embodies the idea of rule-governed 
consequence, the judgment is redundant in the appropriate sense.  
 If we have managed to come slightly closer to our goal, however, this judgment 
will not enable us to reach it. The reason is that while the judgment in question is not, 
strictly speaking, a hypothetical judgment, because it does not contain the terms 'if' and 
'then', the intensional upshot is the same. It asks us to suppose that something causes X, 
and then spells out what follows from this supposition. It can be paraphrased, quite 
intuitively, as 'if Y causes X, then X follows from Y in accordance with a rule'. From 
Kant's perspective, this means that the judgment in question carries no intrinsic 
commitment to any state of affairs, and hence, that it is not truth-evaluable. While we are 
entitled to pronounce on the correctness or incorrectness of the judgment, because we can 
determine whether the consequent would in fact follow from the antecedent, we are not 
entitled to pronounce on its truth, because, for the purposes of the hypothetical judgment, 
we remain agnostic as to whether the antecedent actually holds.   
 Finally, therefore, it looks as if our attempt to make room for a relational, non-
subject-predicate analytic judgment has come to nothing. Either the properly Kantian 
concept does not include relational content in the first place, and so cannot be unpacked 
in relational form; or such concepts do include relational content, but cannot be unpacked 
in such a way as to yield a judgment that is both analytic and true, in the strong Kantian 
sense of truth.  
 More generally, it appears as if our attempt to extend the formal boundaries of 
analytic judgment on the basis of Kantian assumptions has been unsuccessful. Pace 
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Bolzano and Frege, these boundaries cannot be extended by identifying analyticity with 
logical validity, since the class of logically valid judgments is much larger than the class 
of judgments that are both logically valid and true. And pace Katz, they cannot be 
extended by identifying analyticity with redundancy, since the class of judgments that are 
in some way redundant138 is much larger the class of judgments that both redundant and 
true.   
 
4. Containment 
The next issue to deal with is that of containment. On pain of conceding that Kant’s 
preferred way of talking about analytic judgments actually does very little to illuminate 
analytic judgments, we have to show that there is a meaningful sense in which one 
concept can be said to ‘contain’ another. In the previous chapter, we considered 
Anderson’s attempt to render this notion credible—his attempt to show that relations of 
conceptual containment can be understood in terms of the relations of conceptual 
hierarchy that are schematized on Poprhyan ‘trees’. What I want to do here, by way of 
providing an opening onto the issue of containment, is to ask whether Anderson gives a 
meaningful account of what Kant means when he speaks of containment.  
 An initial question for Anderson concerns the conceptual mappings, or trees, on 
which his account of containment is based. We may agree to follow Anderson's proposed 
                                                
138 The kind of redundancy that Katz has in mind is a redundancy at the level of linguistic 
meaning (Cogitations, p. 60). 'John walks with those with whom he strolls' is analytic, 
from Katz's perspective, because the understanding that is involved in grasping the 
expression 'walking with' is the same as the understanding the goes into the grasping the 
expression 'strolling with'. This is presumably why Katz is untroubled by the requirement 
that analytic judgments be true. Since there are undoubtedly judgments that are 
linguistically redundant in the right way, but which could never actually hold of some 
objective correlate (e.g. 'unicorns are mythical one-horned animals'), an insistence that 
analytic judgment also be true would simply be arbitrary from Katz's perspective.   
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usage, and to say that A is contained in B when A appears 'above' B on some conceptual 
tree. But how do we come to have these trees in the first place? Anderson’s answer, as 
characterized by Ian Proops, consists in an appeal to the “actual classificatory schemes 
developed by working scientists”.139 Thus, Anderson proposes to base claims about 
concept containment on the conceptual mappings that emerge from actual scientific 
practice. This has a consequence to which both Anderson and Proops are attentive. Since 
the classificatory schemes used by working scientists are provisional, the containment 
relations that can read off of those schemes will also be provisional. This in turn implies 
that the analytic judgments that articulate containment relations will not be absolutely a 
priori, as Kant expects, but ‘revisable’. The judgment ‘whales are mammals’ may count 
as analytic now, because whales currently appear under the heading of ‘mammal’; but 
since we cannot exclude the possibility of a refinement in our understanding of mammals, 
or of whales, we cannot exclude the possibility that we may cease to group whales under 
the heading of ‘mammal’, and thus cease to count the judgment ‘whales are mammals’ as 
analytic.  
 From one angle, this looks like a self-inflicted reductio ad absurdum. Since Kant 
is committed to the universal apriority of analytic judgments, a theory of containment that 
suggests that analytic judgments are revisable must simply be a flawed model of 
containment. Anderson, for his part, acknowledges that his result “is hard to reconcile 
with the strict apriority and necessity Kant officially attributes to [analyticities]”.140 
Nevertheless, he thinks that this understanding of containment is consistent with an even 
                                                
139 Proops, “Kant’s Conception of Analytic Judgment”, p. 599. 
140 Anderson, “The Wollfian Paradigm and Its Discontents”, p. 68. 
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more fundamental commitment, Kant's commitment to the revisability of empirical 
concepts.     
 What reason does Anderson give us to think that Kant allows for the revision of 
empirical concepts? Anderson draws for support in this regard on a passage that we 
examined in the first chapter, in which Kant discusses the difficulties involved in defining 
empirical concepts:   
One makes use of certain marks only as long as they are sufficient for making distinctions; 
new observations, however, take some away and add some, and therefore the concept never 
remains within secure boundaries. And in any case, what would be the point of defining 
such a concept? – since when, e.g., water and its properties are under discussion, one will 
not stop at what is intended by the word “water” but rather advance to experiments, and the 
word, with the few marks that are attached to it, is to constitute only a designation and not 
a concept of the thing (A728/B756). 
For Anderson, the key notion here is designation. When Kant says that an empirical 
concept ‘designates’ its object, according to Anderson, he is saying that an empirical 
concept relates immediately to its object. This means that empirical concepts are 
“determined” by the objects to which they correspond, rather than any fixed “conceptual 
content”. And it means that the content that an empirical concept does have can fluctuate 
relatively widely, because the concept as such is anchored to an ‘external’ source of 
conceptual stability: “since the “designation” is available to guarantee the concept’s 
identity across…theory change”, Anderson says, “it is meaningful to speak of genuine 
alterations in the content of the same concept”.141  
 From my perspective, this is simply a misreading of the passage cited above. As I 
read this passage, Kant is not saying that empirical concepts ‘designate’ their objective 
correlates immediately. What he is saying, quite explicitly, is that designation proceeds 
through words, and the “few marks” that are attached to those words. Designation, for 
                                                
141 Anderson, “The Wollfian Paradigm and Its Discontents”, p. 68.  
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Kant, is not a pure, pre-conceptual act of pointing. It is an act wherein a minimal, 
explicitly verbal concept is correlated with an object. 
 Of course, this by itself does not show that these minimal concepts are 
invulnerable to fluctuation. As we saw in the last chapter, there are good reasons to think 
that a designative concept must be able to change, lest that concept cease to designative 
its concept adequately. The point is just that these reasons exert no influence on Kant's 
own understanding of designative concepts. From his perspective, if the concept 
containing the predicates yellowness and metallicity suffices to distinguish gold now, then 
it suffices to distinguish gold tout court. He makes no accommodation for the possibility 
that the core, analytic predicates of a concept might at some point come up for revision.  
 What should we take from this? Unlike Proops, I don’t think that Anderson’s 
failure to flesh out the idea of containment is more fodder for the charge that containment 
is an empty figure of speech. What we can take from Anderson’s account, rather, is a 
sense of why containment is justified as a metaphor. What Anderson allows us to see, 
contrary to his intentions, is that empirical concepts for Kant are individuated not by their 
objective correlates, but by the precise set of predicate concepts to which they are related. 
The concept gold is not individuated by gold itself; it is individuated by the predicate 
concepts yellowness, corporeality, and metallicity. Supposing that we take the initial 
metaphorical step of considering the concept gold as a kind of object, therefore, the 
notion that it should ‘contain’ this conjunction of predicates is not hard to credit. Being 






At this point, therefore, we have some initial justification for thinking of containment as a 
necessary constitutive relation between distinct concepts. A concept R 'contains' a 
concept S, it seems, when the relation between R and S is a necessary condition of R's 
being the concept that it is. What we want to know now is why such relations should 
obtain. Beyond Kant's declarations to this effect, what reason do we have to think that 
there are concepts that are constituted by their relation to other concepts? By way of 
showing that there are such concepts, let's attempt a kind of proof by contradiction. Given 
a concept R that is said to be related constitutively to a distinct concept, let's try to show 
that R bears no such relation. Supposing that this cannot be shown, then we can conclude 
that R is in fact constituted by its relation to a distinct concept or set of concepts. This in 
turn will indicate that the idea of concept containment has a meaningful role to play in the 
analysis of cognition.  
 Consider the concept gold. Kant, as we know, maintains that this concept contains 
the concepts yellowness, metallicity, and corporeality. Let's assume, on the contrary, that 
gold does not contain these predicate concepts. Let's assume that gold contains nothing 
but the idea of something's being gold. How would such a concept come to be part of our 
conceptual repertoire? Since it is not plausibly a pure concept of the understanding (since 
it is not plausibly necessary from the standpoint of coherent thought and experience) it 
follows that it is an empirical concept. And since it is an empirical concept, it follows that 
it is abstracted from experience. What kind of experience would give rise to the kind of 
ideally simple concept that we are entertaining here? Evidently, we must suppose that we 
experience some kind of unified property, which we in turn concretize in the form of a 
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concept. The problem, from a Kantian perspective, is that no such property can be given. 
As we saw in Chapter Three, Kant thinks that the properties that are available for 
conceptualization are properties that are given via sensation; and he thinks that sensation 
offers up general perceptual properties like colors, tastes, and tactile phenomena 
exclusively (A21/B35). Supposing, then, that our concept is to have its content from 
some really given property, then it must have its content from several properties. It is 
only insofar as it refers to several general properties at once that the extension of the 
concept will come out as sufficiently narrow.  
 Let's try the same demonstration in the case of the concept triangle. Instead of 
supposing that this concept contains the predicate concepts three-sidedness and 
rectilinearity, let's suppose that it contains only the idea of a something's being a triangle. 
What we want to know is how we could come to have this ideally simple concept. Since 
the ability to recognize three-sided figures is not mandatory from the standpoint of 
logically coherent experience, we know that the proposed concept cannot be a priori. On 
the other hand, there are reasons to think that the proposed concept cannot be empirical 
either. First, even if there were some kind of primitive experience of triangularity, this 
experience could not form the basis of an appropriately general concept. According to 
Kant, "no image whatever of a triangle would ever be adequate to the concept of it. For it 
would not attain the generality of the concept, which makes this valid for all triangles, 
right or acute, etc., but would always be limited to one part of this sphere" (A141/B180). 
Second, even if we could show that triangle was a purely empirical concept, we could not 
extend this account to concepts like chiliagon: obviously, the latter does not correspond 
to any sensible experience whatsoever, let alone a primitive sensible experience. Both of 
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these demands—the demand for sufficiently general conceptual content, and the demand 
for a sufficiently general account of concept formation—can be satisfied by thinking 
about geometrical concepts in the way that Kant himself does: as concepts that are 
formed a priori on the basis of general empirical concepts. Since the concept triangle will 
be formed on the basis of three-sidedness and rectilinearity, it will apply to all triangles 
whatsoever; and since these predicate concepts (or slight variations on them) can be used 
to construct other kinds of concepts, we will be able to give a unified account of concept 
formation. 
 Finally, let's consider the concept cause. Let's suppose that this concept contains 
nothing but the idea of something's being a cause, and let's ask how this concept might 
have originated. Obviously, it cannot have come directly from experience: with Hume, 
Kant maintains that our purely sensible encounter with objects cannot be the basis for the 
actual concept of causality. As is turns out, though, the proposed concept cannot be a 
priori either. In order to see this, consider the kinds of features that we expect the 
corresponding phenomenon to have. According to Kant himself, a cause invariably 
comes before something else. Even where cause and effect are practically simultaneous, 
we can nevertheless show that the cause has a temporal priority relative to the effect 
(A203/B248). This being the case, it follows that a cause qua object cannot be 
represented by a pure, a priori concept, because an a priori concept cannot embody a 
sensible property like temporal precedence. Being products of the understanding, a priori 
concepts embody logical properties exclusively. This allows us to understand why our 
actual concept of causation is constitutively related to a distinct concept. For Kant, this 
concept has the function of representing things in terms of the logical properties that are 
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necessary but not sufficient for something's being a cause. In other words, this concept 
represents things in terms of properties that are not yet the property of being a cause. This 
means that the concept itself is constitutively related to a concept that is distinguishable 
from the concept cause itself. Specifically, it is related to the more general concept of a 
something that allows an inference to something else.  
 In the previous chapter, I alluded to Fodor and Lepore, and to their demand that 
concept complexity be justified independently of an appeal to analyticity—thus, that the 
complexity of, say, body, be justified without reference to the analyticity of 'bodies are 
extended'. In light of what we have just seen, I think that it is clear that Kant is able to 
provide this independent justification. He is able to explain the phenomenon of 
conceptual complexity in terms of facts about representational content (in the case of 
empirical concepts), facts about the systematic generality of scientific cognition (in the 
case of geometrical concepts), and facts about the role of the understanding relative to 
experience as a whole (in the case of a priori concepts). He need not appeal, question-
beggingly, to the analyticity of this or that proposition in order to show that certain 
concepts bear necessary relations to certain other concepts. 
  
5. Identity and Clarification 
Above, we saw that Kant is ambivalent as regards the status of explicitly identical 
judgments like 'man is man'. While suggesting in his early works that such judgments are 
analytic, he later comes to insist that a genuinely analytic judgment must be implicitly 
identical, meaning, in effect, that a genuinely analytic judgment must be (completely or 
partially) identical at the level of conceptual form and non-identical at the level of 
linguistic form. As for what might motivate this restriction, it looks as if Kant is 
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concerned to safeguard the epistemological significance of analytic judgments. He thinks 
that an analytic judgment is a judgment that succeeds in rendering its subject concept 
distinct. Since only an implicitly identical judgment can possibly have such an effect, 
only an implicitly identical judgment can qualify as analytic.  
 Of course, Kant is not committed to the view that a judgment qualifies as analytic 
just insofar as it actually succeeds in illuminating its subject concept. Since this would 
make analyticity relative to the particular acts of judgment of particular individuals, it 
would become impossible to identify any proposition as analytic. All the same, it is 
possible to be troubled by the notion that analyticity should be subject to an 
epistemological criterion, even the relatively weak criterion that I proposed above, 
according to which a judgment is analytic insofar as it is potentially clarificatory. This 
would suggest that being-an-analytic-judgment is a matter of satisfying formal criteria 
(bearing on the strictly ideal relations between concepts) and psychological criteria at 
once. 
 Fortunately, I think that Kant can present an argument as to why explicitly 
analytic judgments like 'man is man' fail to qualify as analytic without appealing to 
epistemological or psychological considerations. He can show that the concepts like man 
cannot contain themselves as constituents, and that it is not therefore meaningful to 
describe a judgment like 'man is man' as the product of the analysis of its subject concept.   
 The proposed argument is just a matter of drawing a slightly different moral from 
the discussion of containment above. There, I concluded that certain kinds of concepts, 
namely, empirical and geometrical concepts having relatively narrow extensions and a 
priori concepts having application within a spatio-temporal context, are constituted by 
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their relation to other concepts. Here, what I want to stress is that those same concepts are 
constituted exclusively by their relation to other concepts. The concept water does not 
include the idea of something's being water; it includes the idea of something being a 
fluid body. The concept substance does not include the idea of something's being a 
substance; it includes the idea of something existing exclusively as subject.  
 Of course, someone could respond here by suggesting that a different notion of 
containment is available to us. While admitting that the concept water does not contain 
itself in the sense of a predicate concept, they could suggest that it contains itself in the 
sense that any complex whole can be said to contain, or belong, to itself—as an 
'improper' part. Unfortunately, this has no real basis in Kant's understanding of concepts. 
For Kant, as we saw above, the question of what a given concept contains is a question 
about the distinguishing features of the corresponding object. Thus, the concept gold 
contains the concepts of yellowness and metallicity because yellowness and metallicity 
are the distinguishing perceptual features of gold. In order to say that gold also contains 
itself, in this sense, we would have to say that gold is distinguished by the properties of 
yellowness, metallicity, and the property of being gold. Since this would not only be 
redundant, but would ascribe to gold a property that is precisely not a property, it is easy 
to see that the proposed line of argument will not work.   
 But this does not exhaust the range of possible objections. Even granted that the 
concept water does not contain itself as a constituent, someone could insist that the 
judgment 'water is water' is analytic in the sense that it is assertable a priori, 
independently of any input from experience. To press this case, however, would be to fall 
victim to the same kind of confusion that we have already diagnosed. It would be to 
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confuse what can be asserted a priori on the basis of logical laws for what can be asserted 
a priori on the basis of conceptual content.142 Hence, it would be to place a judgment like 
'round squares are round' on an equal footing with 'bodies are extended things' as regards 
analyticity. 
 Somewhat surprisingly, I do not think that these considerations bear on the 
judgment 'a = a'. The reason, very simply, is that it is possible defend the analyticity of 
this proposition in terms of conceptual content. In order to see how this defense might 
work, consider Kant's non-symbolic articulation of the judgment in question. He says that 
'a = a' is equivalent to the judgment 'every whole is equal to itself'. Thus, the judgment 
does not say that any concept whatsoever can be predicated of itself; nor does it say that 
we can predicate self-identity of any concept whatsoever. Rather, the judgment says that 
a particular kind of object, a whole, is characterized by the relational property of self-
equality. As for why we should think that this judgment spills directly out of the concept 
whole, and is in this sense analytic, this follows from reflection on what would plausibly 
be involved in the representation of an object as a whole. Since the object in question is 
highly general, and highly abstract, it is at least intuitively appropriate that it should be 
represented in terms of a property, self-equality, that is similarly abstract. It is far less 
intuitive to suppose that natural substances like water should be represented in terms of 
self-identity (which would be another way of motivating the claim that judgments like 
'water is water' are analytic).  
 To conclude, therefore, it looks as if the prohibition against explicitly identical 
analytic judgments is defensible, but not in the terms that Kant himself seems to think. 
                                                
142 According to Kant, any concept can be predicated of itself, as a matter of logic. But 
this follows, he says, from the fact that "logic abstracts from all content" (A598/B626). 
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Instead of invoking the fact that such judgments are not illuminating, or even potentially 
illuminating, it suffices to invoke the fact that concepts simply do not contain themselves 
as constituents, meaning that it is impossible in every case to derive a strictly conceptual 
judgment of the form 'x is x'. Where does this leave the issue of epistemological 
significance and analyticity? Does it mean that analytic judgments have no 
epistemological role to play whatsoever? On the contrary, what it means is just that the 
epistemological role of analytic judgments is an accidental rather than essential feature of 
such judgments. Being structured in the way that they almost always are, analytic 
judgments are almost always potentially clarificatory; but this is not a positive, 
distinguishing feature of analytic judgments; it is a function of the mundane fact that not 
all judgers will be on an equal footing with respect to all analytic judgments.   
 
6. Already Thought 
In the Chapter Two, I noted that Kant's other apparently psychological criterion for 
analyticity, the criterion which states that a judgment is analytic when the predicate 
concept is 'already thought' or 'actually thought' in the subject concept, has been subject 
to a series of powerful objections. I noted that Kant's contemporary Maaβ gets the ball 
rolling in this regard, namely, when he says that this way of characterizing analytic 
judgments makes the distinction between analytic and synthetic judgment relative. On 
Maaβ's construal, the judgment 'bodies are extended' will be analytic for me if I happen 
to think of extension in conjunction with 'bodies'; but it will be synthetic for someone else 
if that person does not already think of extension in conjunction with 'bodies'. Following 
Gram, I suggested that Kant could be defended against Maaβ's critique by stipulating that 
conceptual content as such does not fluctuate between individuals: the concept body has 
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the content it has, independently of the content that anyone happens to attribute to it in a 
particular act of judgment. But again following Gram, I observed that this line of defense 
seems to render Kant's psychological (or phenomenological) criterion defunct as a basis 
for distinguishing analytic judgments. Even if I do not 'already think' the concept 
extension in conjunction with the concept body, it might nevertheless be the case that 
these concepts are actually conjoined. In other words, even if 'all bodies are extended' 
seems from my perspective like a synthetic judgment, it might actually be analytic. In 
what follows, I want to defend and clarify Kant phenomenological criterion by showing 
that the scenario on which Gram's critique turns, the scenario in which a judgment seems 
to be synthetic but is actually analytic, is ultimately quite benign from Kant's perspective.   
 Staying with our example, let's suppose that for some person the judgment 'bodies 
are extended' seems to be synthetic. When they reflect on the concept body, they do not 
think of extension; hence, they conclude that the judgment 'bodies are extended' amplifies 
the concept body rather than merely unpacking it. Prima facie, this scenario seems quite 
plausible. There might even be someone for whom the judgment 'bodies are extended' 
seems to be false. Consider, however, what happens when we try to convert this initial 
judgment concerning 'bodies are extended' into a more certain claim, when we try to 
show that the judgment 'bodies are extended' actually is synthetic. What we find is that 
we cannot carry the proposed demonstration forward. Since we cannot represent a body 
independently of extension, we cannot render plausible the claim that extension is a 
concept that is extrinsic to the concept body. Contrary to our objectives, we are obliged to 
conclude that 'bodies are extended' is actually an analytic judgment.  
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 From one angle, of course, this seems to confirm Gram's point about the 
phenomenological criterion. It suggests that the phenomenological criterion is insufficient 
on its own, and needs to supplemented by a different form of conceptual analysis—a 
form of conceptual analysis that draws in the objective correlates of our concepts, and 
inquires into the properties that are involved necessarily with those objective correlates. 
What I want to suggest, on the other hand, is that it is just these properties that Kant has 
in mind when he invokes the idea of what is 'already thought' in a given concept. When 
Kant asks 'what do I already think in the concept body?', in other words, he is not asking 
'what concepts do I spontaneously associate with the word 'body'?' but rather, 'what do I 
think necessarily in the representation of a body?'.  
 What reason do we have to think that Kant understands the idea of what is 
'already thought' in these terms? The best evidence comes from Kant's frequent admission 
that what is 'already thought' in a concept may be "confused" or "obscure" (without being 
any less 'thought' for that reason). Intuitively, this cannot mean the content that we 
consciously associate with a given concept is susceptible of obscurity. If it means 
anything, it must mean that the content that actually constitutes a given concept not 
always accessible to a person who has, and is able to apply, that concept. But since the 
content that actually constitutes a concept is the content that enters into the representation 
of the corresponding object, this means that what is 'already thought' in a concept is 
precisely that object-related content.  
 This suggests that the problem described by Gram is not a real problem. The fact 
that certain analytic judgments do not seem intuitively like analytic judgments does not 
indicate a deficiency in Kant's phenomenological criterion. It does not suggest that the 
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phenomenological criterion needs to be supplemented, or supplanted, by a broader 
criterion. The fact that certain analytic judgments might not seem to be analytic, rather, 
points to the relatively trivial fact that conceptual content is not always reflectively 
transparent: we do not always have immediate access to the content that we 'already 
think' in connection with a given concept.  
 On the other hand, there is a sense in which Kant's phenomenological criterion is 
too narrow. As Beck notes, the phenomenological criterion does not capture the 
judgments that express the 'analytic attributes' of our concepts. Thus, the 
phenomenological criterion captures the analytic judgment 'all triangles are three-sided', 
because three-sidedness is a "primitive and constitutive mark", and as such, "must always 
be there to be found in the thing represented" (9:61). But this criterion does not capture 
the no less analytic judgment 'all triangles have three angles', because the property of 
having three angles, according to Kant, is a not immediately present in our representation 
of triangles. It is necessary to 'derive' this property from the property of being three-sided.  
 This suggests the following amendment to Kant's phenomenological 
characterization of analytic judgment. What we should say, it seems, is that an analytic 
judgment is a judgment in which the predicate concept is already thought in the subject 
concept or in which the predicate concept can be derived from a predicate concept that is 
already thought in the subject. This in turn suggests that the problem raised by Beck is 
not fatal. Insofar as there exist analytic judgments that are not captured immediately by 
the phenomenological criterion, these judgments are parasitic upon judgments that are 
captured immediately by the phenomenological criterion. We cannot circumvent the 
phenomenological criterion entirely and devise analytic judgments that bear no relation to 
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what we actually think in connection with the objective correlates of our concepts. 
According to Kant, conceptual analysis begins necessarily with the content that is 
'already thought' in conjunction with those objects.   
 Finally, then, what of the most general objection that can be raised in connection 
with Kant's phenomenological criterion, the objection that analytic judgment simply 
should not be defined in phenomenological terms at all, because a judgment is analytic 
whether or not it is grasped or formulated or realized in anyone's consciousness 
whatsoever? Ultimately, I think that this objection gives an accurate characterization of 
Kant's own position. The key to seeing this is seeing that Kant does not really attach a 
psychological or phenomenological meaning to the expression 'already thought'. When 
Kant talks about what is 'already thought' in a concept, he is not talking about what a 
person invariably thinks in a given concept: he acknowledges that mental content is 
variable and imperfect. Rather, he is talking about what a person necessarily thinks in 
connection with a concept if, by means of that concept, they are to succeed in thinking 
about the corresponding object. In this sense, it is possible to regard Kant's 
phenomenological criterion as symmetrical with the more obviously formal containment 
criterion: both define an analytic judgment as a judgment that articulates a necessary 
feature of the corresponding object. What the phenomenological criterion contributes, by 
virtue of its distinctive formulation, is ultimately just the following conditional: if one is 
to grasp an analytic judgment as such, then one grasps its constituent concepts in terms of 






Before moving on to some general remarks, let's review what we have seen in this 
chapter. 
The first issue that I tackled was that of negative analytic judgment. Noting that the idea 
of negative analytic judgment involves a particularly high epistemic standard, in the 
sense that it presupposes insight into what our terms necessarily do not mean, I noted that 
Kant could justify a negative analytic judgment in essentially the same way that he 
justifies an affirmative analytic judgment: with reference to the objective correlate of the 
subject concept. Thus, the negative analytic judgment 'no bodies are simple' can be 
justified with reference to the fact that bodies are given as parts of space, and so are not 
simple in the way that Kant understands simplicity.   
 Still within the arena of epistemic issues, I moved on to consider the issue of 
truth. I asked how Kant could justify the claim that an analytic judgment is grasped as 
true just insofar as we see that the negation of that judgment is contradictory. In response, 
I suggested that when Kant invokes the principle of contradiction as a means of assessing 
analytic truth, he presupposes that the objective reality criterion has been satisfied. He 
assumes that since the concept in question already agrees with its object, the relations of 
contradiction and necessity that can be derived from that concept will mirror the real 
relations in which that object is involved.  
 Moving on to consider truth from a semantic, or metaphysical angle, I asked 
whether the object-relatedness of analytic truths implies that those truths are not actually 
analytic truths, in the sense that they reflect facts about objects, rather than conceptual 
content exclusively. I suggested that this conclusion does not follow, and that in order to 
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see this, it is necessary to understand how the constituents of analytic truths come to be 
related to objects. In principle, the subject concept in an analytic judgment is related a 
priori to its objects. It is not distilled from the experience of those objects, but enables 
those objects to be given in the first place. This means that analytic truths manage to be 
strictly conceptual and objectively significant at once. They are strictly conceptual in that 
they flow immediately from the analysis of their constituent concepts, making no appeal 
to any actual experience of the corresponding objects; but they are objectively significant 
in that they convey the properties that the corresponding objects necessarily have.  
 The next two sections were in some ways the most difficult, and dealt, broadly 
speaking, with the relationship between analytic judgment and logical form. First, I asked 
whether analytic judgments are necessarily subject-predicate judgments as Kant seems to 
think. I suggested that we might be able to generate non-subject-predicate analytic 
judgments by interpreting analyticity, as Bolzano does, as truth preservation in virtue of 
propositional form. But I concluded that this strategy cannot work, because the alternate 
propositional forms that Kant recognizes are not susceptible of truth and falsity in the 
first place. While hypothetical and disjunctive judgments can be 'correct', in the sense of 
being assertable a priori, they cannot be true, in the strong sense of agreement with an 
objective correlate. Next, I asked whether logic as whole might qualify as analytic from 
Kant's perspective. Appealing once again to the issue of truth, I concluded, against Frege 
and others, that Kant does not in fact regard logic as analytic. Since the laws of logic do 
not bear directly on objects, it follows that neither those laws, nor the inferences 
derivable from them, are susceptible of truth and falsity; and since they are not 
susceptible of truth, it follows that they are not candidates for analytic truth specifically.  
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 Returning to the issue of analyticity and subject-predicate form, I asked whether 
we might be able to generate a non-subject-predicate analytic judgment by following 
Katz, and his suggestion that what distinguishes an analytic judgment is semantic 
redundancy, rather than conformity to a particular, truth-preserving propositional form. 
Ultimately, I concluded that this strategy cannot be made to work in a Kantian context. 
While it is indeed possible to extract redundant, non-subject-predicate judgments from 
certain a priori concepts, it is not possible to extract redundant, non-subject-predicate 
judgments that are also true, meaning, by extension, that it is not possible to extract 
redundant, non-subject-predicate judgments that are analytically true. 
 Next, I considered Anderson's attempt to clarify the 'metaphor' of containment in 
terms of Porphyran trees. I concluded that the attempted clarification is unsuccessful, 
because it presupposes a view of empirical concepts that is foreign to Kant—a view 
according to which empirical concepts are individuated just by the substances to which 
they correspond, and are in that sense essentially devoid of content. Arguing that 
empirical concepts are actually individuated by fixed sets of predicate concepts, 
according to Kant, I suggested that it is this kind of relation between concepts that he has 
in mind when he talks about containment. Rather than a kind of provisional association 
between concepts, what Kant means when he says that one concept 'contains' another is 
that the first is actually constituted by the second. What I tried to do next was to answer 
Fodor and Lepore's challenge, and to show that the viability of such complex concepts 
could be established without reference to analyticity. In other words, I tried to show that a 
claim having the form 'X contains Y' could be justified without reference to the apparent 
necessity of the judgment 'X is Y'. What I found is that when Kant says that one concept 
 181 
contains another, it is because the object corresponding to the first concept is necessarily 
represented in terms of the general property corresponding to the second concept. Thus, 
the concept gold contains yellowness because gold itself is necessarily represented as 
yellow. Given Kant's basic assumptions about representational content, it turns out that 
there is no way of representing gold that does not run through the more general concept 
of yellowness.   
 This way of understanding containment then became a way of resolving the status 
of explicitly identical judgments, that is, of deciding whether explicitly identical 
judgments like 'water is water' qualify as analytic. I suggested that if the question 'what 
does X contain?' is to be answered by pointing to the more general concepts that are 
involved in the representation of the corresponding object, then there is no basis on which 
to claim that any concept whatsoever contains itself, and hence no basis on which to 
claim that any judgment having the form 'x is x' is analytic. This in turn became a way of 
resolving the status of Kant's epistemological criterion for analyticity—the criterion 
which states that an analytic judgment must succeed in rendering its subject concept 
distinct. What I found is that this criterion is superfluous. Since concepts cannot contain 
themselves, it turns out that analytic judgments will necessarily be non-identical at the 
level of linguistic form, and hence, that analytic judgments will always be at least 
potentially illuminating.  
 As for the other apparently psychological criterion that Kant associates with 
analytic judgment, the criterion which states that an analytic judgment is a judgment in 
which the predicate concept is 'already' or 'actually' thought in the subject concept, here I 
reached the following conclusion. I concluded that when Kant refers to what is 'already' 
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or 'actually' thought in a given concept, he is not referring to the content that we 
consciously associate with that concept, but to the content that that we necessarily (if 
more or less unconsciously) associate with the corresponding object. This conclusion, in 
turn, allowed me to dismiss Gram's objections concerning the psychological, or 
phenomenological criterion. Whereas Gram worries that what is already thought in a 
concept may be inadequate to its essential, analytic content, I suggested that what is 
already thought in a concept simply is the essential, analytic content of that concept. It is 
by means of its essential, analytic content that any concept whatsoever comes to be 
related to an object. 
 
Conclusion  
In the second chapter, I showed that if we are to reconcile Kant's criteria for analytic 
judgment with his examples of analytic judgment, it is necessary to consider those 
examples in terms of their underlying conceptual form. Thus, in order to see in what 
sense 'bodies are extended' conforms to Kant's identity criterion for analyticity, it is 
necessary to consider the subject term, 'bodies', as the expression of a complex concept 
that contains the concept extension. Otherwise, 'bodies are extended' is simply a non-
identical judgment. At this point, having examined the idea of analytic judgment in much 
greater depth, and in the light of a number of potential problems, it possible to extend this 
conclusion. What I want to suggest is that Kant's various criteria for analytic judgment 
are individually coherent and mutually consistent only insofar as the a priori objective 
reality of the concepts that feature in analytic judgments is presupposed. In other words, 
Kant's idea of analytic judgment only makes sense if we understand that analytic 
judgments are necessarily judgments about objects. Thinking about analytic judgments in 
 183 
this way allows us to make sense of the basic idea of an analytic judgment, that of a 
judgment that can be grasped as true just on the basis of conceptual form: since we know, 
a priori, that the subject concept in an analytic judgment already embodies the essential 
features of its objective correlate, we know, a priori, that the judgments that are extracted 
directly from that concept are true of the object in question. Thinking about analytic 
judgment in this way allows us to clarify Kant's own criteria for analytic judgment, thus, 
the requirement that the predicate concept in an analytic judgment be 'contained' or 
'already thought' in the subject concept: facts about containment, as it turns out, are facts 
about the concepts that involved in the representation of a given object; facts about what 
is 'already' thought in a concept, likewise, are facts about what is necessarily thought in 
the representation of an object. Most importantly, this way of thinking about analytic 
judgment allows us to impose a sensible boundary on the kinds of judgments that can 
actually qualify as analytic. We can rule out non-subject-predicate judgments as 
candidates for analyticity, because such judgments necessarily fail to make positive, 
truth-evaluable assertions concerning an object; we can rule out formal-logical judgments 
as candidates for analyticity, because those judgments articulate the rules of thought, 
rather than the laws of objects; finally, against Kant's own assumptions about the scope of 
analytic judgment, and our own partially successful attempts to vindicate those 
assumptions, we can rule out judgments that bear on objects like gold and water: since 
those objects are not logically necessary features of reality, but contingently given natural 
substances, the corresponding concepts will have a posteriori rather a priori objective 
reality, meaning that the corresponding judgments will not be strictly analytic.  
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 Of course, we might worry that in eliminating all of these forms of judgment as 
candidates for analyticity, we have produced a picture of analytic judgment that Kant 
would not recognize, in that it seems to characterize only a very small corner of our 
judicative activity. Hasn't Kant told us that "all judgments in which the relation of a 
subject to the predicate is thought" will either be analytic or synthetic (A6-6/B10-11, my 
emphasis)? And doesn't this suggest that analytic judgments will form a significant part 
of everyday cognition? What I want to propose, in response to this legitimate expectation, 
is that insofar as Kant leads us to think of analytic judgment as a meta-linguistic or meta-
cognitive notion, meaning a notion that describes a linguistic or cognitive phenomenon 
that simply 'happens' in everyday run of things, then Kant gives a misleading 
characterization of analytic judgment. At base, analytic judgment is a methodological 
notion. It is the name for the conceptual interrogation that is essentially characteristic of 
metaphysics; and it is the name for the product of this conceptual interrogation, insofar as 
the judicative acts that are directed toward our a priori conceptual repertoire can be 
retained as fixed 'acquisitions'.   
 That analytic judgment should be understood first and foremost in terms of what 
it accomplishes in the context of metaphysical inquiry can be underscored by reflecting 
on what we have seen in the present chapter. What we have found, very simply, is that we 
can only understand Kant's various criteria for being an analytic judgment by reflecting 
on what an analytic judgment is intended to do. Once we know that analytic judgment has 
the function of unpacking our a priori conceptual repertoire, meaning the concepts that 
invest our spatio-temporal experience with logical form, we can see that containment, for 
example, is not a way of expressing the idea of linguistic or cognitive synonymy, but a 
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way of talking about the logical properties that are involved necessarily into the 
representation of particular objects.  
 This way of understanding analytic judgment, finally, has important ramifications 
as regards the kind of criticism to which Kant is genuinely vulnerable. What it suggests is 
that if we are to undermine the foundations of analyticity, it does not suffice to show that 
'bachelors are unmarried men' is not assertable a priori. Instead, we need to show that the 
basic rationalist foundations of which Kant's doctrine of analyticity rests are unstable, 
that experience does not in fact presuppose an arsenal of concepts having fixed content. 
In what remains of this study, I will not try to tackle this obviously quite imposing task. 
What I will do is something more modest, but perhaps more instructive. Examining one 
of Kant's most important successors, Edmund Husserl, what I want to do is to see what 
happens to the idea of analytic judgment when its specifically rationalist foundations fall 
away. Is the idea of analytic judgment fated to become the idea of mere linguistic 





Husserl's Theory of Analyticity 
In the first chapter of this study, I explored the methodological context in which Kant's 
idea of analytic judgment is articulated. I argued that analytic judgment is best 
understood in relation to synthetic a priori judgments, first, as a justificatory mechanism 
which allows us to shore up the syntheticity of synthetic a priori judgments, and second, 
as a clarificatory mechanism which spells out the content of our a priori conceptual 
repertoire. In the subsequent chapters, I examined analytic judgment in terms of the 
semantic, epistemic, and logical properties that Kant attributes to such judgments. I 
showed that these properties can only be successfully clarified in the light of the 
overriding methodological role of analytic judgment (thus, in light of the results of the 
first chapter). For example, while it is otherwise hard to explain why Kant thinks that 
analytic judgments are true just by virtue of their constituent concepts, it becomes 
possible to explain this when we take into account the kinds of concepts that are at issue 
in analytic judgments: since those concepts are already intrinsically involved with 
objects, being the basic conditions of possibility for the representation of objects, it 
follows that they embody objective truths in and of themselves. Likewise, while it is 
otherwise hard to explain why Kant thinks that only subject-predicate judgments qualify 
as analytic, since many non-subject-predicate judgments seem to be appropriately 
tautological, or redundant, it becomes possible to explain this restriction when we take 
into account the basic mandate of analytic judgment: since analytic judgment is a matter 
of articulating the basic logical properties of objects, and since facts about objects can 
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only be expressed in subject-predicate form, it follows that analytic judgments must be 
subject-predicate judgments. 
 In light of the explanatory gains that are won when we foreground the 
methodological context in which analytic judgment arises, I think it is clear that we 
should see analytic judgment as the name of a particular kind of inquiry. Rather than 
seeing analytic judgment as the name of a function taking any complex concept or 
linguistic meaning whatsoever as an argument, we should see it as a form of 
metaphysical inquiry, a form of metaphysical inquiry targeting the basic logical 
framework within which the objects of experience are given.  
 Having established a clear picture of Kant's idea of analytic judgment, what I 
want to do at this point is to pivot to Edmund Husserl and his own thinking on the subject 
of analytic judgment, or analyticity more generally. As for why Husserl might be an 
interesting or important point of reference for us at this point, it is because he is unique in 
the history of post-Kantian philosophy in having taken up the genuinely Kantian notion 
of analytic judgment. In contrast to Bolzano and Frege, both of whom understand 
analyticity in terms of validity, and both of whom sideline the question of what analytic 
judgments are about, Husserl defends the idea that analytic judgments bear essentially on 
the formal properties of objects.  
 Of course, if Husserl could be seen merely as having taken over Kant's doctrine of 
analyticity wholesale, then there would be no particular reason to turn to his work at this 
point. We could simply remain with Kant, and avoid the difficulties posed by a novel 
terminology and a novel set of methodological presuppositions. As it happens, though, I 
do not think that we can see Husserl in these terms. For one, even where Husserl's views 
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on analyticity resonate perfectly with those of Kant, they are conveyed in far more lucid 
and clear-sighted terms. Whereas Kant tends to present analyticity in narrow, formalistic 
terms, and is correspondingly vague on the issue of its broad metaphysical significance, 
Husserl is quite explicit as to the nature of analytic inquiry and its place vis-à-vis other 
kinds of inquiry. Second, as I will try to show, Husserl makes a number of important 
advances on Kant. Husserl clarifies the epistemic and logical relationship between the 
analytic and the synthetic a priori; he reintegrates the analytic and formal logical spheres; 
he explains in what sense mathematics can be understood as analytic; and most 
importantly perhaps, he explains how we are actually to arrive at analytic knowledge.  
 In the sixth and final chapter of this study, I will take up these departures from 
Kant in detail. What I want to do in the present chapter is to lay the groundwork for this 
comparison. In Section 1, I rehearse Husserl's most fully elaborated account of 
analyticity, the one that he gives in the third Logical Investigation. After outlining the 
distinction that Husserl gives there between analytic and synthetic law, I show that this 
distinction corresponds to an ontological distinction that is pervasive in Husserl's 
writings: the distinction between aggregates and wholes. In Section 2, I shift from the 
ontological perspective of the third Investigation and take up analyticity in 'apophantic' 
terms, meaning in terms of propositions. I show that propositions are subject to analytic 
law in three respects: first, as regards the ways in which meanings can combine to form 
propositions; second, as regards the ways in which meanings can combine to form truth-
evaluable propositions; third, as regards the ways in which propositions can combine to 
form theories. In Section 3, I circle back to the third Investigation to take up what Husserl 
calls an 'analytically necessary proposition'. Since the analytically necessary proposition 
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seems to come closest to what philosophers have tended to understand by 'analytic 
judgment', I ask whether Husserl is able to give a defensible account of such 
propositions. This means asking whether Husserl can appeal coherently to explicit 
definition, implicit definition, or to some other fact about linguistic meaning to show that 
terms like 'bachelor' have their meanings as a matter of necessity. What I conclude is that 
Husserl cannot vouchsafe a priori access to the meanings of such terms, and so cannot 
vouchsafe the possibility of analytic judgments in the mold of 'all bachelors are 
unmarried men'. Noting that this suggests that Husserl has severed the idea of analyticity 
from the idea of analysis, I conclude by showing that these concepts are indeed intimately 
related.  
 
1. Analytic and Synthetic A Priori Law 
While the theme of analyticity runs across Husserl's published and unpublished writings, 
undoubtedly the most comprehensive account of analyticity comes from the third Logical 
Investigation (specifically, the second edition of the third Logical Investigation, from 
1911). By way of a point of entry into Husserl's theory, I propose to begin by examining 
this account, supplementing it with reference to other works and other authors where 
appropriate.143 
                                                
143 The idea of analyticity remains more of less consistent across the body of Husserl's 
writings. Accordingly, I will not concern myself in what follows with distinctions within 
Husserl's account of analyticity. As far as is possible, I will try to present a coherent 
picture of Husserl's idea of analyticity, one that unifies the different treatments that this 
idea receives in different texts. As to how we can explain the consistency of Husserl's 
idea of analyticity, particularly in light of the dramatic changes that his thinking 
undergoes in other areas, I think that this is ultimately a function of the consistency of his 
views on logic. For the Husserl of the Logical Investigations, as for the Husserl of 
Formal and Transcendental Logic, logic remains an "abstract theoretical discipline" 
concerned with the ideal meanings and propositional forms that enter into our judgments 
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Independent and non-Independent Content  
The third Logical Investigation is a study of what Husserl calls 'formal ontology'.144 By 
'ontology', what Husserl means is the eidetic analysis of objects, meaning an examination 
of objects at the level of their pure, a priori essence.145 By formal ontology, what Husserl 
means is an ontology that abstracts from the material determinations of objects and says 
what can be said about all objects whatsoever. This way of representing formal ontology 
reflects the meaning that Husserl gives to the term 'formalization' in general. Rather than 
a process in which we work out the features that some materially determinate set of 
entities have in common, Husserl understands formalization as a process wherein we 
imaginatively eliminate the material determinations of some set of entities and direct our 
attention to the features and properties that remain. In the 'apophantic' sphere, this means 
abstracting away from the particular meanings that attach to our terms and considering 
propositions at the level of syntactical structure. In the context of the third Logical 
Investigation, it means examining objects at the level of mereological structure, thus, in 
                                                                                                                                            
about objects (Logical Investigations, Vol.1, pp. 32, 82, 26). Analyticity, in turn, is 
represented across all of Husserl's writings as a logical concept denoting the necessary 
laws to which propositions and objects are subject (On the continuity between Husserl's 
early and later views on logic see: Formal and Transcendental Logic, p. 104; John Sallis, 
Logic of Imagination, p. 82). 
144 Husserl mentions formal ontology parenthetically at the outset of the third Logical 
Investigation, but otherwise avoids the term 'ontology'. In a footnote to the Ideas, he 
explains his reticence in this regard as driven by the 'offensive' historical connotations 
attached to the term. By the time of the Ideas, this reticence is dissipated, and Husserl 
retroactively classes the third Logical Investigation as an investigation in the mode of 
formal ontology (Ideas, p. 24, ftn. 8). 
145 Eugen Fink defines ontology in the Husserlian mode as an "apriori eidetic of object 
classes, and, more particularly, an eidetic in the naively thematic "straightforward 
attitude"" (Introduction to Edmund Husserl, Introduction to the Logical Investigations: A 
Draft of a Preface to the Logical Investigations, p. 4). 
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terms of the determinations that belong to objects just insofar as they can be characterized 
as wholes or parts. 
 Husserl begins the third Logical Investigation on the side of parts, drawing a 
distinction that will prove to be crucial as regards the distinction between analytic and 
synthetic a priori law: the distinction between independent and non-independent parts. 
According to Husserl, an independent part is a part that has the character of a 'piece', 
meaning a part that can be 'broken off' from the whole to which it belongs and presented 
separately. A non-independent part, meanwhile, is a part that is not separable in this 
sense: it is a part that "can be distinguished 'in' an object", but which cannot be presented 
apart from that object. Key examples of non-independent parts include color and shape, 
both of which can be distinguished as features or 'moments' of the wholes to which they 
belong, but neither of which are given as objects in their own right.146 
 Acknowledging that the term 'part' is somewhat out of place in the context of 
phenomena like color and shape, in the sense that 'part' tends to connote an independent, 
separable 'piece', Husserl proposes a terminological adjustment. Rather than speaking of 
independent and non-independent 'parts', Husserl proposes to frame the third Logical 
Investigation in terms of independent and non-independent 'contents'. This language sits 
comfortably with color and shape, in the sense that both can be spoken of comfortably as 
'abstract contents'; more importantly, the language of contents is in keeping with the 
phenomenological perspective that is adopted in the third Logical Investigation. It 
                                                
146 Husserl's distinction between pieces and moments has an important historical 
antecedent in Brentano's closely related distinction between physical and metaphysical 
parts (Carlo Ierna, "Beginnings of Husserl's Philosophy, Part 2: Mathematical and 
Philosophical Background", p. 51; Robin Rollinger, Husserl's Position in the School of 
Brentano, p. 103). 
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captures the fact that the mereological relations that are of interest in this study are to be 
characterized from the standpoint of their givenness to consciousness.  
 It is worth lingering over this terminological adjustment for a moment to consider 
a possible objection, namely, that talk of 'content' is simply out of place in the context of 
ontology; that the way that things are given in conscious experience has no direct bearing 
on what pertains to those things as such. Husserl is eager to forestall this objection. What 
he argues is that talk of content is talk of objects. What the language of 'contents' does is 
to bring into focus the subjective arena in which objects are given and in which they 
alone have significance; it does not entail a shift in thematic interest toward pure 
phenomena or pure qualia. This is borne out by the fact that judgments bearing on 
'contents' can be converted into judgments about objects: "we need only say 'object' and 
'partial object', instead of 'content' and 'partial content'…to achieve an objective 
distinction freed from all relation to interpretative acts and to any phenomenological 
content that might be interpreted".147 
 Without forfeiting the objective significance of his analyses, therefore, Husserl 
reframes the distinction between independence and non-independence in the language of 
phenomenological content. For a content to be independent, Husserl explains, means that 
it can be kept "constant in idea despite boundless variation...of the contents associated 
with it, and, in general, given with it".148 For a content to be non-independent, 
conversely, means that it cannot be kept constant in idea across variations of the 
"presentational complex" in which it is given.149 Certain kinds of variations in that 
                                                
147 Logical Investigations, Vol. 2, p. 10.  
148 Logical Investigations, Vol. 2, p. 9. 
149 Logical Investigations, Vol. 2, p. 6. 
 193 
presentational complex entail the alteration or the elimination of the phenomenological 
content in question. As an example of the first kind of content, Husserl gives the slightly 
macabre example of a horse's head. He notes that "the head of a horse can be presented 
'on its own' or 'cut off', i.e. we can hold it in our fancy, while we allow the other parts of 
the horse, and its whole intuited setting, to alter and vanish at will".150 As an example of 
non-independent content, meanwhile, Husserl points to the relationship between color 
and extension. He notes that there exists a relation of "functional dependence" between 
color and extension such that a change at the level of extension produces a change at the 
level of color. When the boundaries of an object are enlarged, the moment of color 
'becomes bigger'; and when the boundaries of an object are reduced to zero, the moment 
of color is entirely eliminated.   
 
Synthetic A Priori Law 
Having descended to the level of a particular instance of non-independent content, 
Husserl has at the same time reached the level of synthetic a priority. He claims that 
relations of functional dependence like the relation between color and extension, or the 
relation between the intensity of a tone and its quality, amount to synthetic a priori laws. 
As for why Husserl might describe these relations of functional dependence as a priori 
laws, this is relatively easy to see: the relation between color and extension holds not just 
for some instances of color at some times, but for all instances of color at all times. But in 
what sense can these a priori laws be described as 'synthetic'? In a Kantian context, we 
say that a judgment is synthetic when the predicate concept "lies entirely outside of" the 
subject concept (A6/B10). Although Husserl puts this in more general terms—namely, in 
                                                
150 Logical Investigations, Vol. 2, p. 6. 
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terms generalize beyond subject-predicate propositional form—it turns out that 
syntheticity means something similar for him. According to Husserl, synthetic a priori 
judgments are synthetic to the extent that they are "not mere particular instances of 
formal-ontological truths".151 Thus, the judgment "color cannot exist without something 
colored" is synthetic insofar as we cannot account for its manifest necessity by showing 
that it instantiates some more general logical or ontological truth. By way of explaining 
what does in fact make judgments like this true, it will be worth asking how Husserl can 
defend his conception of the synthetic a priori against a well-known challenge.  
  
Schlick's Attack on the Synthetic A Priori 
In an article from 1932, Moritz Schlick tries to show that Husserl's synthetic a priori laws 
collapse into insignificant tautologies. His strategy turns on an appeal to language use. 
According to Schlick: 
the meaning of a word is solely determined by the rules which hold for its use. Whatever 
follows from these rules, follows from the mere meaning of the word, and is therefore 
analytic, tautological, formal. The error committed by the proponents of the [synthetic a 
priori] can be understood as arising from the fact that it was not clearly realized that such 
concepts as those of the colors have a formal structure just as do numbers of spatial 
concepts, and that this structure determines their meaning without remainder.152 
 
From Schlick's perspective, therefore, the proposition "color cannot exist without 
something colored" is straightforwardly analytic. The concept color contains the idea of a 
relation to something colored, meaning that the proposition as a whole has the structure 
of a tautology. Were this proposition otherwise than purely tautologous, Schlick suggests, 
then it could be meaningfully denied. I could speak of colors as objects in their own right 
without rendering myself unintelligible to others. Intuitively, however, it is clear that this 
                                                
151 Ideas, p. 31; Logical Investigations, Vol. 2, p. 21. 
152 Moritz Schlick, "Is There a Factual A Priori?", p. 169. 
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way of speaking would result in misunderstanding. If I were to say to someone "look at 
that red", my interlocutor would respond by asking me to specify the red object I have in 
mind. For Schlick, this gives us all the assurance we need regarding the content of the 
concept color. 
 From Husserl's perspective, meanwhile, Schlick's appeal to linguistic usage as a 
means of fleshing out concepts like color is illegitimate. The fact that I cannot 
meaningfully employ the word 'color' without implicitly affirming certain facts about 
color does not mean that those facts are built into the meaning of the concept. In Section 
21 of the first Investigation, Husserl indicates that the question of meaning can only be 
settled by reference to intuition. "In order to be quite clear as to the sense of an 
expression (or as to the content of a concept)", he argues, it is necessary to refer our 
"purely symbolic meaning-intentions" to "directly intuitive presentations" and "certain 
cogitative elaborations and formulations of the same".153 What does this reference to 
intuition reveal in the case of color? What it demonstrates, according to Husserl, is just 
what we have seen so far in this chapter, namely, that color is distinguishable from its 
material support—not in the sense of a "separately presentable" part, but in the sense of a 
freely variable moment. Presented with a colored object of some kind, we can always 
imagine the same object taking on an entirely different color. While materially 
interdependent, in the sense that they cannot actually be disjoined, color and extension 
are nevertheless formally distinct. 
 What remains now is just to affirm the same principle that underlies Kant's theory 
of synthetic a priori judgment, and which Kant himself inherits from Hume: the principle 
                                                
153 Logical Investigations, Vol. 1, p. 212; cf. Hua XXXV, p. 446.  
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which says that if two phenomena can be distinguished, then the corresponding concepts 
are distinct. Hence, because there is undoubtedly a phenomenological distinction between 
color and its material support, we should count the concepts color and colored thing as 
distinct, even if our linguistic practices strongly suggest that they are identical. What this 
indicates, in turn, is that if the color-proposition is necessary, there must be some non-
formal, non-conceptual grounds for its necessity. Rather than pure intuition, or mere 




Having followed a path from non-independent content to synthetic a priori law, it might 
look as if we could pursue a parallel track en route to analytic law. That is, it might look 
as if we could simply circle back to independent content and work our way towards a 
second, distinct sphere of a priori law. As it turns out though, there is no path from 
independent content to analytic law, or to any sphere of law whatsoever. As Robert 
Sokolowski remarks, independent content serves principally as a "foil" for the idea of a 
non-independent content.155 It does not project us into a unique domain of law.  
 Fortunately, there is another route possible, one that leads from the idea of 
synthetic a priori law that we have just secured. Thus, whereas we have found that 
synthetic a priori law is law that governs contents by virtue of the specific kinds of 
contents that they are, what now suggests itself is the idea of law that governs contents 
independently of the kinds of contents that they are; in other words, the idea of a law that 
                                                
154 Logical Investigations, Vol. 2, p. 21 (my emphasis). 
155 Robert Sokolowski, "The Logic of Parts and Wholes in Husserl's Logical 
Investigations", p. 541. 
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applies indifferently to contents just insofar as they are contents, and thus to objects just 
insofar as they are objects.   
 We already have a sense of the language in which such laws can be articulated. 
We know that we can describe something as a 'whole', an 'independent part', or a 'non-
independent part' while leaving aside its particular material determinations. Here, by way 
of enlarging our terminology, it is worth noting that mereological characterizations such 
as 'whole' and 'part' fall under a broader heading—that of categorial form. 
 By categorial form, what Husserl means is the formal content that objects have 
over and above their pure sensuous givenness. One such example of this supra-sensuous 
form, as I've just suggested, is the form manifested by something insofar as it is a whole 
or a part. The property of being a whole or a part is straightforwardly given in the 
presentation of particular kinds of objects; but this property is not grounded in the 
sensuous particularity of those objects. Otherwise, it would not be possible to grasp as 
whole as a part or to grasp a part as a whole in its own right. The property of wholeness 
or of partness would be inscribed directly and inalienably on the surface of objects. 
Another example of categorial form is the form manifested by objects that stand in a 
particular external relation, such a 'larger than' or 'to the left of'. Again, this relation is 
given with the objects, but cannot be an immediate expression of the objects, since they 
would otherwise have no existence outside of the relation in question. A final example of 
categorial form is the form manifested by an object just insofar as it is given as an object. 
To be given as an object, according to Husserl, means to be given in terms of properties 
that are not immediately apprehensible at the level of sensuous content: it means being 
given as self-identical, and hence susceptible of being given repeatedly across multiple 
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experiences; and it means being given as a bearer of properties, hence as a thing that in 
some sense transcends the properties with which it is factually given.  
 For our purposes, what is crucial is that categorial forms, and by extension, the 
objects that fall under those categorial forms, are subject to laws. These are the laws that 
Husserl calls 'analytic'.156 Consider a simple example. When anything whatsoever is 
given as an object, it is given as a bearer of properties. But it cannot be a bearer of just 
any properties whatsoever. In particular, it cannot accommodate contradictory properties 
simultaneously. An object R cannot be simultaneously P and not-P. Just insofar as it has 
been constituted categorically as an object, therefore, R is subject to the law of non-
contradiction. Since this law applies to R independently of the class of objects to which R 
belongs means that it is an analytic law.  
 Husserl gives a more involved example of analytic law in the principle that 
"correlatives mutually entail one another".157 What this principle says is that if two 
objects, R and S, are constitutively related, then neither object can be given in the 
absence of the other. R is necessarily given in conjunction with S and S is necessarily 
given in conjunction with R. Again, this law bears not on the sensuous or material 
properties of R and S, but on the categorial form that they instantiate. As such, it is 
applicable to any objects whatsoever that instantiate the same categorial form.  
 Other examples of analytic law have a more explicitly mereological character. 
Thus, in the third Logical Investigation, Husserl says that if something is a part, then it is 
necessarily given as part of a whole. This is a logical requirement that bears on the part as 
                                                
156 Husserl notes that analytic laws "say nothing" on the question of which categorial 
forms can be constituted on the basis of "sensuous intuitions" (Logical Investigations, 
Vol. 2, p. 310).  
157 Logical Investigations, Vol. 2, p. 19. 
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such; it is not a function of the material properties of any particular kind of part. Another 
essentially mereological law is given in Husserl's unpublished writings on Russell's 
paradox. If something is a whole, Husserl explains, then it cannot contain itself as a 
part.158 A final example bears on the relation that exists within a whole, between its forms 
and its materials: according to Husserl, "it is an analytic truth that the forms in a whole 
cannot function as its materials, nor vice-versa".159  
 This list of mereological relations and attendant analytic laws could be extended 
still further. Following Husserl, we could distinguish between immediate and mediate 
relations between part and whole; we could distinguish between the different 'external' 
relations that can obtain between parts, relations such as similarity, likeness, and position; 
we could talk about the relations of 'intersection' that can obtain between different 
wholes, namely, when they have one or more parts in common;160 and we could describe 
the invariant forms that these different relations take, thus arriving at a set of strictly 
analytic laws. For the moment, though, our objective is just to understand what Husserl 
means by 'analytic law', and with the foregoing, we have made a start in that regard. What 
we have found is that an analytic law is a law that bears on the internal and external 
relations that objects sustain just insofar as they are objects; in other words, a law that 
applies to objects with regard only to the categorial relations in which they are involved.  
                                                
158 Claire Ortiz Hill, "Tackling Three of Frege's Problems, Husserl on Sets and 
Manifolds", p. 98; cf. Claire Ortiz Hill, "Georg Cantor's Paradise, Metaphysics, and 
Husserlian Logic", pp. 232-3. It is easy to see how considerations of essence allow 
Husserl to respond to Russell's paradox. If wholes cannot contain themselves as parts, 
then sets cannot contain themselves as elements, and the problem posed by the set of all 
sets that are not members of themselves (R) cannot arise, because we cannot coherently 
ask whether R is a member of itself.  
159 Logical Investigations, Vol. 2, p. 64. 
160 Experience and Judgment, pp. 240-1. 
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Aggregate and Whole 
Remaining for the time being within the domain of objects, I want to consider another 
way of motivating the distinction between analytic and synthetic a priori law. Rather than 
approaching the distinction between analytic and synthetic a priori law in terms of the 
distinction between independent and non-independent content, I want to try approaching 
the issue of analytic and synthetic law in terms of the distinction between Inbegriffe and 
Ganzen, or aggregates and wholes. Although this distinction is strongly correlated with 
the distinction between analytic and synthetic a priori law, Husserl himself declines to 
draw the connection explicitly.  
 The idea of the 'Inbegriff' originates in its broad outline with Bolzano. In Section 
82 of his Theory of Science, Bolzano defines an Inbegriff as a  'composite idea' 
[zussamengesetzter Vorstellung] having no internal principle of order, meaning a 
complex object whose constituent parts stand in no specified relation.161 By way of an 
example, Bolzano offers the scenario in which we seek to understand a certain kind of 
event, and we recognize that this event is brought about causally by a number of factors. 
In such cases, he says, we form an Inbegriff encompassing those various factors; we 
unify them without necessarily attributing to them an order amongst themselves. 
Elsewhere, expressing what amounts to a negative condition for what it means to be an 
Inbegriff, Bolzano notes that there is no constraint on the kinds of objects that can enter 
into a given Inbegriff: "any arbitrary object A can be combined with all the other arbitrary 
objects B, C, D, . . . into [an Inbegriff] or (to speak more correctly) already forms [an 
                                                
161 Bernard Bolzano, Gesamtausgabe (Band 11,2: Wissenschaftslehre §§ 46-90)  
pp. 197-8. 
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Inbegriff] in itself".162 Thus, we can combine a rose with the concept of a rose to form an 
Inbegriff. The manifest heterogeneity of these objects does not preclude the possibility of 
an Inbegriff that encompasses both.  
 Husserl takes up the idea of the Inbegriff, or aggregate, in his Philosophy of 
Arithmetic from 1893. At this stage, what principally distinguishes an aggregate from 
Husserl's perspective is the fact that it is arbitrary, meaning that it can draw together 
objects that differ arbitrarily as regards their basic ontological determinations.163 This 
emphasis reflects the use to which Husserl puts the idea of the aggregate in the 
Philosophy of Arithmetic. In this context, the aggregate is invoked as the concrete basis 
for the concept of multiplicity, and ultimately that of number.164 As such, the relevant 
feature of the aggregate is precisely the fact that it lacks any criterion for membership. 
Why must the concept of number have its basis in the experience of such collections? 
According to Husserl, this is the only way that we can explain the generality of the 
concept of number, that is, the fact that it can be made to apply to collections of objects 
having no meaningful relation to one another. Only if the concept of number is originally 
related to a set that can take in any object whatsoever can I explain my ability to say of 
this bottle, happiness, and Moby Dick, that they constitute a collection of three things.  
 Of course, we might wonder whether our experience actually testifies to such 
collections. Most people would agree that we experience collections having relatively 
weak criteria of membership, such as 'all of the objects on the table right now'; but it is 
not as clear that we experience collections having no criteria of membership. In order to 
                                                
162 Bernard Bolzano, The Mathematical Works of Bernard Bolzano, p. 601.  
163 Philosophy of Arithmetic, pp. 17, 19, 60; cf. Philosophy of Arithmetic ["On the 
Concept of Number"], pp. 314-315, 345. 
164 Philosophy of Arithmetic, p. 17, cf. pp. 72-77. 
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see that we do in fact have this experience, what we need to do is to simply shed the 
expectation that such experience would be passive in nature. Rather than a collection that 
is unified by spatial or temporal coincidence, an aggregate is constituted "in an actual act 
of assembly, in an act, that is, expressed in the conjunctive form of connection A and B 
and C…".165 It is not held together by a passively apprehended connection between its 
constituent members, but by the "unitary interest" that "distinctly picks out and 
encompasses its various contents".166 This explains why an aggregate is experienced as 
freely variable in its membership: the unitary interest that holds the set together is 
independent, in principle, from the objects toward which it is directed.167 In consciously 
taking together a certain number of objects, I am tacitly aware that the set that I have 
constituted in thought transcends the set's initial membership.  
 In the interests of clarity, it is important to stress here that the members of an 
aggregate need not be spatially and temporally unrelated.168 To insist on this would be to 
impose a criterion of membership on aggregates, which we are definitionally prevented 
from doing. The point is just that in taking something as an aggregate, I am essentially 
unconcerned with the material relatedness of its constituents. I am concerned solely with 
the relations that the constituents have as members of the aggregate, the logical or 
                                                
165 Logical Investigations, Volume 2, p. 280. Carlo Ierna notes that in characterizing the 
notion of the Inbegriff in terms of collective combination, Husserl is drawing more from 
Brentano than Bolzano ("Beginnings of Husserl's Philosophy, Part 2: Philosophical and 
Mathematical Background", p. 45).  
166 Philosophy of Arithmetic, p. 77. 
167 Logical Investigations, Vol. 2, p. 38.  
168 As Husserl says, the members of an Inbegriff are "possibly 'quite disconnected and 
intrinsically unrelated'". Unrelatedness is not a necessary condition for something's being 
an Inbegriffe (Logical Investigations, Vol. 2, p. 38). 
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categorial relations that flow from the "act of assembly" that brings the aggregate into 
being.  
 This provides a suitable opening onto the idea of the whole (Ganze). For Husserl, 
a whole is a collection grounded in an "immediate bond between the representing sense-
contents", rather than a bond supplied by the understanding.169 It is a unity that is given at 
the level of intuition rather than the level of categorial thought.170 Based on what we have 
seen so far, we will already have some sense of the kinds of unity that can obtain just at 
the level of intuition, prior to categorial synthesis. According to Husserl, what binds 
together a whole is not an "act of assembly", but the bond that exists between non-
independent contents. This bond, in turn, is grounded in the species to which the non-
independent contents in question belong. The color and shape of the table in front of me 
are bound together by the "combinations and the relations" that belong to those contents 
as instances of color and shape, respectively.171  
 This makes it clear in what sense the whole is correlated with synthetic a priori 
law. The idea of the whole is the idea of a complex, unitary object that is governed by 
synthetic a priori law. What about the relationship between the aggregate and analytic 
law? In what sense can we think of an aggregate as an 'analytic' combination? In short, 
the aggregate for Husserl represents the ontological strata to which analytic law properly 




                                                
169 Logical Investigations, Vol. 2, p. 301.  
170 Experience and Judgment, p. 248.  
171 Philosophy of Arithmetic ["On the Formal Determination of a Manifold"], p. 499. 
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Manifold 
By way of an opening on to the next category of objects, it is worth making note of an 
important difference that has come to light in this section. What we have found is that 
synthetic a priori law governs collections that are passively given whereas analytic law 
governs collections that are actively constructed. Synthetic a priori law bears on 
collections that are given to us originally as collections, and thus collections that we are 
not at liberty to 'un-collect' (as we discover, for example, when we attempt to 
imaginatively disentangle color from extension). Analytic law bears on collections that 
are not given originally as collections, and thus collections that we are indeed at liberty to 
un-collect. This means that synthetic a priori law and analytic law 'kick in' at different 
moments, which is to say, at different stages in the intentional constitution of experience. 
Synthetic a priori law kicks in at the moment that different, mutually dependent sensuous 
contents are given to us. Analytic law kicks in at a later moment: once we have 
constituted sense contents in terms of discrete objects and grasped (begriffen) those 
objects within an initial composite structure (Inbegriffe).172 
 For precisely the same reason, however, analytic law extends much further than 
synthetic a priori law. Whereas synthetic a priori law bears just on relations between 
species of non-independent content, and so is bounded by the species of non-independent 
content that are actually given, and by the different "combinations and relations" in which 
those species of non-independent content can be involved, analytic law bears on 
aggregates, and so encompasses an indefinitely large class of collections, constituted in 
                                                
172 When it comes to formulating synthetic a priori and analytic laws, on the other hand, 
this order of priority is reversed. As we will learn in Chapter Six, the possibility of 
representing phenomenal content as necessarily and synthetically related presupposes the 
possibility of representing phenomenal content as analytically related.  
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terms of combinations and relations having their point of origin in the understanding. 
Precisely because analytic law intervenes after the exercise of categorial spontaneity, in 
other words, it has all of the indefinitely numerous products of categorial spontaneity 
within its jurisdiction. In order to become somewhat clearer on what those products of 
categorial spontaneity might look like, it will be helpful to refine our terminology 
somewhat.  
 According to the narrower sense that Husserl gives to the term, an aggregate is 
just a collection of objects. The objects that constitute the aggregate are drawn together 
by the categorial relation 'and', but they are not joined together in any particular 
sequence. I might take the objects A, B and C together in an act having the form 'A and B 
and C', but this does not establish any particular relation between A and B or between B 
and C.173 From Husserl's vantage point, this means that an aggregate lacks order. In notes 
from the early 1890s, he defines an ordered collection as  
eine Verkettung, welche die besondere Eigenschaft hat, daß jedes Glied in Bezug auf jedes 
beliebige eine eindeutige Stellung im engeren Sinne des Wortes besitzt, d.h. also durch die 
bloße Form der unmittelbaren oder mittelbaren Verknüpfung mit dem letzteren eindeutig 
charakterisiert werden kann.174  
 
This in turn means that an aggregate in the narrow sense is not yet a 'Mannigfaltigkeit', or 
manifold. Husserl explains that  
                                                
173 Bolzano is more explicit on this point than Husserl. According to Bolzano, the claim 
that the elements of an Inbegriff are linked through the relation 'and' has a perverse 
consequence: it suggests either that every element is linked related only to two adjacent 
elements (e.g. B is related to A and C, because it appears in the sequence 'A and B and 
C…') or that the collection as a whole has a complex nested structure, as in ((((A & B) & 
C) & D)….). Above all, this conflicts with the way in which we encounter an Inbegriff, 
namely, as a kind of pile of ideas. We do encounter Inbegriffe as complex structures of 
elements linked by the 'and' relation (Bernard Bolzano, Gesamtausgabe, Band 11,2: 
Wissenschaftslehre §§ 46-90, p. 199; cf. Peter Simons, "Bolzano on Collections", p. 94). 
174 Husserl, Hua XXI, Studien zur Arithmetik und Geometrie, p. 93.  
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eine Mannigfaltigkeit ein Inbegriff nicht bloß geeinigter, sondern auch irgend geordneter 
Elemente ist und andererseits nicht bloß geeinigter, sondern kontinuierlich 
zusammenhängender Elemente.175 
 
In sum, therefore, a manifold is an aggregate which is such that every element is 
determinately related to every other element, either immediately or mediately. Whereas 
the relation between any two elements of an aggregate is unspecified, the relation 
between any two members of a manifold is determined. How does this relational structure 
come to be established? Above, I said that what relates the members of an aggregate to 
the aggregate itself is an "act of collection". But it is not obvious that any such act could 
succeed in establishing the relational structure that Husserl envisions for the manifold—
at least for collections of more than a few objects. In other words, it is not obvious that 
there is a highly articulated subjective performance from which a manifold would issue 
forth in experience. The solution lies in seeing that a manifold is not the objective 
correlate of an act, but of a theory. The web of relations that are constitutive of the 
manifold are not determined in a single, subjective stroke, but by the axioms and 
propositions that are constitutive of the theory.176 This explains why we can say of any 
two elements of a manifold that they are determinately related. This relation need not be 
determined in the sense of having been consciously thematized. As long as we are in the 
                                                
175 Husserl, XXI, Studien zur Arithmetik und Geometrie, p. 96. The issue is slightly 
ambiguous, in that Husserl seems in other places to distinguish more sharply between 
Inbegriffe and Mannigfaltigkeiten. Thus, in another set of notes from the early 1890s, 
Husserl says that "eine Mannigfaltigkeit ist nicht ein Inbegriff beziehungsloser Elemente. 
Gerade die Beizehungen sind das Wesentliche und Auszeichnende gegenüber einem 
bloßen Inbegriff" (Husserl, Studien zur Arithmetik und Geometrie, p. 410). On balance, 
however, I think that the most textually consistent reading is the one that sees 
Mannigfaltigkeiten as highly articulated Inbegriffe, rather than entirely different kinds of 
objects. This explains, for example, why Husserl remarks in lectures from 1906/7 that a 
Mannigfaltigkeit is "to start with, nothing more than" an Inbegriff (Introduction to Logic 
and Theory of Knowledge, p. 84).  
176 Formal and Transcendental Logic, p. 93; Logical Investigations, Vol. 1, p. 156. 
 207 
terrain of deductive or nomological theory—which is the terrain in which the idea of the 
manifold is developed—then it suffices that the relation be determinable, in the sense that 
it can be deduced "from the "fundamental laws' of the corresponding nomological 
science".177 An example will help to make this notion slightly more tangible. 
  Geometry, according to Husserl, is an essentially deductive science. It does not 
"apprehend in individual intuitions, describe, and classify the lowest eidetic differences". 
Rather, geometry builds axioms on the basis of a "few kinds of fundamental forms" such 
as body, surface, point, and angle,178 and then derives "in purely deductive fashion all 
shapes “existing” in space, i.e., all ideally possible spatial shapes and all the essential 
relations pertaining to them".179 This offers a general sense of the way in which laws 
allow for the determination of relations. By way of a more concrete example, take the 
Euclidean axiom system specifically. The Euclidean axioms allow for the derivation of 
                                                
177 Formal and Transcendental Logic, p. 96.  
178 Husserl presents a more comprehensive account of the constitution of geometric 
theory in notes from the turn of the century: "Der Ursprung der geometrischen 
Vorstellung vom Raume setzt bereits den Ursprung der geometrischen Grundbegriffe 
voraus. Denn erst durch diese Idealisierungen der ursprünglichen Begriffe von Gebilden, 
wie wir sie in der Anschauung finden, sind jene Quasi-Induktionen, die wir auch 
Idealisierungen nennen können, möglich, welche die Axiome schaffen" (Hua XXI, p. 
286). Thus, geometry in the sense of a realized axiomatic theory comes to be on the basis 
of a two-step process of idealization: from intuition to concept, and then from concept to 
axioms (see also: René Jagnow, "Edmund Husserl on the Applicability of Formal 
Geometry", pp. 70-71). 
179 Ideas, p. 130 (my emphasis). According to Husserl, this is equivalent to the claim that 
Euclidean geometry is complete, in David Hilbert's sense. In other words, it amounts to 
the claim that every true proposition of Euclidean geometry can be proven on the basis of 
the axioms of Euclidean geometry (Philosophy of Arithmetic ["On the Transition 
Through the Impossible ("Imaginary") and the Completeness of an Axiom System"], p. 
426). Unfortunately, like Hilbert himself, Husserl is vulnerable on this point to Gödel, 
who establishes that no axiom system can be complete in the stipulated sense (David 
Woodruff Smith, Husserl, p. 121; Suzanne Bachelard, A Study of Husserl's Formal and 
Transcendental Logic, p. 52, cf. Yvon Gauthier, "Husserl and the Theory of Multiplicities 
"Mannigfaltigkeitslehre"", pp. 124-5). 
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the Pythagorean theorem; the Pythagorean theorem, in turn, sets out the essential relation 
that obtains between a certain kind of shape, the triangle, and the internal angles of that 
shape: it says that the internal angles of any triangle whatsoever sum to 180 degrees.  
 If this example allows us to understand in what sense a deductive theory 
determines the relations between the objects belonging to the corresponding manifold, it 
also gives rise to a concern. In short, our example seems to have taken us outside of the 
domain of analytic law. Whereas the idea of the manifold was ostensibly an extension of 
the idea of the aggregate, thus an extension of the idea of a collection that is subject just 
to analytic laws, our manifold seems to be subject to decidedly non-analytic laws. The 
Euclidean axioms refer to specifically spatial entities, like points, lines, and circles. They 
are not "unconditionally universal".180 
 The key to resolving this problem lies in further reflection on what it means for 
Euclidean geometry be an axiomatic science. What it means is not just that Euclidean 
geometry proceeds on the basis of a certain set of axioms; it also means that Euclidean 
geometry is characterized by a general axiom form. Just as any collection of objects 
embodies an abstract categorial form over and above its materially specific elements, any 
set of axioms embodies an abstract axiom form over above its materially specific content. 
 The idea of the axiom form originates with Husserl's colleague David Hilbert. 
What Hilbert proposed, according to René Jagnow, was that we should view geometrical 
axioms not 
in the traditional sense as sentences stating fundamental facts about spatial intuition, but 
rather as logical forms devoid of intuitive content. Accordingly, geometric terms like 
‘point,’ ‘line,’ and ‘plane’ did not refer to intuitable objects, but rather functioned as purely 
syntactic elements whose interrelations were determined by the axioms.181 
                                                
180 Logical Investigations, Vol. 2, p. 20. 
181 René Jagnow, "Edmund Husserl on the Applicability of Formal Geometry", p. 67. 
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This has significant implications for how we should understand geometrical inference. 
Instead of viewing geometrical inference as a process that runs through the particular 
features of space, we should view geometrical inference as a process that proceeds on the 
basis of pure form. In a purely formal axiomatic system, Jerrold Katz explains 
the rules of the system apply to a string of symbols on the basis of the form (or shape) of 
the symbols in the string and their arrangement and the instructions for converting one 
string into another embodied in the rule can be carried out by elementary operations of 
adding, deleting, substituting, and permutating symbols, themselves defined solely in terms 
of the form and arrangement of symbols in strings.182  
 
This means that there is no reason to regard Euclidean geometry as a wholly singular 
theory. Since Euclidean geometry is not defined exclusively by its unique objective 
correlative, but by the purely formal inferential system that it brings to bear on its 
objective correlate, there exists the possibility that other geometrical theories might turn 
out to be formally symmetrical ('equiform') with Euclidean geometry.183 Being perfectly 
formal, the axiom form of Euclidean geometry can be realized by multiple geometrical 
theories.184 
 This allows us to clarify in what sense the manifold in question, Euclidean space, 
is subject to analytic law. It is subject to analytic law not insofar as it is subject to the 
                                                
182 Jerrold Katz, The Philosophy of Language, p. 25.  
183 Philosophy of Arithmetic ("On the Transition Through the Impossible ("Imaginary") 
and the Completeness of an Axiom System"), p. 410; Formal and Transcendental Logic, 
p. 140. 
184 The possibility of formal symmetry between theories naturally extends beyond this 
particular example. For Husserl, formal symmetry is a possibility for "purely deductive", 
or "mathematical" theories in general. He notes that "two mathematical theories 
established in different fields fully agree in form, because both proceed from basic 
principles and basic concepts that of course have a different meaning intensionally, but 
formally have completely the same constitution" (Introduction to Logic and Theory of 
Knowledge, p. 81, 168, cf. Hua XXX, p. 261; Formal and Transcendental Logic, pp. 95, 
99, 141-2; Suzanne Bachelard, A Study of Husserl's Formal and Transcendental Logic, 
pp. 27-8, Claire Ortiz Hill, "Tackling Three of Frege's Problems, Husserl on Sets and 
Manifolds", p. 89, 92). 
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Euclidean axioms per se, or insofar as it subject to the materially specific theorems 
derivable from the Euclidean axioms, but insofar as it is subject to the Euclidean axiom 
form.185 Neither this axiom form nor the laws of inference embodied in it make any 
reference to the specifically spatial features of the Euclidean manifold. They are generic 
laws relating to the generic features of the objects constitutive of that manifold.186 
 Ultimately, then, the situation as regards manifolds is the same as the situation as 
regards aggregates or objects. When anything whatsoever is constituted as an object, it 
comes under laws that apply to it as an object, such as the law which says that an object 
cannot be a substrate for mutually contradictory properties. When anything whatsoever is 
constituted as an aggregate, it comes under laws that bear on it as an aggregate, such as 
the mereological law which dictates that an whole cannot be a member of itself. Finally, 
when something is constituted as a manifold, meaning, as the objective correlate of a 
deductive theory, then it is subject to the axiom form that is constitutive of that theory.  
 Before concluding, it is worth acknowledging that Husserl does sometimes speak 
of manifolds in a looser sense. He acknowledges that manifolds are not necessarily 
                                                
185 Husserl puts this point in more general terms in lectures from the early 1920s: "In der 
Mannigfaltigkeitslehre denken wir Gegenstände, und zwar in allgemeiner Weise als 
bestimmt durch allgemeine Formen von Urteilen, die für sie gelten sollen" (Hua XXXV, 
p. 460, my emphasis). 
186 For Husserl, there is a sense in which a manifold simply is a domain of purely general 
objects subject to purely general deductive laws. Thus, he says that "the object domain" 
of a deductive theory "is delimited as a certain sphere of objects in general…for which 
basic propositions of such and such forms hold true" (Philosophy of Arithmetic, p. 410, 
my emphasis). Elsewhere, he defines a manifold as "an “aggregate” or a “class” of 
objects conceived in complete indeterminacy and universality" that is "exclusively 
defined by the form of [its] theoretical connections" (Introduction to Logic and Theory of 
Knowledge, pp. 84, 107, cf. p. 82). Finally, he remarks that a manifold is a "a field which 
is uniquely and solely determined by falling under a theory of such a form, whose objects 
are such as to permit of certain associations which fall under certain basic laws of this or 
that determinate form" (Logical Investigations, Vol. 1, p. 156, my emphasis).  
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'definite' manifolds, meaning that not all manifolds are exhaustively determined by the 
correlative theory.187 Certain manifolds are 'indefinite', in the sense that the correlative 
theory fails to determine every "configuration" that is possible within the manifold. This 
happens when the correlative theory is non-deductive. Thus, the manifold of pure 
consciousness is an indefinite manifold, because it is correlative to a non-deductive 
theory, namely, phenomenology. Phenomenology can deliver certain a priori truths about 
consciousness; but it cannot simply 'read off' the necessary features of consciousness 
from an initial set of axioms. Phenomenology is a "descriptive doctrine of the essences of 
the transcendentally pure experiences in the phenomenological attitude".188 
 Does this mean that indefinite manifolds are not subject to analytic law? Since 
they are not constituted in terms of a deductive theory, it might look as if there are no 
strictly general laws to which such manifolds are subject. In order to see that this is not 
the case, it suffices to reflect that an indefinite manifold is a whole, in the broadest, 
mereological sense of the term, and so is subject to whatever laws pertain to wholes in 
general. Thus, the elements of an indefinite manifold must be mutually compatible. It 
cannot be the case that mutually contradictory "configurations" are possible at one and 
the same moment. Within the domain of pure consciousness, for example, spatial things 
cannot be both inadequately and adequately given.  
 Expressed at the more intuitive level of theory, this means that theories such as 
phenomenology must be 'analytically non-contradictory' if they are to hang together as 
theories. While phenomenology cannot generate true propositions on the basis of pure 
'analytic consequence', because it cannot get from premises to conclusions on the basis of 
                                                
187 Formal and Transcendental Logic, p. 102. 
188 Ideas, p. 134. 
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deduction alone, which is to say, on the basis of pure form, it is nonetheless obliged to 
respect the negative analytic conditions bearing on theoretical unity. Just as a whole qua 
whole cannot accommodate contradictory parts, a theory qua theory cannot accommodate 
contradictory propositions. We will explore analyticity at the level of theory in more 
detail in the next section.   
 
2. Apophantic Analytic Law 
So far, we have followed two different paths towards analytic law. By rehearsing the 
distinction between non-independent and independent content, we were brought to the 
idea of a law that governs objects independently of the kinds of objects that they are; and 
by rehearsing the distinction between the aggregate and the whole, we were able to refine 
this understanding, and to see analytic law as that sphere of law which governs objects 
just insofar as they have been subjected to categorial formation. With these results in 
hand, it is easy to come to grips with the formal definition of analytic law that Husserl 
offers in Section 12 of the third Logical Investigation, according to which "analytic laws 
are unconditionally universal propositions, which are accordingly free from all explicit or 
implicit assertions of individual existence; they include none but formal concepts, and if 
we go back to such as are primitive, they contain only formal categories".189 Analytic 
laws are universal to the extent that they bear on all objects whatsoever, of whatever 
kind; and they contain only formal concepts and categories because they bear strictly and 
exclusively on the formal features of objects.  
 At this point, departing from the ontological perspective that is adopted in the 
third Logical Investigation, I want to approach analytic law from a rather different 
                                                
189 Logical Investigations, Vol. 2, p. 20. 
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perspective. Following Husserl's lead, I want to approach analytic law from the side of 
judgment rather than the side of objects. Doing so will not bring to light entirely novel 
analytic laws, obeying a different logic than the analytic laws that we have examined thus 
far: in a sense, it will simply deliver to us the same analytic laws that we have already 
encountered. What this change of perspective will do, however, is help us to understand 
what Husserl's investigation of analytic law is intended to accomplish.   
 
Meaning 
As will already be apparent from the various distinctions that we have traced over the 
course of this study, Husserl is not averse to characterizing conscious experience in terms 
of general categories. Far from vainly trying to capture a "flux of unrepeatable and 
incomparable individualities", he wants to circumscribe the essential features of 
conscious experience.190 This approach extends to the study of meaning: instead of trying 
to record the infinitely subtle and infinitely differentiated meanings or acts of meaning to 
which our experience bears witness, Husserl wants to capture general "categories of 
meaning".  
 How should we understand these categories? What kinds of semantic regularities 
do the categories of meaning circumscribe? According to Husserl, the categories of 
meaning do not correspond to particular kinds of objects, like inanimate and animate 
objects. He suggests that the phenomenological analysis of meaning leaves to the side 
"everything which could give semantic forms (types, patterns) a definite relation to 
                                                
190 Edmund Husserl, "Zur Kritik an Theodor Elsenhans und August Messer" in Aufsätze 
und Vorträge, 1911-1921 (Hua XXV), p. 234 (my translation). 
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factual spheres of being".191 Instead, the basic categories of meaning correspond to the 
"fundamental concepts inherent in the essence of the proposition (apophansis)".192 In 
other words, they correspond to the generic, formally specified elements of propositions 
or judgments.193 An illuminating example comes at the outset of the fourth Logical 
Investigation. According to Husserl, the category of 'syncategorematic meaning' 
encompasses all of those propositional elements, like 'and' and 'or', that cannot signify 
independently of the proposition as a whole. It is opposed to 'categorematic meaning', the 
category which encompasses those meanings that can signify independently of an 
encompassing propositional whole.  
 As for what we can actually say about these categories of meaning, the situation is 
not much different than the one that pertains to the categories of conscious experience. 
Just as we can talk about the laws that govern, for example, the experience of spatial 
things, we can analyze the basic categories of meaning with an eye to the "laws of 
meaning" which flow from them.194 Thus, we can talk about the laws which flow from 
syncategorematic meaning, and which make it the case that such meanings require 
supplementation in terms of other, precisely specified forms of meaning. Likewise, we 
can talk about the laws which flow from categorematic meaning, and which make it the 
case that categorematic meanings can be varied arbitrarily without compromising the 
unity of the proposition in which they are encountered.195 What I want to do now is to 
                                                
191 Logical Investigations, Vol. 2, p. 69. 
192 Ideas, p. 23.  
193 In what follows, I will use 'proposition' synonymously with 'judgment'. Accordingly, 
'judgment' will not be used in the sense of the act of judgment; I will use it just in the 
sense of the abstract object that is realized in the act of judgment.   
194 Logical Investigations, Vol. 2, p. 49. 
195 Logical Investigations, Vol. 2, p. 63. 
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rehearse the three different strata at which the laws of meaning are articulated. This will 
mean working through Husserl's theory of pure grammar, his understanding of logic, and 
his theory of the possible forms of theories.   
 
First Level: Pure Grammar 
According to Husserl, the logically primary task that arises for 'formal apophantics' is that 
of articulating the laws that bear on complex meaning. We are to identify those possible 
combinations of meaning that conspire to form a unified meaning, and to distinguish 
them from those possible combinations of meaning that are "excluded by laws, and yield 
only a heap of meanings, never a single meaning".196 Husserl is clear as regards the kinds 
of insight that this inquiry can deliver. Just by investigating the possible combinations of 
meaning, we will not derive any insight into the circumstances under which propositions 
are true or false, or the circumstances under which propositions are possibly true or false. 
According to Husserl, this investigation is revealing just as regards the requirements of 
"significant unity" or "purely grammatical sense".197  
 How can we distinguish between legitimate and illegitimate complex meanings? 
According to Husserl, this is not a matter of sorting actually given judgments into two 
piles. Rather, it is a matter of exhibiting the primitive forms of judgment, along with the 
operations that allow for the production of more complex forms of judgment on the basis 
of those primitive forms. Thus, it is not a matter of simply noting that judgments of the 
form 'Sq is p' satisfy our native sense of grammaticality; it is matter of showing that this 
judgment form represents a reiterative transformation of the simple predicative judgment, 
                                                
196 Logical Investigations, Vol. 2, p. 62, 49. 
197 Logical Investigations, Vol. 2, p. 49; Formal and Transcendental Logic, p. 220. 
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'S is p', and that the judgment form 'S is p' arises in turn from still more basic "operation 
of determining a determinable substrate, S".198 Showing that a judgment of the form 'S or 
and p' is not a legitimate judgment, conversely, is a matter of showing that this judgment 
form cannot be derived from more primitive forms on the basis of any "fundamental 
operations" whatsoever.  
 By way of an illuminating aside, it is worth mentioning Yehoshua Bar-Hillel's 
remarks on this ambitious project. According to Bar-Hillel, Husserl's "purely logical 
grammar" remains tethered to 19th century grammatical categories, and so fails to deliver 
adequately general insights regarding meaning.199 Instead of describing the underlying 
semantic ingredients of all languages whatsoever, Husserl merely describes the 
grammatical constituents of Indo-European languages. Even in light what we have seen 
so far, it is clear that this objection is misplaced. When Husserl invokes the 'predicate' of 
a judgment, he does not have in mind an adjective, meaning an element of verbal 
expression;200 he has in mind the meaning that arises from the operation of "determining 
a determinable substrate."201 Similarly, when Husserl invokes the 'subject' of a judgment, 
                                                
198 Formal and Transcendental Logic, pp. 63, 52. 
199 Yehoshua Bar-Hillel. "Husserl's Conception of a Purely Logical Grammar", p. 365. 
200 James Edie, "Husserl's Conception of 'The Grammatical' and Contemporary 
Linguistics", p. 138.  
201 Bar-Hillel's confusion on this point is responsible for a conspicuous misreading of the 
following passage from the fourth Logical Investigation: "Where nominal material 
stands, any nominal material can stand, but not adjectival, nor relational, nor completed 
propositional material" (Logical Investigations, Vol. 2, p. 63). According to Bar-Hillel, 
this prohibition is falsified by the possibility of proposition-pairs such as 'this tree is 
green' and 'this tree is a plant', which demonstrate that nominal matter and adjectival 
matter can indeed 'stand' in the same place ("Husserl's Conception of a Purely Logical 
Grammar", p. 365). From Husserl's perspective, however, these propositions do not 
represent a genuine counter-example. While we can point to a grammatical distinction 
between 'is green' and 'is a plant', there is no essential semantic distinction between them.  
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he does not have in mind a noun-phrase; he has in mind the semantic correlate of an 
objective substrate. Since any language will presumably have some way of talking about 
objective substrates, and some way of expressing the fact that a given substrate is 
determined in a certain way, we may assume that these categories are meaning are 
universally present in all languages.202 The point is just they are not reducible to 
language. They arise from what is, in effect, a pre-linguistic encounter with objects.  
 This is instructive as to how we should think about the laws that are in question 
here. Since these laws are not laws of grammatically defined objects, like subjects and 
predicates, it follows that they are not identifiable with the laws that govern the use of 
this or that particular language. They reflect the combinatory and transformational 
possibilities that belong to the meaning categories themselves, as a matter of pure 
essence.203 These possibilities can be inspected at the level of language: we can glimpse 
the semantic possibility of transforming a predicative judgment into the antecedent of a 
hypothetical judgment in the English-language operation that places the word 'if' before a 
subject-predicate expression; and we can glimpse the impossibility of simply stacking 
dependent meanings together arbitrarily in the 'nonsensical' (unsinnig) quality of the 
                                                                                                                                            
Adjectival and substantial predicates both functional semantically as predicates 
(Experience and Judgment, p. 221).  
202 Husserl acknowledges that a given language might lack a grammatical formula for 
expressing hypothetical judgment, plural judgment, etc. But since these judgment forms 
are not artifacts of particular, historically contingent languages, but expressions of the 
"thought forms belonging to the essence of the proposition", it follows that they "must 
somehow take effect in each language" (Introduction to Logic and Theory of Knowledge, 
p. 69, my emphasis; cf. Logical Investigations, Vol. 2, p. 74). Unless we are prepared to 
suppose that the speakers of certain language simply cannot think in hypothetical terms, 
in other words, then we must assume that they have some means of conveying this 
meaning category in speech. 
203 Logical Investigations, Vol. 2, p. 62. 
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English sentence 'King but like or and'.204 Husserl's point is just that the boundaries of 
grammatical correctness are not drawn at the level of particular languages; they are 
drawn at the logically prior level of meaning. 
 In summary, therefore, we should see this first tier of semantic analysis as a 
matter of articulating the formal or purely grammatical conditions for significant unity. 
This analysis is based in a systematic, eidetic examination of the basic forms of meanings 
and of the recursive operations to which those basic forms of meanings are subject.  
 
Second Level: Logic 
One way to understand the next level of formal apophantics is to consider a judgment 
form such as 'Sp is not p'. From the standpoint of pure grammar, this judgment-form is 
perfectly acceptable, being a legitimate, reiterative transformation of the judgment form, 
'S is p'. Obviously, though, there is something problematic here. Judgments like 'the bear 
which is red is not red' strike us as dysfunctional in a deep sense. What is needed, it 
seems, is a language that will help to us express the nature of this particular dysfunction. 
 According to Husserl, this language lies ready to hand. He thinks that traditional 
logic enables to avoid those judgments that are not the "possible forms of true 
judgments", despite being syntactically well-formed.205 Thus, logic enables us to 
recognize that 'Sp is not p' cannot for the basis of a true (or indeed a false) judgment, 
even though it can always form the basis of a coherent judgment. The key concept in this 
regard is that of contradiction. Logic legislates against judgment forms like 'Sp is not p' 
                                                
204 This can of course be seen equally clearly in the German-language original of 
Husserl's example: 'König aber oder ähnlich und'. 
205 Formal and Transcendental Logic, p. 53. 
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by showing that they give rise to contradiction no matter how they are filled in 
materially.206  
 But logic also has a positive employment. Not only does it help us to avoid those 
judgment forms that preclude truth, it also allows us to identify those judgment forms that 
preserve truth. It examines the relations of purely formal consequence that exist between 
judgments by virtue of syntactical structure alone, thus, the relation of consequence 
which allows us to derive 'A is C' from the judgments 'A is B' and 'B is C', and which 
makes it the case that 'A is C' is necessarily true if both 'A is B' and 'B is C' are true.207 
 Importantly, logic in the traditional sense cannot tell us that any judgment 
actually is true. Especially in his later writings, Husserl is insistent that the question of 
truth draws in "supplementary conditions" having nothing do with formal, syntactical 
structure. These supplementary conditions "lie on the subjective side and concern the 
subjective characteristics of intuitability, of self evidence and the subjective conditions of 
its attainment".208 What logic provides are the "negative conditions of the possibility of 
truth", along with the deductive tools necessary in order to explore and extend the truth-
preserving relations of consequence that exist between different judgments.  
 
Third Level: The Theory of Theories 
The move from logic to the next and final level of formal apophantics does not reflect a 
limit on the extent of possible logical insight so much as a broadening of thematic 
                                                
206 What traditional logic cannot legislate against is "material countersense", meaning an 
incompatibility at the level of specific propositional content (Formal and Transcendental 
Logic, pp. 327, 65). Noam Chomsky's famous example 'colorless green ideas sleep 
furiously' serves as a fitting example of what Husserl has in mind here.  
207 Formal and Transcendental Logic, pp. 332, 53. 
208 Experience and Judgment, pp. 17, 21.  
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interest. Whereas logic in the narrow sense examines particular judgment-forms, the third 
level of formal apophantics examines "judgment-systems in their entirety". Whereas 
logic sets bounds on the on the kinds of judgment-forms that occur within a theory, the 
pure theory of theories sets bounds on possible forms of deductive theories. This 
examination of the a priori constraints on possible deductive theory-form does not 
proceed in piecemeal fashion. Husserl is not proposing to work through a series of theory 
forms and to determine individually whether they are possible or impossible. Rather, 
Husserl approaches this task in the same way that he approaches the theory of pure 
grammar: he proposes to develop a systematic representation of the universe of deductive 
theory forms. Supposing that a given theory form can be shown to belong within this 
universe of theory forms, it follows that it is possible.  
 According to Husserl, this ambitious project is already in some sense underway: 
mathematics already seeks to grasp mathematical theories at the level of pure form and to 
understand the relations between formally defined theories. Thus, Riemannian geometry 
examines the relations between different geometrical theories (or geometrical theory 
forms) relating to manifolds of different degrees of curvature.209 Likewise, pure 
mathematics examines the relation between the different 'arithmetics' (or arithmetical 
theory forms) relating to different kinds of number, for example, between the arithmetic 
of cardinal numbers and the arithmetic of rational numbers. What do these investigations 
reveal? In the first case, we discover a "systematic interconnection" between geometric 
                                                
209 Logical Investigations, Vol. 1, p. 157; Philosophy of Arithmetic ["On the Transition 
Through the Impossible ("Imaginary") and the Completeness of an Axiom System"],  
p. 410. 
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theory forms.210 We find that the form of a geometric theory evolves in a certain uniform 
fashion as the curvature of the corresponding manifold is varied. In the second case, we 
discover that the theory form of cardinal arithmetic in 'contained' in the theory form of 
rational numbers. The latter includes the former as a special case.211  
 These two cases illustrate the approach that will characterize the pure theory of 
deductive theories once that theory is taken up self-consciously in the context of 
philosophy. On the one hand, Husserl envisages the construction of a "definite, ordered 
procedure" that will enable us to pass from one possible theory form to another by 
"varying their basic determining factors".212 On the other hand, he speaks of "ranging" 
each formalized deductive theory "in more comprehensive forms or classes of forms".213 
Since deductive theories are axiomatic theories, for Husserl, this means exhibiting the 
relations of inclusion that that exist between axiomatic theory forms, and bringing to light 
general types of axiomatic theory forms.  
 As for whether we can get beyond particular types of deductive theory, Husserl 
speaks about a "highest theory, which would comprise all possible forms of theories as 
mathematical particularizations — accordingly, as deducible".214 Thus, he thinks that it 
possible to isolate a maximally generally deductive theory form, and to identify a series 
of operations that will allow us to deduce every other possible theory form on its basis. 
This highest theory form would embody the most general a priori constraints on the range 
                                                
210 Husserl elsewhere speaks of the "lawlike order of the forms of theories" (Philosophy 
of Arithmetic ["On the Transition Through the Impossible ("Imaginary") and the 
Completeness of an Axiom System"], p. 411). 
211 Claire Ortiz Hill, "Tackling Three of Frege's Problems, Husserl on Sets and 
Manifolds", p. 3 
212 Logical Investigations, Vol. 1, p. 155. 
213 Logical Investigations, Vol. 1, p. 157. 
214 Formal and Transcendental Logic, p. 98. 
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of possible deductive theory-forms. It would spell out in the most general terms the ways 
in which propositions can and cannot come together to form deductive theories. 
Supposing we can show that any apophantic law whatsoever can be considered analytic, 
then it is easy to see why the laws flowing from this maximally general theory would 
warrant that designation.  
 
Judgment and Analyticity 
By way of getting clearer on the relationship between formal apophantics and analyticity, 
let's summarize what we have seen in this section. What we have seen is a three-fold 
distinction between the different kinds of laws that bear on judgments. The first set of 
laws prescribes the formal features that any judgment must have in order to be a 
proposition. These laws are articulated in terms of familiar grammatical categories, but 
rest on pre-grammatical categories of meaning. The second set of laws determines the 
ways in which judgments must be structured in order to be susceptible of truth and 
falsity. These laws allow us to distinguish those propositional- and argument-forms that 
generate contradiction and those forms that preserve truth. The third set of laws 
determines the ways that judgments can come together form deductive theories. Insofar 
as these laws allow us to grasp deductive theory at the level of pure form, they allow us 
to understand the ways in which different deductive theories, relating to different object-
domains, are related to one another.  
 What we want to know now is why any domain of apophantic law should qualify 
as analytic. One possible answer might be to say that the laws in question bear on all 
judgments whatsoever, and so are analogous to the 'ontological' analytic laws that we 
have already examined. The ontological analytic laws would apply to all objects just 
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insofar as they are objects; the apophantic analytic laws would apply to all judgments just 
insofar as they are judgments. Unfortunately, this cannot be the story of why Husserl's 
apophantic laws are analytic. The reason is that it opens the door to indefinitely many 
categories of analytic law. It suggests that for every kind of thing, there is a distinct set of 
analytic laws, thus, that there is a set of analytic laws that govern mammals just insofar as 
they are mammals, a set of analytic laws that govern basketball players just insofar as 
they are basketball players, a set of analytic laws that govern inhabitants of Cleveland 
just insofar as they are inhabitants of Cleveland, etc.   
 The solution to this problem depends on seeing apophantic analytic law as more 
than merely analogous to ontological analytic law. It depends on seeing these forms of 
analytic law as two different expressions of what is essentially one sphere of law. This in 
turn is a matter of seeing judgment and object as correlative notions.  
 We have already seen a glimpse of this correlativity in the discussion of content 
above. There, we learned that talk of content is ultimately equivalent to talk of objects; 
what the shift in registers accomplishes is simply a shift in perspective, from objects 
themselves to the subjective medium in which they are given. Here, much the same thing 
applies: to talk in terms of judgments is not to abandon objects; it is to thematize the 
"semantic medium" in which objects are given.215 To talk directly about objects, 
conversely, is not place oneself outside of the domain of judgment; it is just to decline to 
thematize the arena in which objects alone "make their appearance", in which they alone 
"have being for us".216 Of course, the correlation between judgment and object might still 
                                                
215 Bernet et. al, Introduction to Husserlian Phenomenology, p. 50; cf. Introduction to 
Logic and Theory of Knowledge, p. 72. 
216 Formal and Transcendental Logic, pp. 78-9, 120; Husserliana XXXV, pp. 449-50. 
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be imperfect if there could be judgments having nothing whatsoever to do with objects. 
According to Husserl, though, it is in the nature of judgments to be about objects. He 
explains that "wherever an activity of judgment, an activity of thought of any kind, 
explicit or not, comes into play, objects must already be present in mind, either in an 
empty way or as intuitively self-given; every activity of thought presupposes pregiven 
objects".217  
 What we want to know now is whether this relation is merely external in nature. 
Granted that a judgment necessarily targets an object, and that an object is necessarily 
given in judgment, it might still be the case that judgment and object are essentially 
distinct. According to Husserl, this is not the case: he maintains that we can draw 
significant structural parallels between judgment and object. The most obvious parallel is 
the one that runs between the grammatical subject and the object: just as the subject is a 
pole around which predication can accrue, the object is a pole around which properties 
can accrue.218 Further parallels can be brought out through 'nominalization', that is, by 
means of that operation whereby a proposition or a "partial form distinguishable in the 
proposition" is converted into nominal form. Take for example 'S is p'. Nominalized, this 
proposition has the form 'that S is p'. The idea that some S is p, in turn, yields the 
ontological category state of affairs. By way of another example, take the element 'is p' 
from the same proposition. In nominal form, according to Husserl, this propositional 
element has the form 'being p'. The idea of something's being p, in turn, gives us the 
ontological category property. Finally, take the plural judgment 'S and R'. In nominal 
                                                
217 Experience and Judgment, p. 19; see also: pp. 14, 78. 
218 He notes that "all logic would come to an end if the concept "object" would not be 
conceived in as broad a sense as this equivalence demands" (Introduction to the Logical 
Investigations, p. 26). 
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form, this comes out as 'that S and R'; and this in turn represents a thematization of 
plurality. It gives us the ontological category of multiplicity, or that of the set. 219 
 In short, therefore, what nominalization shows us is that judgment and object are 
intertwined at the level of essence. Far from standing in a merely external relation, 
judgment and object are symmetrical at the level of their internal, constitutive 
determinations. This in turn has important implications for the formal inquiry that is 
targeted at the judgment and the object, respectively. What it means is that formal 
apophantics and formal ontology "must be held to be a single science".220 The categories 
that emerge from the formal study of the judgment are ultimately identical with the 
categories that emerge from the formal study of the object. If we distinguish between 
formal apophantics and formal ontology at all, according to Husserl, we do so merely to 
distinguish the different "point[s] of view" that can be taken with respect to one and the 
same domain.221  
 The identity of formal apophantics and formal ontology can be brought out quite 
forcefully with reference to the threefold distinction that Husserl draws within formal 
apophantics. As several authors have noted, this distinction corresponds to a symmetrical 
distinction within formal ontology. Thus, Husserl's pure grammar corresponds to a 
"morphology of the formal objective categories", such as object, state of affairs, unity, 
                                                
219 Ideas, p. 238. In a recent monograph, Burt Hopkins suggests that Husserl is less than 
clear on the mechanics of nominalization. Husserl does not explain, for example, how 
"the plurality as a singular logical object" comes to be constituted on the basis of "plural 
consciousness" (Burt Hopkins, The Origin of the Logic of Symbolic Mathematics: 
Edmund Husserl and Jacob Klein, p. 445). 
220 Formal and Transcendental Logic, p. 111. 
221 Experience and Judgment, p. 12.  
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multiplicity, number, relation, etc.222 Whereas pure grammar tells us what formal features 
a judgment must have in order to be a judgment, ontological morphology tells us what 
formal features an object must have in order to be an object, what formal features a state 
of affairs must have in order to be a state of affairs, etc. At the next level up, Husserl's 
notion of logic corresponds to the formal-ontological investigation of the being and non-
being of objects and states of affairs in general. Whereas logic tells us what formal 
features a judgment must have in order to be susceptible of truth and falsity, formal 
ontology tells us what formal features an object or state of affairs needs to have in order 
to be an object. Finally, Husserl's theory of deductive theories corresponds to the formal-
ontological investigation of the manifold. Whereas the apophantic theory of deductive 
theories discovers systematic connections between different kinds of deductive theory, 
the ontological theory of manifolds discovers systematic connections between different 
kinds of manifold. It finds, for instance, that a "variation of curvature makes the various 
sorts of space-like manifolds pass into one another".223 
 Finally, therefore, we are in a position to answer the question we flagged above: 
the question of why any domain of apophantic law whatsoever should qualify as analytic. 
The answer is not that apophantic law applies to all judgments whatsoever. As we 
learned, this particular kind of universality does not get us as far as analyticity. Rather, 
the answer is that apophantic analytic law is effectively equivalent to ontological analytic 
law: the laws that govern judgments are symmetrical to the laws that govern objects. 
These laws are framed differently, in terms of different kinds of concepts: apophantic 
                                                
222 Bernet et. al, Introduction to Husserlian Phenomenology, p. 48; cf. Stefania Centrone, 
Logic and Philosophy of Mathematics in the Early Husserl, pp. 111-2. 
223 Logical Investigations, Vol. 1, p. 157. 
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analytic laws are framed in terms of judgments, and ontological apophantic laws are 
framed in terms of formal-ontological categories.224 As with formal apophantics and 
formal ontology more generally, however, this is a difference of point of view rather than 
a difference of domain. Apophantic analytic laws deliver universal truths about objects 
from the perspective of judgment. They articulate the formal features that belong to all 
objects whatsoever insofar as those formal features are reflected in the judgments that we 
bring to bear on objects.  
 To conclude, it is worth making note of two qualifications that Husserl appends to 
his discussion of apophantic analytic law in the third Logical Investigation. First, while 
stressing the organic link between apophantic analytic law and ontological analytic law, 
he notes that the former is "narrower" than the latter. Second, and perhaps in reference to 
the first qualification, he tells us that apophantic analytic law is only partially equivalent 
to ontological analytic law. What should we make of these qualifications? At the risk of 
glossing over a nuance in Husserl's theory, I think that it is best to simply dismiss them. 
The reason for this comes from Husserl's later work, Formal and Transcendental Logic. 
There, after noting that the relationship between formal apophantics and formal ontology 
is not actually taken up in the Logical Investigations, Husserl says that there is a "perfect 
correlation" between these two modes of inquiry.225 Since this implies that there are no 
ontological laws that lack apophantic counterparts, I conclude that what we have, 
ultimately, is a single set of analytic laws.  
 
 
                                                
224 Logical Investigations, Vol. 2, p. 72. 
225 Formal and Transcendental Logic, pp. 86, 111. 
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3. Analytically Necessary Propositions 
Having explored analyticity in the context of formal ontology and formal apophantics, I 
want to shift the discussion at this point to a less austere plane. With reference to 
Husserl's account of 'analytically necessary propositions', I want to see what Husserl has 
to say concerning the possibility of analytic judgments that depend in some sense on their 
determinate, material content. In effect, I want to see whether Husserl can explain why 
judgments like 'bachelors are unmarried men' should qualify as analytic, in spite of the 
widespread consensus that no such explanation can be given.  
 Husserl tells us what he means by an 'analytically necessary proposition' in 
Section 12 of the third Logical Investigation. According to Husserl:  
We may define analytically necessary propositions as propositions whose truth is 
completely independent of the peculiar content of their objects (whether thought of with 
definite or indefinite universality) and of any possible existential assertions. They are 
propositions which permit of a complete 'formalization' and can be regarded as special 
cases or empirical applications of the formal, analytic laws whose validity appears in such 
formalization.226 
 
In other words, an analytically necessary proposition (ANP) is a proposition that contains 
non-formal concepts but which is nevertheless reducible to a strictly formal, analytic law 
(AL). It is a necessary truth that has material and possibly existential content, but which 
depends for its truth just on the formal content "in virtue of which it empirically 
specifies" some analytic law.227 The test for such propositions is formalization, which, in 
this context, means the substitution of "indefinite expressions" like A, B, and C, for terms 
like 'dog', 'cat', and 'car'. Supposing that the truth of a given judgment survives this 
process of formalization (supposing, in other words, that it is formalizable salva veritate) 
then we can conclude that it owes its truth to its formal structure alone.  
                                                
226 Logical Investigations, Vol. 2, p. 21.  
227 Logical Investigations, Vol. 2, p. 21 
 229 
 Husserl offers two examples of such propositions, alongside the purely formal 
laws that they are said to instantiate:    
 
ANP: the existence of this house includes that of its roof, its walls and its other parts 
AL: the existence of a whole W (A, B, C...) generally includes that of its parts A, B, C... 
 
ANP: There cannot be a king (master, father) without subjects (servants, children) etc. 
AL: If a certain A stands in a certain relation to a certain B, this same B stands in a 
certain corresponding (converse) relation to that A. 
 
Though the first of these two examples is more transparent than the second, the logic of 
both seems relatively clear. Since the meaning of 'house' already includes a reference to a 
roof, walls, and other parts, the proposition as a whole has the structure of the 
tautological, purely formal law with which it is paired. Likewise, since the meaning of 
'king' already includes the idea of a relation to subjects, and since the meaning of 
'subjects' already includes the idea of a relation to a king, this second proposition has the 
structure of the pure relational law with which it is paired. Both propositions are true 
"independently of the peculiar content of their objects" in the sense that they are true just 
on the basis of their underlying formal structure. Any other proposition having the same 
formal structure as either would also come out as true.  
 Note, however, that I have yet to discharge a crucial assumption. I have suggested 
that the house-proposition is formalizable salva veritate because the term 'house' contains 
a reference to a particular set of parts; and I have suggested that the king-proposition is 
formalizable salva veritate because the term 'king' contains a reference to 'subjects' and 
vice versa; but I have not shown that these terms actually do contain the references in 
question. Certainly, as a matter of everyday linguistic practice, we would be inclined to 
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affirm these relations of containment. If we were told of a house without a roof or walls, 
we would probably deny that a house was actually at issue; and if we were told of a king 
whose rule did not extend over any subjects, then we would perhaps deny that a king was 
at issue. As we learned in the third chapter, however, such linguistic intuitions are not 
sufficient for analyticity. In the wake of Quine, the proponent of analytic judgment needs 
be able to claim a priori insight into the meaning of her terms. Thus, we need to be able 
to say a priori that 'house' means a thing with a roof, walls, and other parts; and we need 
to be able to say a priori that 'king' means a thing that entails the existence of a subject. 
Otherwise, we are not entitled to the truth-preserving formalization that Husserl proposes. 
We cannot replace the term 'house' with the complex variable 'W (A, B, C...)' because we 
do not know that the term has any content whatsoever, let alone precisely the content that 
appears on the right side of the proposition; and we cannot replace the term 'king' with an 
indefinite 'A' that is internally related to an indefinite 'B', because we do not know that 
the term 'king' embodies any relation whatsoever, let alone a relation to the object on the 
right side of the proposition.  
  This suggests two possible courses of action. On the one hand, we can seek out 
examples of analytically necessary propositions that do not depend on our undischarged 
assumption; on the other hand, we can attempt to discharge this assumption ourselves: we 
can try to explain on Husserlian grounds why the meanings of certain materially 
determinate terms should be accessible a priori. The first route is the one taken by 
Stefania Centrone. In her discussion of analytically necessary propositions (which she 
calls 'impure analytic truths') she leaves Husserl's examples to the side, and offers the 
 231 
judgment 'if Socrates has both courage and wisdom then he has courage' in its place.228 
Since the truth of this proposition is preserved even when we replace its constituent terms 
with simple variables ('if S has C and W, then S has W') it follows that it is not vulnerable 
to Quinean objections. We do not need to know anything whatsoever about the meaning 
of 'Socrates' in order to see that the proposition has the structure of an analytic law.229 In 
order to see whether we should follow Centrone in this regard, and thus rule out of 
consideration a potentially large class of analytic judgments—namely, analytic judgments 
that depend for their analyticity on the non-articulated content of their constituent 
terms—it is worth trying to see if the second route can be made viable. In other words, it 
is worth trying to see if Husserl can defend the possibility of a priori access to materially 
determinate terms like 'house' and 'king'.230 The best place to start, perhaps, is with the 
same clarificatory process that allowed us to resolve the status of Husserl's synthetic a 
priori judgments. 
 
                                                
228 Stefania Centrone, Logic and Philosophy of Mathematics in the Early Husserl, p. 117. 
This is consistent with the view that Husserl's examples in the Logical Investigations are 
designed for ease of comprehension, not to withstand serious scrutiny (Suzanne 
Bachelard, Husserl's Formal and Transcendental Logic, p. 7; James Edie, "Husserl's 
Conception of 'The Grammatical' and Contemporary Linguistics", p. 138) 
229 Guillermo Rosado Haddock makes a similar move at this juncture. He claims that for 
Husserl, judgments like 'all bachelors are unmarried men'—meaning judgments that 
depend for their analyticity on the underlying semantic structure of their constitutive 
terms—are not actually candidates for analyticity, and that Husserl is therefore out of the 
range of Quine's critique ("Husserl on Analyticity and Beyond", p. 134). 
230 Precisely this kind of examination is lacking in Tommaso Piazza's analysis of the 
house-proposition. Piazza simply assumes without further ado that the house-proposition 
is reducible to the formal statement: 'The existence of G (a, b, c, d) implies the existence 
of a, b, c, d' (A Priori Knowledge: Toward a Phenomenological Explanation, p. 159). To 
my mind, however, this is to leave dangling the crucial question of how we can know a 
priori that the term 'house' contains any constituents whatsoever, let alone precisely the 
constituents that Husserl attributes to it.   
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Meaning 
Above, I noted that for Schlick, Husserl's putatively synthetic a priori propositions are 
better regarded as simple tautologies. 'Color cannot exist without something colored' does 
not posit a necessary relation between two essentially disjoined phenomena; it spells out 
the "rules which hold for [the] use" of the term 'color'. By way of a response to Schlick, I 
noted that the appeal to language use does not settle the question of meaning from 
Husserl's perspective. What settles the question of meaning, rather, is intuition. Only 
insofar as we consult the "directly intuitive presentations" that correspond to the term 
'color' are we in a position to clarify the meaning of that term.  
 In the present case, unfortunately, it is not clear that this strategy can work. 
Whereas it is arguably possible to show by these means that 'color' does not entail 
reference to 'something colored', it is impossible to show by the same means that 'house' 
entails reference to 'roof', 'walls', and 'other parts', or that 'king' entails reference to 
'subjects'. The reason for this becomes clear when we attempt to carry out the proposed 
demonstration.   
 Simplifying Husserl's example somewhat, suppose that I want to justify the 
analytic status of the judgment 'the existence of this house includes the existence of a 
roof'. Proceeding as I did above, I begin by holding the term 'house' up to the light of 
intuition. I secure a presentation of a house, and I try to show by means of imaginative 
variation that this presentation necessarily includes a roof. This means imaginatively 
removing the roof from the overall presentation of the house, and asking whether the 
object that remains is a house. If the object that remains is a house, then we can conclude 
that the meaning of 'house' does not include the idea of a roof, and that the judgment in 
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question is a synthetic judgment concerning a particular house. If the object that remains 
is not a house, on the other hand, then we can conclude that the meaning of 'house' does 
include the idea of a roof, and that the judgment in question is analytic.  
 The problem is that the demonstration just rehearsed does not actually allow me 
to decide whether a house without a roof remains a house. Intuition can tell me that color 
requires extension, because it bears witness to the fact that color simply disappears when 
extension is reduced to zero; but intuition cannot tell me a house requires a roof, because 
it discovers no phenomenologically meaningful distinction between a house with a roof 
and a house without a roof. On both sides, we are given a perfectly coherent presentation 
of an object.231 
 The prospects for the proposed method of meaning clarification grow even more 
faint in the case of Husserl's other examples. In short, it is simply impossible to see how 
an appeal to intuition could vindicate the claim that a king is necessarily related to 
subject, or that a father is necessarily related to a child. These relations simply do not 
show up at the level of intuition; they are essentially social relations that are invisible to 
anyone who does not participate in the social and linguistic context wherein they have 
reality.  
                                                
231 Robert Sokolowski spells out the general mereological principle underlying this point. 
He notes that one simply does not meet with a priori relations once one leaves "the 
necessary logic of moments and wholes and enters the factual, contingent structure of 
pieces and wholes" ("The Logic of Parts and Wholes in Husserl's Logical Investigations", 
p. 546). What I want to stress is the way that these mereological principles bear on the 
question of meaning: whereas it is possible to sharply delineate the meaning of 'color' in 
terms of intuition, because this term corresponds to a moment, and is thus related in 
lawlike fashion with a corresponding whole (Ganz), it is not possible to sharply delineate 
the meaning of 'house' in terms of intuition, because this term corresponds to a particular 
aggregative whole (Inbegriff), which, as such, bears only contingent relations to its 
constitutive pieces.    
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Language 
How can we show, therefore, that the meaning of 'house' entails the idea of a roof, walls, 
and other parts, and that the meaning of 'king' entails the idea of a relation to subjects? 
Surprisingly, given the response to Schlick that we have constructed on Husserl's behalf, 
Husserl seems to be inclined to refer this question to language. He thinks that the 
relations in question are a matter of specifically linguistic entailment. This is suggested 
by a passing remark from the fifth Logical Investigation, in which Husserl evokes one of 
his earlier examples of analytically necessary propositions. According to Husserl: 
pleasure without anything pleasant is unthinkable. And it is unthinkable, not because we 
are here dealing with correlative expressions, as when we say, e.g., that a cause without an 
effect, or a father without a child, is unthinkable, but because the specific essence of 
pleasure demands a relation to something pleasing.232 
 
Thus, whereas the necessary relation between 'pleasure' and 'something pleasing' is a 
function of the essences to which those terms correspond, the necessary relation between 
'father' and 'child' is a function of the terms themselves. There exists a relation of mutual 
entailment between these terms.  
 Evidently it is this relation of mutual entailment that explains the analyticity of 
'there cannot be a father without a child' from Husserl's perspective.233 Rather than a 
relation between the essence of fatherhood and the essence of childhood, what gives this 
proposition the structure of an analytic law is a relation of mutual entailment between the 
terms 'father' and 'child': the term 'father' is subject to a rule such that we cannot predicate 
                                                
232 Logical Investigations, Vol. 2, p. 108 (my emphasis). 
233 Indirect support from this interpretation comes from Husserl's account of why the 
judgment 'color cannot exist without something colored' is not analytic. According to 
Husserl, "'color' is not a relative expression, whose meaning includes the idea of a 
relation to something else". Supposing it were an analytic proposition, in other words, 
then the relation between 'color' and 'something colored' would be built into the terms 
themselves. It would not be necessary to refer those terms to their intuitive correlates.  
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'being without a child' of that term, and the term 'child' is subject to a rule such that we 
cannot predicate 'being without a father' of that term. When we say that 'there cannot 
exist a father without a child', we are simply articulating these restrictions on possible 
predication.  
 By making room for one-way relations of linguistic entailment, it now becomes 
possible to account for Husserl's other example of analytically necessary truth. Thus, if 
we suppose that the term 'house' is subject to a law such that we cannot predicate 'being 
without a roof' of it, then we can explain why 'there cannot exist a house without a roof' 
comes out as analytic, according to Husserl. Instead of trying to show that this is a 
function of the necessary features of actual, intuitively given houses, we can refer this 
fact to the constitutive, inter-linguistic relations in which the word 'house' is involved. 
 The overriding question is whether this appeal to linguistic relations is legitimate. 
Granted that the existence of a necessary constitutive relation between the words 'house' 
and 'roof' would allow us to account for the analyticity of the corresponding proposition, 
what we want to know is whether the possibility of any such constitutive relations can be 
coherently entertained. 
 The first problem that arises in this regard is one of internal consistency: whereas 
the category of synthetic a priori judgment depends on the claim that word-meanings are 
determined strictly by their objective correlates, we are now asked to entertain the notion 
that word-meanings are determined by their relations with other words. Fortunately for 
Husserl, this inconsistency is defensible. What it amounts to is a principled and quite 
routine distinction between theoretical and non-theoretical terms. Terms like 'color', 
'spatial thing', and 'pleasure' are theoretical terms referring to phenomenologically basic 
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elements of experience; like the theoretical terms operative in any area of science 
whatsoever, they demand to be determined precisely and exclusively on the basis of their 
respective correlates. Terms like 'house', 'king', and 'father', on the other hand, are non-
theoretical terms referring to contingent, socially constituted elements of experience; as 
such, they actually cannot be determined just on the basis of their respective correlates.  
Rather, as intuition suggests, and as Husserl's talk of relative and correlative expressions 
confirms, these terms are to be determined on the basis of their relations to other terms.  
 What we want to know at this point is whether any such relation holds with 
necessity. Can we say categorically that 'house' means a thing that has a roof, or that 
'king' means a thing that is related to subjects? The most obvious way to show this would 
be to show that these terms get their meanings from explicit definition. Unfortunately, 
except for the fact that the terms 'house' and 'king' are "logically composite", and so meet 
the most basic condition that Husserl associates with definability,234 there is no real 
reason to think that such terms get their meanings from explicit definition. From 
Husserl's perspective, definition is not a precondition for the kind of non-systematic, non-
theoretical discourse that would include terms like 'house' and 'king'; definition is a 
relatively exceptional methodological device that is employed just in the context of the 
mathematical sciences.235 It has the function of precisely coordinating a certain set of 
terms with a certain set of objects, thus of establishing the parameters within which 
                                                
234 Philosophy of Arithmetic, pp. 124-5, 101. 
235 Logical Investigations, Vol. 1, p. 23; Logical Investigations, Vol. 2, pp. 28-9, 53; 
Introduction to Logic and Theory of Knowledge, p. 79. Husserl notes in several places 
that phenomenology makes no essential use of definitions, that it proceeds, rather, on the 
basis of description (Introduction to the Logical Investigations: A Draft of a Preface to 
the Logical Investigations, p. 60; Ideas, pp. 7-8). 
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subsequent scientific inquiry will unfold.236 (As for whether we might seize on terms that 
are explicitly defined in order to ground materially determinate analytic judgments, this 
prospect to turns out to be illusory. According to Husserl, what happens in the course of a 
scientific inquiry is the progressive refinement of our initial founding definitions, and 
thus a progressive illumination of the objects coordinated with those definitions.237 While 
Kant thinks that definitions in natural science remain static, Husserl thinks that 
definitions in science remain open to the possibility of change).238 
 If we cannot show that terms like 'house' and 'king' are subject to explicit 
definition, perhaps we can show that they are subject to implicit definition. This would 
mean showing that these terms get their meanings from our accepting as true certain 
propositions containing those terms. Thus, we could try to show that the word 'house' gets 
its meaning from our accepting as true a judgment like 'a house is a structure with a roof, 
walls, and a door'; and we could try to show that the word 'king' gets its meaning from 
our accepting as true a judgment such as 'a king is someone who rules over people called 
subjects'. Supposing that we succeeded on either front, then we could claim with some 
plausibility that 'house' is necessarily related to 'roof', and that 'king' is necessarily related 
to 'subjects'. On this picture, the meaning of 'house' would be determined by the judgment 
                                                
236 Logical Investigations, Vol. 2, p. 225. There is an echo here with Kant, and his claim 
that definitions in the context of empirical science have a designative function, meaning 
that they are intended just to fix the relevant objects of inquiry, not to exhaustively 
determine those objects.  
237 Logical Investigations, Vol. 2, pp. 12, 41; Philosophy of Arithmetic, p. 414; Dagfinn 
Føllesdal, "Husserl and Gødel on Mathematical Objects and our Access to Them", p. 342.  
238 A still more basic obstacle to this reading is that Husserl does seem to think that the 
examination of a definition can meaningfully be understood as 'analysis' (Hua XL, pp. 
348-9). Thus, even if definitions could be expected to remain static, they could not serve 
as the basis for analytic judgments. 
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that predicates having a roof of houses. The claim that some particular house lacked a 
roof would count as a contradiction in terms, or as an equivocation on the term 'house'. 
 Unfortunately, I do not think that implicit definition will take us as far as 
necessity. The reason for this is not that implicit definition is untenable.239 The reason, 
rather, is that even if a proposition P implicitly defines the meaning of a term T at this 
moment, there is no reason to think that P will always have that status relative to T, or 
indeed that it has always had that status. It is reasonable to assume that 'gold has 79 
protons' implicitly defines 'gold' now, but it obviously did not always define the meaning 
of 'gold', and it might cease to define the meaning of 'gold', given a revision in our 
understanding of gold itself.240 
 Of course, we might think that terms like 'house', 'king', and 'father' are immune to 
the possibility of revision, being non-theoretical terms, and thus terms that are not 
exposed to the possibility of meaning-change in the light of scientific discovery. On the 
                                                
239 Timothy Williamson has recently subjected the notion of implicit definition to 
sustained critique. His argument works as follows. Given a term and a proposition said to 
implicitly define that term, he conjures up an individual who understands the term in 
question but who nevertheless fails to assent to the corresponding proposition. Thus, he 
conjures up an individual who understands the meaning of 'vixen', but who, on the basis 
of certain beliefs about the evolution of foxes, nevertheless fails to assent to 'vixens are 
female foxes'; and he conjures up an individual who understands the word 'and', but who, 
on the basis of certain logical beliefs, fails to assent to a judgment having the form 'A and 
B, therefore A'. (The Philosophy of Philosophy, pp. 87-8). One problem with this 
approach, as Peter Hacker has pointed out, is that it proceeds by cases: Williamson 
simply "think[s] up…counter-examples of exactly the right structure" to challenge 
whatever proposition is under consideration ("A Philosopher of Philosophy", p. 345). The 
more serious problem, which Paul Boghossian has emphasized, is simply the manifest 
implausibility of the counter-examples themselves. The notion that the individuals in 
these examples actually mean the same thing as we do by 'vixen' and 'and', respectively, 
despite refusing to endorse certain extremely trivial propositions containing these terms, 
runs counter to our basic intuitions regarding meaning (Paul Boghossian, "Williamson on 
the A Priori and the Analytic", pp. 492-4). 
240 Hans-Johann Glock, Quine and Davidson on Language, Thought, and Reality,  
pp. 87-8. 
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contrary, this arguably makes these terms more susceptible to meaning-change. Whereas 
the (strictly scientific) meaning of 'gold' can only change in the light of empirical 
discovery, the meaning of 'house' or 'king' can effectively change for any reason at all. 
What is required is just some shift in the meaning that an individual or a community 
confers onto those terms. Since there is no "intrinsic connection" between verbal symbols 
and the meanings that are conferred on those symbols, there is nothing to prevent such 
shifts from taking place.241 That they actually do take place is something that Husserl 
recognizes quite clearly: he remarks on the "fluctuating ambiguity that clings to words to 
a far too great extent".242 
 What should we say, therefore, about Husserl's examples of analytically necessary 
propositions? At this point, it looks as if we should abandon those examples, along with 
the possibility that they gesture toward—the possibility of analytic judgments whose 
conformity to analytic law is not visible at the level of syntactic structure. Since we have 
been unable to show that words have their meanings as a matter of necessity, there is no 
way of showing that a judgment that is not obviously analytic might nevertheless be 
tacitly analytic. Given any such putatively analytic judgment, e.g. 'the existence of this 
house includes the existence of a roof', it will always be open to the skeptic to claim that 
'house' does not actually mean a thing having a roof, that this is a matter of contingent 
association rather than necessary entailment.  
 Fortunately, this result need not worry us too much. In a Kantian context, it is 
indeed quite important to explain why terms should have their meanings as a matter of 
necessity: since a Kantian analytic judgment is invariably a judgment having the surface-
                                                
241 Logical Investigations, Vol. 1, pp. 233, 218-228.  
242 Introduction to Logic and Theory of Knowledge, p. 79. 
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level syntactical structure 'S is P', analyticity is invariably a function of the meaning of 
'S'. In a Husserlian context, however, it is not particularly important to explain this. Even 
if Husserl thinks that analytic necessity is in some cases a function of meaning, he does 
not think that analytic necessity is invariably a function of meaning. As Centrone's 




This result has an interesting corollary. In short, analytically necessary propositions for 
Husserl do not seem to have any necessary relationship with analysis. Whereas we expect 
an analytic judgment to tell us something about a term appearing in that judgment, 
judgments like 'if Socrates has both courage and wisdom then he has courage' are not 
about their constituent terms in any obvious sense. Husserl's position on this matter 
stands in sharp contrast with Kant's. From Kant's perspective, a proposition like 'if 
Socrates has both courage and wisdom then he has courage' is logically unassailable, and 
thus a priori in a certain sense, but it is not analytic, because it does not articulate a 
judgment-internal relation of containment. The same is true of identical propositions like 
'man is man': since concepts do not contain themselves, according to Kant, even such 
purely tautological judgments do not qualify as analytic.  
 How can we account for Husserl's distance from Kant on this matter? Has Husserl 
simply dissolved the relationship between analysis and analyticity? The first step toward 
seeing that this is not the case comes from recognizing that analyticity does not enter the 
scene with the analytically necessary proposition. Rather, it enters the scene with analytic 
law. Analytically necessary propositions inherit analyticity from the analytic laws to 
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which they are isomorphic. The next step, therefore, consists in clarifying the relationship 
between analytic law and analysis. In the case of certain simple analytic laws, like 'a part 
is necessary a part of a whole', this relationship seems relatively straightforward: the law 
in question seems to just lay out the meaning that is built into the term 'part'. But this way 
of understanding the relationship between analyticity and analysis breaks down in the 
case of more complex analytic laws: the logical judgment  '((R à S) & (S à T)) à (R 
à T)' cannot reasonably be viewed as an expression of the meaning that is built into the 
term 'if'. 
  The key here is just to adopt a broader concept of meaning, and a 
correspondingly broader concept of analysis. Where analytic laws are concerned, 
meaning is not a matter of necessary and sufficient conditions. Meaning in this instance is 
a matter of the content that is necessarily entailed by a given concept, the content that 
flows from that concept independently of additional conditions. Analysis, accordingly, 
need not be a matter of examining the "really immanent parts" of the concepts that we 
entertain. According to Husserl, analysis can take in everything that flows as a matter of 
necessity from those concepts, which means everything that can be attributed a priori to 
the objects of those concepts.243 Since the content that can be attributed a priori to, say, 
wholes, far exceeds the content that comes to mind spontaneously when I reflect on the 
term 'whole', it follows that this second kind of analysis—which Husserl calls 'logical 
analysis'—is considerably more fruitful than the first kind—which he calls the 'act 
analysis of meaning'. This, finally, enables us to understand the relationship between 
                                                
243 Formal and Transcendental Logic, p. 245, cf. Philosophy of Arithmetic, p. 146; 
Logical Investigations, Vol. 1, p. 288. Denis Fisette situates this object- or phenomenon- 
directed conception of analysis at the heart of Husserl's dispute with Frege 
("Erläterungen: Logical Analysis vs. Phenomenological Description", pp. 83-4). 
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analyticity and analysis. From Husserl's perspective, analytic laws can be understood as 
expressions as logical analysis, meaning that they can be understood as judgments that 
draw out the content that is logically entailed by a given concept.244  
 This leaves us with one last question. What kind of concepts are at stake in 
analytic laws? In conformity to with the two-sided nature of analytic law, we can 
distinguish between two basic categories. On the ontological side, analytic laws flow 
from the logical analysis of the concept object and from the concepts logically 
subordinate to that concept (e.g. whole, part, property); on the apophantic side, analytic 
laws flow from the logical analysis of the concept proposition and from the concepts 
logically subordinate to that concept (e.g. dependent meaning, independent meaning). 
Ultimately, the articulation of analytic law amounts to an interrogation of these 
correlative, superordinate concepts.   
 
Conclusion  
Somewhat surprisingly, our examination of analyticity in Husserl has brought us back 
around to a recognizably Kantian picture of analytic judgment. Just as Kant understands 
'bodies are extended' as a product of the analysis of the concept body, Husserl regards 
judgments like 'a whole cannot contain itself a part' as a product of the analysis of the 
concept object. What distinguishes Husserl from Kant on this matter is Husserl's sense of 
what conceptual analysis means. If for Kant, conceptual analysis of the concept body 
means seeking out the conditions that are necessary and sufficient for something's being a 
body, Husserl thinks that conceptual analysis of the concept object means spelling out 
                                                
244 I part company here with Dallas Willard, who suggests that Husserl does not regard 
logical analysis as providing the basis for analytic judgments (Logic and the Objectivity 
of Knowledge, pp. 173-4).  
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everything that holds a priori of objects, thus everything that can be said of objects 
insofar as they constitute wholes, insofar as they constitute parts, insofar as they jointly 
constitute a collection, insofar as they jointly constitute a manifold, etc.  
 Another difference between Kant and Husserl that has come to light here concerns 
the expository difficulty that their respective theories of analyticity present. With Kant, 
the main difficulty was that of reconciling the many different ways that he describes 
analytic judgments. In the case of Husserl, the main difficulty was that of reconciling the 
many different ways in which the idea of analytic law is deployed. What do the laws that 
govern the ways that wholes can be given have in common with the laws that constrain 
the possible kinds of deductive theory? 
 The most important thing to grasp in this regard is that analytic law bears 
simultaneously on two essentially correlative domains: that of the object as such and that 
of the judgment as such. The next thing to understand is that analytic law on both sides is 
arrayed along a kind of ascending scale. On the ontological side, we can talk about the 
laws that bear on objects as such, aggregates as such, and manifolds as such; and on the 
apophantic side, we can talk about the laws that bear on judgments as such, arguments as 
such, and deductive theories as such. This allows us to explain the relation between the 
two regions of analytic law mentioned above: the first represents the lowest level of 
ontological analytic law; the second represents the highest level of apophantic analytic 
law. This also allows us to grasp the underlying unity of these regions of law: the analytic 
laws bearing on the ways that wholes can be given have precise apophantic counterparts 
in the laws dictating the ways that judgments can be constructed; these laws, in turn, are 
presupposed by the laws that constrain the possible kinds of deductive theory.  
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 In the next chapter, I want to tackle the relationship between Kant and Husserl 
more directly. I will begin by taking up a question that I have left conspicuously to the 
side in the present chapter, the question of what Husserl himself has to say about Kant's 
idea of analytic judgment. From there, it will be possible to clarify a number of subtle but 
important differences between Kant and Husserl on the issue of analyticity, for example, 
the different ways that they conceive of the relationship between analyticity and synthetic 
a priority, and the different ways that they conceive the relationship between analyticity 
and logic. Having done so, it will be possible to venture some general remarks about the 
relationship between Kant and Husserl. Despite its relatively marginality in the work of 
both thinkers, analyticity will prove to be a very instructive lens on to the relation 




Kant and Husserl on Analyticity 
Having investigated Kant and Husserl's respective notions of analyticity in detail, what I 
want to do in this final chapter is to bring Kant and Husserl into direct conversation. To 
some extent, this will mean revisiting the material that has already come to light over the 
previous four chapters. Especially in the case of Husserl, however, it will mean bringing 
to light issues and material that we have not so far had an occasion to consider.  
 The objective of this comparison, in one sense, will simply be to highlight the 
surprising degree of unanimity that exists between these thinkers. Against Husserl's own 
representation of his relationship to Kant on this issue, I will show that they do in fact 
converge on a very similar conception of analyticity. This in turn will make possible a 
more interesting task, that of identifying the point at which Husserl diverges from Kant. 
What I will show is that Husserl's primary innovation relative to Kant is his claim that 
formal logic is analytic. The subsequent non-Kantian elements in his theory of 
analyticity—from his distinction between analytic truth and analytic necessity, his 
distinction between two kinds of analytic evidence, and his conception of the relationship 
between the analytic and the empirical—flow ultimately from this initial point of 
divergence.  
 The plan for this chapter is as follows. In the first section, I outline Husserl's 
critique of Kant on the subject of analyticity and offer an assessment of its merits. I show 
that Husserl's Kant is largely a straw man. Contrary to Husserl's assertions, Kant does not 
situate analytic judgment under the heading of general logic, meaning that he does not 
understand analyticity as a matter of a mere formal validity. For Kant, rather, analytic 
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judgment concerns objects, meaning that it falls under the heading of transcendental 
logic. In the second section, I consider the issue of analyticity and logic in more depth. I 
begin by clarifying the question of why general logic cannot be a logic of objects from 
Kant's perspective. I then explain why general logic is a logic of objects for Husserl, and 
I show that this position leads him to a number of significant departures from Kant—to a 
non-Kantian understanding of the nature and role of transcendental logic, and to a 
similarly non-Kantian distinction between analytic truth and analytic necessity. In the 
third section, I take up the issue of analytic evidence. I show that Kant and Husserl have 
similar views on the nature of analytic evidence, in the sense that both think that analytic 
evidence is to be won on the basis of objects, but I suggest that Husserl departs from Kant 
in several important respects. First, Husserl clearly confronts the question of how we can 
derive analytic truths from particular, arbitrarily chosen objects. Second, he distinguishes 
between two different forms of analytic evidence: the evidence that is relevant to analytic 
law and the evidence that is relevant to analytic necessity. In the fourth section, I consider 
the epistemic relationship between the analytic and the synthetic. I argue that Kant and 
Husserl conceive this relationship in very similar terms: both maintain that analytic 
judgment plays a necessary role in the representation of synthetic judgments, and both 
maintain that analytic judgment plays a necessary role in the formation of synthetic 
judgments. In the fifth and final section, I take up the issue of analytic judgments having 
empirical content. After rehearsing Kant's argument in this regard, I consider the position 
that Husserl sketches in various recently published manuscripts. I show that Husserl's 
empirical analytic judgments make a claim to analytic necessity rather than analytic truth, 
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and that to this extent, Husserl is insulated from the problems that afflict Kant's 
formulation of empirical analytic judgment.  
 
1. Husserl on Kant 
On the question of analyticity, Husserl's attitude toward Kant is for the most part 
negative. In his Draft Preface to the Logical Investigations, he notes that he is concerned 
to work out the "proper concept of the analytical as opposed to the unclear Kantian 
one"245; and in the Logical Investigations, he remarks that Kant's formulation of the 
analytic-synthetic distinction does not "deserve to be called classical", meaning, 
presumably, that Kant's formulation of the analytic-synthetic distinction does not deserve 
to be treated as a template for all future formulations of that distinction.246 
 The basis of this negative assessment is relatively easy to make out. For Husserl, 
in short, Kant simply fails to take analytic judgment seriously as an epistemological 
problem. Kant proceeds as if the only epistemological task that arises in connection with 
analytic judgment is that of producing a "principle" by which the "objective validity" of 
analytic judgments can be seen; and he supposes that with the principle of non-
contradiction, he has succeeded in producing such a criterion. According to Husserl, this 
shallow treatment of analytic judgment reflects Kant's understanding of where analytic 
judgment fits in the theoretical edifice of the first Critique, namely, under the heading of 
general logic.247  
                                                
245 Introduction to the Logical Investigations: A Draft of a Preface to the Logical 
Investigations, p. 43. 
246 Logical Investigations, Vol. 2, p. 21. 
247 Introduction to Logic and Theory of Knowledge, pp. 110, 133, 335 
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 General logic, as we learned in the fourth chapter, is Kant's "science of the 
necessary laws of the understanding and of reason in general" (or his "science of 
thinking", in Husserl's paraphrase). It is a logic that examines concepts, judgments, and 
inferences as such, and which spells out the different ways in which concepts, judgments, 
and inferences can legally combine. This tells us what it means to say that, for Kant, 
analytic judgment falls under the heading of general logic. What it means is that analytic 
judgment figures in the critical philosophy as a particular kind of legitimate inference. 
Rather than a genuinely distinct form of cognition, analytic judgment is simply what 
happens when we predicate a constituent of some concept of that concept itself.  
 What kinds of questions are left to the side in this treatment of analytic judgment, 
according to Husserl? For one, Kant does not inquire into the basis of analytic validity. 
Having shown that the validity of an analytic judgment is in some sense a function of the 
principle of non-contradiction, he does ask what the principle of non-contradiction—or 
logic as a whole—is grounded in. Once we know that for Husserl, this question is to be 
answered by pointing to a "separate, self-contained "world" of ideal objects",248 and to 
the lawlike relations that obtain between those ideal objects, we are in a position to 
understand the second question that Husserl poses to Kant. What Husserl wants Kant to 
explain is "how objectively valid knowledge, knowledge of things existing on their own, 
is possible vis-à-vis the subjectivity of knowing as a subjective activity".249 In other 
words, given that logical truth is a matter of the necessary relations that obtain between 
                                                
248 Formal and Transcendental Logic, p. 260. 
249 Formal and Transcendental Logic, pp. 260-1, cf. Introduction to Logic and Theory of 
Knowledge, p. 335. 
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objects existing entirely independently of human minds, how does it happen that that 
these relations can be constituted, purely spontaneously, by human minds? 
 Of course, Kant is not insensitive to the problem of explaining how consciousness 
comes to be the setting for a priori knowledge of objects. Like Husserl, he formulates 
something that he calls transcendental logic as a means of addressing precisely this 
problem. According to Husserl, however, Kant's transcendental logic cannot become a 
way of clarifying logical truth. The reason is that Kant does not recognize that logical 
truth amounts to truth of objects. Hence, Kant cannot meaningfully ask in what sense this 
particular variety of objective truth comes to be constituted within consciousness. He is 
obliged to treat logical truth as a kind of primitive fact about human consciousness, and 
to treat general logic as an examination of this primitive fact.  
 What is the role of transcendental logic if not to clarify general logic? According 
to Husserl, Kant's transcendental logic is a matter of explaining how our a priori 
knowledge of spatio-temporal objects is possible. In other words, it is matter of 
explaining how synthetic a priori judgments are possible. Transcendental logic 
presupposes general logic, in the sense that synthetic a priori judgments are necessarily 
logically sound; but since it is turned toward spatio-temporal objects, transcendental logic 
cannot become a way of reflecting on general logic, meaning that it cannot become a way 
of reflecting on analytic judgment. According to Husserl, the latter remains out of the 
reach of any meaningful clarificatory effort in the context of Kant's philosophy.   
 
Assessing Husserl's Claims 
What should we make of these criticisms? Ultimately, I think that they proceed from a 
mistaken understanding of what analytic judgment means for Kant. In the first place, 
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while it is true that Kant seems to treat the principle of non-contradiction as a sufficient 
basis for seeing the truth or validity of analytic judgment, this appearance is deceptive. 
As I argued in the fourth chapter, seeing that a putatively analytic judgment is true 
involves two essential conditions: first, we need to know that the negation of the 
judgment in question is contradictory; second, we need to know that the subject concept 
of the judgment has objective reality. Supposing that this second condition has not been 
met, then our judgment can be nothing more to us than a sequence of words, or a 
sequence of purely idiosyncratic mental representations. Since we do not know that the 
subject concept of our judgment corresponds to a real object, we cannot know that the 
content that we attribute to that concept belongs to it in any robust sense, thus we cannot 
know that a judgment that seems analytic actually is analytic.  
 This in turn suggests that Kant does not situate analyticity within general logic, as 
Husserl suggests. For the purposes of general logic, a judgment is true, or rather 'correct', 
just insofar as its constituent terms are 'connected' in the right way. The question of 
whether its constituent terms also have objective reality does not arise for the logician, 
because this is irrelevant to the question of whether the one follows from the other in a 
strictly formal sense. Does this mean that Kant situates analytic judgment within 
transcendental logic? Although he does not say so himself, this seems to be the most 
plausible reading of his position. Since analytic judgment is by definition a priori, and 
since it is necessarily about objects, it falls squarely into the "science of pure 
understanding…by means of which we think objects a priori" that Kant envisions 
(A57/B81).  
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 This suggests that the distinction between analytic and synthetic a priori judgment 
does not correspond to the distinction between general and transcendental logic, as 
Husserl leads us to believe. Rather, it is a distinction within transcendental logic. It 
amounts to the difference between judgments that capture the strictly logical elements in 
our a priori cognition of objects and judgments that capture the material elements in our a 
priori cognition of objects. 
 This allows us some perspective on the two main lines of criticism that Husserl 
directs toward Kant. First, as regards Kant's failure to explain in what sense the principle 
of non-contradiction is justified, I think that this critique loses most of its force in light of 
Kant's actual understanding of analyticity. It remains more or less justified as a comment 
on Kant's understanding of logic: Kant does seem to simply stipulate that certain kinds of 
inferences are correct. But once we see that analytic judgment is not simply a function of 
the principle of non-contradiction, it is no longer possible to charge that Kant's failure to 
clarify the principle of non-contradiction is equivalent to a failure to clarify the nature of 
analytic judgment.  
 What about Husserl's second line of criticism, to the effect that Kant does not 
explain how knowledge of formal-logical truth comes to be constituted in consciousness? 
Again, there is a sense in which this critique simply loses most of its force when it is held 
up against Kant's actual understanding of analyticity. Since Kant does not think that 
analyticity is reducible to logic, the fact that he cannot explain the constitution of formal-
logical truth is beside the point. Husserl's critique does have more force when we 
rephrase it slightly, and ask how Kant proposes to explain how genuinely analytic 
knowledge comes to be constituted, that is, how we are able to grasp the logical 
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properties of mind-independent objects with necessity. But this, as it turns out, is 
precisely the kind of question that Kant is able to answer. From Kant's perspective, we 
are able to grasp the logical properties of mind-independent objects with necessity 
because we can reflect on the a priori conceptual resources through which objects come 
to be represented as mind-independent objects in the first place. Precisely by forming 
analytic judgments, in other words, we can understand what it takes for something to be 
an object.  
 One way of summarizing Husserl's engagement with Kant on this issue, perhaps, 
would be in terms of Husserl's own formulation of analytic judgment. From Husserl's 
perspective, we might say, Kant gets only as far as the analytically necessary proposition. 
Kant gets only as far as seeing that there are certain judgments that are true just by virtue 
of their formal structure, thus, that there are judgments that can be seen as true just 
insofar as we grasp the formally valid propositional structure that they instantiate. What 
Kant does not see, from Husserl's perspective, is that these formal structures are 
themselves analytic. He does not see that analytic judgments like 'bodies are extended' 
inherit their analyticity from the more general analytic laws to which they are 
isomorphic. This means that Kant cannot raise the most important and most difficult 
epistemological question about analyticity. He cannot ask how these formal structures 
themselves come to be valid, and how they come to be valid for us.  
 One way of summarizing the Kantian response to Husserl, meanwhile, would be 
to say that Kant's analytic judgments have much more in common with Husserl's analytic 
laws than with his analytically necessary propositions. Contrary to Husserl, an analytic 
judgment is not reducible to a more general truth. Like an analytic law, it is a kind of 
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ground zero of truth and validity; it is a judgment that is true independently of the truth of 
any prior judgment. 
 
2. Analyticity and Logic  
At this point, it is worth looking more closely at how Kant comes to the view that general 
logic is not related to objects, and thus, that our a priori knowledge of objects is properly 
articulated within transcendental logic. This will help to explain why formal logic is 
related to objects, according to Husserl, and why he assigns a rather different role to 
transcendental logic relative to analytic truth. 
 In Chapter Four, I suggested that we could look to the Transcendental Amphiboly 
of the first Critique as a way of explaining Kant's position on the relation between 
general logic and objects. What Kant tries to show there, I suggested, is that general logic 
falls out of step with objects at certain moments, meaning that the objective validity of 
general logic is not assured in advance. Kant's argument can be reduced to the 
conjunction of two claims:  
 
1) The pure understanding forms judgments about objects on the basis of the concepts 
corresponding to those objects. These judgments reflect the application of innate logical 
principles (A262/B317-8). 
 
2) Concepts capture the "inner determinations" of objects, meaning the determinations 
that they have independently of their givenness at a particular point in space and 
independently of their orientation in space (i.e. their 'handedness') (A263/B319-20). 
 
This conjunction of claims explains why it is possible to be mistaken regarding the 
identity of material objects. Since, according to (2), there is no difference between the 
concept of my left hand and the concept of my right hand, I have no logical basis for 
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distinguishing between them.250 This in turn explains why logical principles of inference 
like the one that Kant appeals to here—the principle that says that if two things have 
exactly the same properties then they are identical—do not hold universally with respect 
to objects. Because our concepts do not encode all of the inferentially relevant properties 
of the corresponding objects, it follows that even a perfectly consistent application of this 
principle will fail to guarantee objectively valid results. This, finally, explains why Kant 
is obliged to appeal to transcendental logic. Since general logic fails to guarantee a priori 
knowledge of objects, Kant needs to develop a language in which such a priori 
knowledge can be articulated.  
 This compressed account of the Transcendental Amphibology allows us to isolate 
the precise point at which Husserl departs from Kant's reasoning. For Husserl, in short, it 
is simply not the case that our strictly formal principles of inference bear strictly on 
concepts—let alone the sharply attenuated concepts that Kant describes. Rather, these 
principles bear on existents, meaning actual or possible objects that are "accessible to 
objective self-evidence within the unity of our experience".251 This is a matter of the 
implicit intentionality of logical judgment. Even though, in logic, we tend to think strictly 
in terms of mere variables, what we have in the background, according to Husserl, is the 
world of experience. We expect that our logical variables are to be 'filled-in' by objects 
                                                
250 This example comes from Kant's 1768 essay dealing with 'incongruent counterparts', 
("Concerning the Ultimate Ground of the Differentiation of Directions in Space", in 
Theoretical Philosophy 1755-1770, p. 370). 
251 Experience and Judgment, p. 39. The flipside of the object-oriented nature of logical 
judgment is the judgment-oriented nature of objects. As Husserl remarks in a number of 
places, it belongs essentially to possible objects of experience that they be possible 
objects of judgment (e.g. Husserliana XXXV, pp. 449-50, 452). 
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that can be given in experience; and we expect that logical judgments are to be 'filled-in' 
by states of affairs that can be given in experience.  
 This allows for a series of important conclusions. In the first place, it means that 
the scenario that Kant describes cannot arise. Since the ultimate object of logical 
judgment is the object of experience, meaning the object as given with all of its 
inferentially relevant determinations, there is no prospect of a logically self-evident 
judgment being falsified in the light of experience. This in turn means that formal logic is 
indeed a logic of objects. Since there is no moment at which formal logic falls out of step 
with the world of objects, there is no reason to limit the claims of formal logic to mere 
concepts or mere variables. And this, finally, means that Husserl is entitled to reject 
Kant's understanding of transcendental logic. Because formal logic already holds 
necessarily with respect to objects, Husserl need not look to transcendental logic as a way 
articulating our a priori knowledge of objects.  
 This now brings us within view of our main question. What does transcendental 
logic mean for Husserl? The answer to this question grows out of Husserl's rejection of 
(1) above. Since Husserl rejects the idea that the principles of logic are simply woven into 
the fabric of human psychology, he is obliged to given an account of how they come to 
be abiding subjective acquisitions. More to the point, he is obliged to explain how 
principles having the status of necessary rules come to be constituted within the finite 
domain of consciousness. According to Husserl, it is the role of transcendental logic to 
supply this explanation. Beginning with the "acts of determination" through which the 
world of experience is first invested with logical form, and proceeding upward through 
acts of scientific and logical intentionality, transcendental logic is to explain how the 
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"traditional objective content of formal logic" comes to be constituted.252 This in turn 
allows us to answer our second question, that is, to specify the role of transcendental 
logic relative to analyticity. Rather than the theoretical setting within which analytic law 
is to be articulated, it follows from what we have seen that transcendental logic will have 
the role of clarifying analyticity, of explaining how judgments that bear on all objects and 
all judgments whatsoever are constituted within the medium of subjective consciousness.  
 Unfortunately, Husserl himself does not manage to carry out this constitutive 
analysis. Although he takes some strides in his late work toward clarifying the 
constitution of basic logical principles and forms of judgments, he does not manage to 
extend this clarificatory effort into the sphere of analytic cognition. Suffice it to say, then, 
that the transcendental clarification of analyticity represents the most pressing task that 
arises for Husserlian phenomenology in this area; and the task that, from Husserl's 
perspective, most strongly distinguishes his own approach to analyticity from Kant's.253 
 
Two Notions of Analyticity 
Here, I want to spell out some of the implications of Husserl's claim that general logic is 
already a full-fledged canon of analytic truth. In the first place, it means that Husserl, 
unlike Kant, can regard analyticity as a hereditary property. Since logical laws are 
                                                
252 Formal and Transcendental Logic, p. 10; Experience and Judgment, p. 50. This 
conception of the role of transcendental logic reflects the meaning that Husserl gives to 
the term 'transcendental' in general. For Husserl, the term signifies the "motif of inquiring 
back into the ultimate source of all the formations of knowledge, the motif of the 
knower's reflecting upon himself and his knowing life in which all the scientific 
structures that are valid for him occur purposefully, are stored up as acquisitions, and 
have become and continue to become freely available" (Crisis of the European Sciences 
and Transcendental Phenomenology, pp. 97-8, cf. Experience and Judgment, p. 49). 
253 According to Husserl, Kant "did not make his analytic Apriori a problem" (Formal 
and Transcendental Logic, p. 260). 
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already analytic, it is sufficient for a proposition's being analytic that it be isomorphic to 
some logical law. We do not need to show that its constituent concepts correspond to real 
objects, or that they do so in a strictly a priori manner. Even manifestly absurd judgments 
like 'all triangles are reckless, Socrates is a triangle, therefore Socrates is reckless' will 
qualify as analytic for Husserl, provided just that they are logically unassailable.254  
 This in turn means that there are effectively two ways for a proposition to be 
analytic. An analytic law, on the one hand, is analytic is the sense of being 
unconditionally universal. An analytically necessary proposition, on the other hand, is 
analytic in the sense that it holds by virtue of an unconditionally universal law. To 
describe a proposition as 'analytic', in this sense, is not to say something about the 
validity of the proposition relative to objects; it is to say something about the way that its 
constituent elements are related. It is to posit a judgment-internal relation of 'analytischer 
Zusammenhang'255 or 'analytische Notwendigkeit'. 
 This relational understanding of analyticity points toward a final, extremely 
significant difference between Kant and Husserl on the issue of analyticity. For Kant, as 
we know, analyticity is a property of individual judgments. Since he associates 
analyticity with truth-evaluability, and since he associates truth-evaluability with subject-
predicate form, it follows that analyticity will extend only over a small class of true, 
subject-predicate propositions. For Husserl, on the other hand, analyticity can be a 
property of propositions, inferences, and entire systems of propositions. The reason is 
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that Husserl understands analyticity as a relation. Analyticity is not merely a property of 
certain universal truths; it is the property that a system of judgments has when its 
constituent elements are related to one another by virtue those universal truths. Thus, it is 
a property that an individual inference has when it follows by virtue of modus ponens; 
and it is a property that an entire science has when its constituent judgments are related 
solely by virtue of the principle of non-contradiction. Since mathematics is just such a 
science, according to Husserl, it follows that mathematics as a whole is analytic.256 
 
3. Analyticity and Evidence 
Before moving on to consider the methodological role that analytic truth performs, it is 
worth pausing to consider a more basic epistemological question. In short, what is the 
evidence for analytic truth? As we saw in Chapter 1, Kant offers a fleeing answer to this 
question in the Introduction to the second edition of the first Critique. He says that the 
evidence for analytic truth comes from conceptual analysis, from my "becom[ing] 
conscious of the manifold that I always think" in a given concept (A7/B11). As for what 
it means to analyze a concept, this is not a matter of simply contemplating an abstract 
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intentional unity. Rather, as Kant explains just a few lines earlier, it is a matter of 
reflecting on an instance of the concept in question, which is to say, on a particular 
object. What does this reflection entail? According to Kant, it entails abstracting from the 
determinations that belong to that object as the particular object that it is in order to get at 
the determinations that belong to it as an instance of the corresponding concept. Thus, in 
the case of Kant's example, that of a particular empirical body, it means gradually 
removing the "color, the hardness or softness, even the impenetrability" until only the 
determinations that belong to that body as a body remain (B5-6). Supposing that we have 
been comprehensive in this effort, Kant explains, then we will recognize that what makes 
a body a body is simply the fact that it occupies space. This means that we will have 
grasped what is 'always thought' in the concept body, namely, the predicate concept 
being-extended. And this, finally, means that we will have grasped the judgment 'bodies 
are extended' as an analytic truth.   
 Husserl, for his part, makes a number of Kant's assumptions about the possibility 
of analytic truth explicit. Where Kant assumes that the evidence for an analytic judgment 
is to come from the objective correlate of a concept, rather than a concept per se, Husserl 
maintains that the evidence for an analytic law is to be won on the basis of a certain kind 
of real objective givenness (which he calls "analytic givenness").257 And where Kant 
assumes that this objective correlate can be chosen almost arbitrarily, because he assumes 
that there is no metaphysically significant difference between one body and another, or 
one cause and another, Husserl makes explicit the notion that the evidence for an analytic 
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truth can come from any relevant "example" whatsoever—even examples that are 
summoned to the imagination on the basis of phantasy258.  
 But Husserl does more than simply clarify Kant's thinking on the subject of 
analytic truth. In the first place, because Husserl maintains that analytic truth extends 
beyond the ontological sphere, he comes to a different understanding of the kind of 
evidence that is relevant in the context of analytic truth. He maintains that the evidence 
for an analytic truth can come not simply from objects, but from judgments; thus, that the 
evidence for the analytic law of non-contradiction can come from any pair of 
contradictory judgments (and from the performance of the 'yes' and 'no' that those 
contradictory judgments evoke).259 Second, because Husserl sees more clearly than Kant 
that the evidence for analytic truth is derived from particular instances, he is more 
directly conscious of the question that arises from this—the question of how the evidence 
for a universal law can come from a particular object or state of affairs. According to 
Husserl, we are able to grasp the law of non-contradiction in a particular contradictory 
judgment because we are capable of a kind of generalization that he calls ideation.260 We 
are capable of abstracting from the particular features of a particular thing and seeing 
what makes it the kind of thing that it is. In short, we are capable of grasping a judgment, 
object, or state of affairs at the level of essence.  
 Why makes Husserl think that we have such an ability? In the Logical 
Investigations, he explains that the possibility of ideation is a matter of the basic 
requirements of knowledge. Supposing that we were not able to grasp what is essential in 
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actually experienced judgments, we would not be in a position to form universal logical 
concepts or the universally valid logical laws that flow from those concepts. This in turn 
would mean that we would not be in a position to apply logical laws, meaning that we 
would not be able to employ logical laws as a way of understanding objects of thought or 
experience. Since, on the other hand, we are manifestly employ logical laws in this way, 
and to do so in a spirit of absolute certainty, then it follows that we do have eidetic 
insight into judgments and into objects of experience in general.261 
 As for analytically necessary propositions, here it looks as if it is necessary to 
modify our account. Since a judgment can qualify as analytically necessary even when it 
is materially absurd (e.g. 'a round quadrangle is angry or not angry') evidence in such 
cases obviously cannot be a matter of exemplifying intuition.262 According to Husserl, 
what is relevant in cases of analytic necessity is the syntax of the judgment in question. I 
grasp a judgment as analytically necessary when I grasp it at the level of its formal, 
syntactical structure, and when I see that the judgment holds by virtue of that syntactical 
structure. The question of the judgment's content does enter into consideration in this 
context. For the purposes of assessing analytic necessity, we allow the terms to "[float] 
freely, so far as their origin and therefore their possibility are concerned".263  
 This means that analytic evidence for Husserl takes two forms. The evidence for 
analytic necessity comes from the judgment as judgment, meaning the judgment grasped 
distinctly as a syntactic unity. The evidence for analytic law, meanwhile, comes 
proximately from a real or imagined object or state of affairs, and ultimately from the 
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formal essence that is exemplified by that object or state of affairs. We grasp an analytic 
law with evidence when we see that the analytic law qua judgment finds fulfillment in a 
corresponding essence. This is evidence in the sense of clarity rather than distinctness.264  
 
4. The Analytic and the Synthetic 
In the first chapter, we learned that for Kant, analytic judgments perform an "important 
and necessary" role in the representation of synthetic a priori judgments as synthetic a 
priori judgments. Only insofar as I enjoy analytic insight into the content of my a priori 
conceptual endowment am I in a position to positively distinguish judgments that extend 
my a priori conceptual endowment.  
 Adjusting for Husserl's phenomenological orientation, it looks as if something 
similar applies for him. From Husserl's perspective, it is strictly by virtue of our ability 
represent phenomenal content in terms of analytic relations that I am able to represent 
phenomenal content in terms of synthetic a priori relations. Thus, it is strictly by virtue of 
that fact that I am able to represent color and extension as distinct members of an 
'analytic' or aggregative whole that I am able to represent color and extension as 
necessarily and materially related. In the absence of this initial act of the understanding, 
or this initial act of "analytic cognition", I simply do not have the basic logical 
prerequisites for a synthetic a priori judgment. I have an experience of color and 
extension; but I do not have color and extension as distinct, unitarily intended objects of 
cognition.265  
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 Of course, analytic judgment is not valuable for Kant only insofar as it enables us 
to represent synthetic a priori judgments. He signals that analytic judgment performs a 
still stronger epistemic role relative to synthetic a priori judgments, that it facilitates the 
formation of new synthetic judgments (4:273-274). Although Kant does not indicate 
exactly how this is to work, it is at least clear why it should work. From Kant's 
perspective, the conceptual content that is reflected in analytic judgments is logically 
prior to the non-conceptual content that is reflected in synthetic a priori judgments. 
Insofar as I have an analytic insight into a given concept, I am therefore in a position to 
extend my understanding of that concept synthetically. I am in a position to characterize 
the precise fashion in which that concept, with its strictly logical content, is schematized 
in the context of spatio-temporal intuition.  
 Husserl, meanwhile, casts the epistemic relationship between the analytic and 
synthetic in similar (but stronger) terms. He says that the "knowledge of form" that is 
made available by analytic law has an "extraordinary methodological significance" 
relative to all "knowledge of things".266 This follows from Husserl's understanding of 
analytic law. Since analytic law, for Husserl, encompasses the laws that pertain to all 
objects whatsoever, it follows that a fully grounded inquiry into any particular domain of 
being presupposes an examination of the analytic domain.267 Before undertaking to 
examine the domain of spatio-temporal being, or the domain of natural being, we must 
examine the "forms and laws belonging to the essence of objectivity in general".268 
Following Kant, who identifies the analysis of our a priori conceptual repertoire as a 
                                                
266 Introduction to Logic and Theory of Knowledge, pp. 108, 60. 
267 Introduction to the Logical Investigations: A Draft of a Preface to the Logical 
Investigations, p. 31; Ideas, p. 108. 
268 Introduction to Logic and Theory of Knowledge, p. 108. 
 264 
distinct, logically primary area of inquiry within metaphysics (4:326, 4:237-4), Husserl 
identifies this examination of objectivity as a distinct, logically primary area of inquiry 
within ontology. He explains that material ontology—meaning the examination of the 
laws that pertain to particular object domains—presupposes a purely formal ontology.269 
 
5. The Analytic and the Empirical  
Before concluding, I want to consider an issue that has so far been absent from our 
discussion of Husserl, that of the relationship between analyticity and the empirical. 
Having shown that analytic judgment can be brought to bear on the formal or categorial 
properties of objects, I want to ask whether analytic judgment can also be brought to bear 
on the empirical or sensible determinations of objects.  
 In Chapter Three, I considered this issue from a Kantian standpoint. I suggested 
that, for Kant, the possibility of analytic judgments having empirical content is to be 
explained with reference to natural scientific methodology. Kant thinks that natural 
science presupposes fixed, designative concepts; and he assumes, for this reason, that a 
certain kind of a priori conceptual judgment is possible in the context of natural science. 
Unfortunately, as we discovered, this account of empirical analytic judgment gives rise to 
serious problems. On the one hand, even if we suppose that a natural substance must be 
defined in terms of an initial, designative concept, it is not obvious why only one concept 
should fit the bill: different communities might endorse different definitions of, say, 
water, meaning that there would be two non-overlapping sets of analytic judgments with 
respect to water. On the other hand, even if we ignore this issue and suppose that 
everyone has the same definition of water, it is not clear why that definition should 
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remain static: given the discovery of a new, water-like substance, our existing definition 
might cease to designate its object sufficiently, meaning that we would be obliged to 
build new predicates into our definition and to bring new analytic judgments into being in 
the process. Since analytic judgments are ostensibly universal, we cannot abide the first 
scenario; and since they are ostensibly a priori, we cannot abide the second.  
 Perhaps unsurprisingly, Husserl's intuitions are out of sync with Kant's on this 
issue. Husserl does not think that the possibility of empirical understanding requires that 
we hold fast certain empirical concepts. But Husserl does think analytic judgments 
having empirical content are possible; and like Kant, he thinks that this possibility has 
something to do with the way that empirical concepts come to be formed.  
 According to Husserl, empirical concepts are formed on the basis of an ongoing 
process of constitution.270 Beginning from an essentially passive experience of particular 
natural types, we proceed to actively thematize those types, and to construct concepts that 
encode the ensuing acts of predication. According to Husserl, these concepts then become 
a lens through which future experiences are refracted. Presented with an object that 
conforms to the passively constituted type 'fir tree', I reflexively constitute that object in 
terms of the corresponding concept, which means that I constitute the object in terms of 
determinations that may or may not be apparent on the surface of the given object.271 This 
in turn means that the object becomes a 'substrate' for analytic judgment. Since the 
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actually given fir tree is constituted in terms of the concept fir tree, it follows that the 
concept can be, as it were, read off of the tree.272 
 For Husserl, this amounts to an analytic judgment in the 'narrow' sense.273 An 
analytic judgment in the 'wide' sense, on the other hand, is a judgment that is directed 
toward a presentation as such, thus, a judgment that makes explicit the various acts of 
intentionality that are directed toward a particular object, and that make it the case that 
this particular object is given in the way that it is. Husserl offers the example of a house. 
He says that I render a 'wide' analytic judgment on the basis of a concretely given house 
when I make explicit the intention that is directed at the front side, the intention directed 
at the back, the actual appearance of the front, the inauthentic appearance of the back, 
etc.274 
 What should we make of the different forms of empirically significant analytic 
judgment that Husserl describes here? As regards the first kind, which Husserl describes 
as narrow analytic judgment, and which amounts to the explication of an empirical 
concept, there seems to be some room for skepticism. Since an empirical concept is 
precisely an open, progressively constituted unity, it might look as though we could never 
be in a position to form an a priori judgment on the basis of that concept. I might judge 
that the concept fir tree involves the idea of certain kinds of leaves, only to revise my 
concept in the light of further experience, and so falsify my original judgment.    
 As it happens, I do not think that this scenario represents a real problem from 
Husserl's perspective. In invoking the term 'analytic' in the context of empirical judgment, 
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Husserl does intend to suggest that certain judgments about empirical objects hold 
necessarily with respect to those objects. What he wants to suggest, rather, is that certain 
judgments about empirical objects have the structure of analytic laws: when I simply 
unpack the conceptual content that is brought to bear on the apprehension of a fir tree, I 
attribute a part of a conceptual whole to that conceptual whole itself. 
 The same thing holds for those judgments that Husserl calls 'wide' analytic 
judgments. Husserl does not think that a judgment like 'my intending of this house 
includes an intending of its front side' is analytic in the sense that it holds a priori with 
respect to intentional acts directed at houses (since, after all, we could always imagine a 
house-directed intentional act that did not include an intention toward the front side). 
What he thinks, rather, is that if my intending of a house actually does include an 
intending of its front side, then the judgment 'my intending of this house includes an 
intending of its front side' will have the structure of a mereological law.   
 Ultimately, therefore, it looks as if we should understand both forms of analytic 
judgment on the model of analytically necessary propositions. Rather than judgments that  
hold by virtue of invariant empirical facts, we should understand narrow and wide 
analytic judgments as judgments that hold strictly by virtue of their formal structure.275 
The important qualification is that a 'judgment', in this case, must be understood in the 
sense of an act of judgment, not in the sense of a proposition. Whereas the formal validity 
of a judgment like 'man is man' is visible on the surface of the judgment, and so is 
independent of whatever is thought in conjunction with 'man', the formal validity of the 
judgment 'a fir tree has needle-shaped leaves' is not visible on the surface of the 
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judgment, and so depends on what is thought in conjunction with 'fir tree' at a particular 
time, in a particular act of judgment.276 
 One way of understanding the difficulties inherent in Kant's notion of the 
empirical analytic, finally, is to reflect that Kant simply cannot appeal to Husserl's 
reasoning. In the first place, Kant cannot claim that an empirical analytic judgment holds 
just by virtue of its formal structure: he is committed to the claim that an analytic 
judgment holds by virtue of its objective correlate, meaning that he is committed to the 
claim that an analytic judgment holds a priori with respect to that objective correlate. For 
just the same reason, Kant cannot say that a judgment is analytic in the sense of an act. 
From his perspective, this would be to say that there are a priori truths that hold only at 
the moment of judgment. It would simply be contradictory.  
 
Conclusion 
In conclusion, I hope to have shown two things. First, I hope to have shown that Kant and 
Husserl are much closer on the subject of analyticity than we might have expected. 
Second, and most importantly, I hope to have identified the salient difference between 
Kant and Husserl on this subject.  
 Husserl's oft-repeated critique of the Kantian model of analyticity offered a 
convenient point of entry onto our first task. Against Husserl, it was possible to show that 
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Kant situates analyticity under the heading of transcendental logic rather than general 
logic, meaning that Kant agrees with Husserl as regards the metaphysical significance of 
analyticity. This in turn made it possible to broaden the parallel between Kant and 
Husserl on this issue. Thus, it was possible to show that Kant and Husserl understand 
analytic evidence in very similar terms: both think that the evidence for analytic truth is 
to come from an arbitrarily chosen instance of the concept or law that is in question. 
Likewise, it was possible to show that Kant and Husserl understand the relationship 
between the analytic and synthetic in similar terms: both regard the cultivation of analytic 
knowledge as a necessary stage en route to substantial, material knowledge.  
 With this understanding in hand, it became possible to tackle the second task, that 
of identifying the central difference between Kant and Husserl on the subject of 
analyticity. What I argued is that Kant and Husserl disagree as to the theoretical setting in 
which analytic truth is properly articulated. Whereas for Kant, it is necessary to articulate 
analytic truth within transcendental logic, because general logic does not reach as far as 
the objects that alone make judgments true, Husserl maintains that analytic truth is 
properly articulated within general, or formal logic, because formal logic is indeed a logic 
of objects. From Husserl's perspective, formal logic is implicitly oriented toward possible 
existents. Its laws are the a priori laws of objective givenness.  
 This in turn prompts number of significant departures from Kant. First, it means 
that Husserl can distinguish between two kinds of analytic judgments: he can talk about 
formal-ontological laws themselves (which are necessarily true) and he can talk the 
particular, empirically specific judgments that conform to them (which need not be true). 
Second, it means that Husserl can extend the range of the analytic beyond particular 
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judgments to entire judgment-systems: given a system of judgments that is held together 
by logical-ontological laws, it becomes possible to say that the system as whole is 
analytic. Third, Husserl can distinguish between different kinds of analytic evidence: he 
can distinguish between the eidetic insight that underwrites analytic truths and the grasp 
of syntactical form that underwrites analytically necessary propositions. Fourth and 
finally, Husserl can formulate a notion of empirical analytic judgment that escapes the 
problems that beset Kant's notion: since what makes an empirically specified judgment 
analytic, according to Husserl, is just its conformity to an analytic law, it does not 
ultimately matter whether the judgment holds a priori with respect to its object. In the 
conclusion to this study, to which I now turn, I will offer a summary of what we have 
seen over all six chapters, some remarks as to its overall significance, and some 




In a sense, what I tried to do at the outset of this study was to preempt a critical response 
that might otherwise have lingered over the entire proceedings. Against the suspicion that 
the idea of analytic judgment is either uninteresting or unimportant or both, what I tried 
to do in Chapter 1 was to show that analytic judgment actually does have a valuable role 
to play in a Kantian context. In contrast to Kant's early modern predecessors, who 
recognize the formally identical judgment as a distinct kind of judgment, but who fail to 
give such judgments any real work do so, epistemologically speaking, Kant recognizes 
that a certain kind of formally identical judgment plays an indispensible role in the 
context of metaphysical inquiry. He says that before we are able to amplify our a priori 
concepts synthetically we are obliged to clarify the content of those concepts analytically.  
 Having established the methodological role of analytic judgment, I narrowed my 
focus in Chapter 2. Working on the basis of Kant's brief and disparate characterizations 
of analytic judgment, I spelled out exact properties that an analytic judgment is to have. 
Having done so, I remarked on a number of ways in which the resulting picture of 
analytic judgment might give rise to concern. For instance, I noted that it was not self-
evident why an analytic judgment should have the status of an a priori truth: prima facie, 
the fact that the concept body contains the concept extension does not make the 
corresponding judgment, 'bodies are extended', true; this seems to depend, in addition, on 
the fact that bodies actually are extended. Likewise, I noted that it was not self-evident 
why an analytic judgment should necessarily be a subject-predicate judgment: since, 
according to Kant, we have an analytic judgment whenever we have a judgment whose 
negation is contradictory, it might look as if analytic judgments could come in any 
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number of logical forms. As regards the internal consistency of Kant's doctrine, I 
followed a number of commentators in noting that Kant seems ambivalent between a 
psychological and logical characterization of analyticity: he characterizes an analytic 
judgment as a judgment in which the predicate concept is 'thought' in the subject concept, 
and as a judgment in which the predicate concept is 'contained' in the subject concept. 
Finally, I remarked that Kant is unclear as regard the status of identical judgments. At 
some moments, Kant suggests that judgments like 'man is man' do not qualify as analytic, 
because they do not succeed in clarifying their subject concepts; at other times, he 
suggests that such judgment do count as analytic, seeming in that way to sideline the 
clarification criterion.  
 Setting the stage for an eventual solution to these concerns, I turned in Chapter 3 
to the constituents of analytic judgments. I established that the conceptual constituents of 
analytic judgments necessarily have objective reality, and that analytic judgment 
becomes fully defensible if we stipulate that those concepts must have a priori objective 
reality. Second, I established that the conceptual constituents of analytic judgments are 
invariably related to a single source of representational content: empirical intuition, pure 
intuition, or the understanding. This became a way of explaining why a synthetic a priori 
judgment cannot simply become (or be made into) an analytic judgment. From Kant's 
perspective, this would not simply mean that a non-conceptual predicate had become a 
conceptual predicate; it would mean that a predicate originating with empirical or pure 
intuition had somehow become a pure concept of the understanding.  
 In Chapter 4, I drew on these results as a way of addressing the problems raised in 
Chapter 2. Thus, I showed that if we think of the conceptual constituents of analytic 
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judgments not merely as intensional unities, but as intensional unities that bear an 
intrinsic relation to objects, it is possible to explain why an analytic judgment can rise on 
its own steam to the level of truth: since the concept body is already involved, 
intrinsically, with the corresponding object, it follows that we can generate true 
judgments about those objects on the basis of conceptual analysis. Subsequently, I 
showed that if we foreground the object-relatedness of analytic judgments themselves, 
then it becomes possible to explain why non-subject-predicate judgments cannot be 
analytic: since such judgments necessarily fail to make claims concerning objects, 
according to Kant, such claims necessarily fail to intersect with the analytic-synthetic 
distinction. As for whether Kant's different characterizations of analytic judgment are 
ultimately contradictory, I showed that when we take account of what Kant is tacitly 
assuming about the conceptual constituents of analytic judgments, the appearance of 
contradiction disappears. We discover that when Kant talks about what is 'thought' in a 
concept, he has in mind what is brought to bear necessarily on the representation of a 
given object; and that when he talks about 'containment', he means exactly the same 
thing. This, finally, became a way of settling the status of identical judgments. I showed 
that since objects are not represented in terms of themselves, but in terms of a series of 
partial representations, there is no reason to think that a concept contains itself, thus no 
reason to think that judgments like 'man is man' are analytic.  
 In Chapter 5, I shifted focus to Husserl. I began by outlining two different ways of 
approaching Husserl's distinction between synthetic a priori and analytic law. Following 
the Third Logical Investigation, I showed that we can think of synthetic a priori law as 
law that governs phenomenal content in virtue of the particular kind of content that it is, 
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and that we can think of analytic law as law that governs phenomenal content 
independently of the kind of content that it is. Then, following indications in a variety of 
texts, I showed that we can think of synthetic a priori law as the law that governs the 
phenomenal whole (i.e. the phenomenal unity that is characterized by the "immediate 
bond" between its constituents) and analytic law as the law that governs the phenomenal 
aggregate (i.e. the phenomenal unity that is held together by the "unitary interest" 
directed at its constituents). Subsequently, I showed that analytic law extends also to the 
manifold, meaning the objective correlate of a deductive theory. Having charted the 
domain of ontological analytic law, I then turned toward what Husserl calls apophantic 
analytic law, which is analytic law insofar as it bears on the judgment or proposition. I 
showed that apophantic analytic law is effectively symmetrical with ontological analytic 
law. I argued that this symmetry reflects a more general symmetrical relationship 
between object and judgment. Finally, I turned to what Husserl calls the analytically 
necessary proposition, which is an analytic judgment having material content. Against the 
assumption that the analyticity of any such judgment is to be explained on the basis of 
formal structure alone, I showed that Husserl attributes the analyticity of propositions 
such as 'a king cannot exist without subjects' to a relation of linguistic entailment. After 
showing that no relation of linguistic entailment can be a priori, and hence that 
proposition like 'a king cannot exist without subjects' cannot actually be analytic, in the 
strict sense, I took up a final task—that of clarifying the relationship between conceptual 
analyticity and analysis. I showed that for Husserl, analytic laws are not the products of 
decompositional analysis, but of an analysis that draws out what is necessarily entailed in 
the concepts object and proposition.  
 275 
 In Chapter 6, I took up the relationship between Kant and Husserl on the subject 
of analyticity. Beginning with Husserl's disparate remarks on Kant's conception of 
analytic judgment, I suggested that Husserl fails to see where he stands relative to Kant 
on this matter, and so fails to locate the moment at which their respective theories 
actually diverge. By way of correcting for Husserl's failure in this regard, I suggest that 
what really distinguishes Husserl from Kant is not the claim that analytic truth amounts to 
priori truth of objects. What distinguishes Husserl from Kant, rather, is Husserl's 
contention that our a priori knowledge of objects is properly articulated within an entirely 
formal setting. Whereas for Kant, formal logic articulates the laws of thought only, 
Husserl contends that formal logic articulates the laws of objective givenness. In the 
remainder of the chapter, I show that this initial divergence ramifies in a number of 
theoretically significant directions. I show that it allows Husserl to distinguish between 
analytic law, which is the domain of strictly formal ontological truth, and analytic 
necessity, which is the domain of the material substantially judgments and materially 
substantial judgment-systems that realize formal-ontological truths. I show that this in 
turn motivates a distinction between different kinds of analytic evidence: on the one 
hand, Husserl picks up on and elaborates the Kantian conception of analytic evidence, 
according to which we grasp an analytic truth by grasping a particular representative 
instance; on the other hand, Husserl develops a purely syntactical conception of analytic 
evidence, according to which we grasp a relation of analytic necessity by grasping a 
judgment, or state of affairs at the level of pure form. Finally, I show that this enables 
Husserl to partially rehabilitate the idea of empirical analytic judgment. Whereas it was 
ultimately impossible to make Kant's empirical analytic judgments work, because such 
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judgments are inevitably responsive to the real features of real objects, meaning that such 
judgments are tacitly synthetic, Husserl can make the empirical analytic judgment work 
by interpreting such judgments on the model of the analytically necessary proposition. 
On this model, analyticity is precisely not a function of the necessary features of an 
objective correlate; it is a function just of the formal, syntactical structure of the 
proposition in question.  
 Naturally, there are a number of important tasks that I have been unable to 
undertake here. With respect to Kant, for instance, what is needed is a much clearer 
picture of the domain of analytic truth. Whereas I have confined my attention to a number 
of key examples of analytic judgment, because my concern has to clarify the nature, role, 
and possibility of analytic judgment, it will be necessary in future work to determine 
precisely what kinds of truths can be won from conceptual analysis alone. This will mean 
working through the pure concepts of the understanding; and it will mean working 
through the predicables of the pure concepts of the understanding, meaning the concepts 
that are derived from the pure concepts of the understanding and that populate Kant's 
later writings on the metaphysical foundations of the natural sciences.   
 In the case of Husserl, there is rather less urgency to task of actually describing 
the domain of analytic law. Indeed, since Husserl thinks that formal logic, mathematics, 
and formal geometry are analytic, it might look as if this task is already well underway. 
On the other hand, this very fact poses an important theoretical question—namely, how 
can Husserl defend the uniqueness of analytic law. Given that logic, for example, can 
take different, mutually incompatible forms, how can Husserl justify the claim that some 
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particular iteration of logic is analytic? How can he justify the claim that some particular 
iteration of logic articulates the a priori laws of objective givenness? 
 Another question that arises here concerns Husserl's relationship to his 19th and 
20th century contemporaries on the issue of analyticity. On the one hand, it seems clear 
that in having identified analyticity with logical entailment, Husserl is quite close to 
thinkers such as Bolzano or Frege. One way of looking at the results of this study, 
however, would be say to that Husserl comes to this position from a rather different 
direction than Bolzano or Frege. Rather than simply collapsing the metaphysical 
dimension of analyticity and equating analyticity straightforwardly with a certain kind of 
validity, Husserl gets to this destination by way of a claim about the metaphysical 
significance of analyticity. Following Kant, Husserl identifies analyticity first and 
foremost with a priori objective truth. Having done so, he then comes to the narrower 
understanding of analyticity associated with Bolzano and Frege: he allows that certain 
propositions are valid in virtue of the fact that they instantiate pure analytic laws. 
Charting Husserl's exact course between Kant on side and Bolzano and Frege on the 
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